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INTRODUCTION
British philosopher Herbert Spencer has fallen into such obscurity that his
tremendous popularity among his contemporaries is difficult to believe. Though he was
an “independent scholar” in the truest sense of the word—refusing all institutional
affiliation and almost all public recognition of any kind—he was famous not just among
intellectuals, but among educated readers worldwide. He was, quite possibly, the only
philosopher in history whose books sold more than a million copies during his lifetime.1
Spencer’s work was translated into more than a dozen languages, first into Russian, then
to French, German, Italian, and Spanish, and eventually to Hungarian, Bohemian, Polish,
Dutch, Swedish, Greek, Japanese, Chinese, and possibly even Mohawk.2 For many non‐
Western readers he stood for science, rationality, and progress against backwardness
and mysticism; his anti‐imperialism took some of the sting out of his affirmations of
European superiority.3 Educated men and women all over the world considered Spencer
the master thinker of the age, whether or not they agreed with him.

1

Michael W. Taylor, The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer (London: Continuum, 2007), 4. Taylor
extrapolates based on the nearly 370,000 books sold by his American publisher alone.
2

John Offer, Herbert Spencer and Social Theory (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2010), 8‐9.; Naomi Beck, “The Diffusion of Spencerism and its Political Implications in France
and Italy,” in Herbert Spencer: The Intellectual Legacy, Proceedings of a Conference Organised by the
Galton Institute, London, 2003 (London: The Galton Institute, 2004), 41‐57.
3

J. D. Y. Peel, Herbert Spencer: The Evolution of a Sociologist (New York: Basic Books, 1971), 3.

1
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Spencer wrote on an incredible variety of topics, from physics to metaphysics,
from biology to aesthetics. His greatest work, and the one which cemented his fame,
was his ten‐volume Synthetic Philosophy, which covered all scientific phenomena from
the beginning of the cosmos to its end, embracing biology, psychology, sociology, and
ethics. He also wrote on topics as diverse as style, manners, music, art, health, and
parenting. Yet today his books sit in libraries unread. One brave explorer, reporting that
he was the first to read the Royal Society’s copy of The Principles of Biology, described
the volumes as “thicker and squarer than Gibbon’s, each bound in a cloth which has
acquired with age a reptilian colour and texture, so putting one in mind of some great
extinct monster of philosophic learning.”4 The metaphor is pervasive: in a book on
Spencer’s sociology, J. D. Y. Peel referred to Spencer’s works as “the fossil remains of an
extinct megasaur,” while Richard Hofstadter called them “a fossil specimen from which
the intellectual body of the period may be reconstructed.”5 Spencer’s work no longer
lives for modern readers. However, a study of its petrified remains provides a window
into the intellectual culture of the Victorian era. This is particularly true of the American
scene, for Spencer was more popular in the United States than in his home country,
especially at the beginning of his career.

4
5

P. B. Medawar, The Art of the Soluble (London: Methuen, 1967), 39.

Peel, Herbert Spencer, 4; Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1992 [1944]), 31.
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Spencer and Social Darwinism
Today, if Spencer is known at all, it is as an extreme conservative, the architect
behind the doctrine of social Darwinism. This is particularly true for students of
American history. Since the publication of Richard Hofstadter’s Social Darwinism in
American Thought, it has been a commonplace that the Gilded Age was a time of
intense and savage economic competition in which robber barons used the notion of
the “survival of the fittest” to justify their rapacity and greed.6 Spencer, who coined the
phrase, is more closely associated with social Darwinism than any other thinker,
including Charles Darwin himself. In fact, some scholars have suggested that a more
accurate term would be “social Spencerism.”7 However, since Hofstadter wrote there
has been much scholarly disagreement about the extent of social Darwinism’s influence
in America.8 Furthermore, Spencer scholars do not unanimously agree in considering

6

Taken as a whole, Hofstadter’s view is more nuanced than this; this simply represents a commonly
accepted historical perspective. See Peter J. Bowler, Evolution: The History of an Idea, 25th anniversary
ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 274.
7

Eric Foner, “Introduction,” in Social Darwinism in American Thought (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992),
xix. An early reference to “social Spencerism” is found in Arthur Meier Schlessinger and Morton Gabriel
White, Paths of American Thought (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), 5. See also Carl N. Degler, In Search
of Human Nature: The Decline and Revival of Darwinism in American Social Thought (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1991), 11‐13.
8

For a summary of the argument see Geoffrey M. Hodgson, “Social Darwinism in Anglophone
Academic Journals: A Contribution to the History of the Term,” Journal of Historical Sociology 17, no. 4
(Dec., 2004), 431‐433.
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Spencer a social Darwinist himself.9 Spencer’s popularity in America is not in doubt, so
the question becomes, on what was this popularity founded?
It is my contention that in America, Spencer was known first and foremost as a
philosopher and evolutionist. His political theories were discussed less frequently than
his metaphysical beliefs and his doctrine of evolutionary progress. When they were, it
was almost always his stance on the value and purpose of government that was of
interest. Spencer was clearly a social Darwinist, and repeated his insistence that
allowing natural selection to work improved the human race in many of his books.
Nevertheless, references to this aspect of his thinking were relatively rare in nineteenth‐
century America. Far from demonstrating social Darwinism’s wide acceptance, the
American reception of Spencer reveals a general indifference to naturalistic social
thought. What Americans responded to above all was the philosophical and progressive
side of Spencer, in the shape of the metaphysical, ontological, and scientific ideas
introduced in the first volume of the Synthetic Philosophy, First Principles. Where
political and social doctrines were at issue, it was not dour forecasts of racial doom in
the form of swarming paupers that attracted Americans, but optimistic promises of
continuous social and ethical progress based on rational scientific principles.

9

Mark Francis, Herbert Spencer and the Invention of Modern Life (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2007), 2‐3.; Mark Francis, “Introduction,” in Herbert Spencer: Legacies, eds. Mark Francis and Michael W.
Taylor (London: Routledge, 2015), 9; Offer, Herbert Spencer and Social Theory, 17‐19.
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The Spencerian Philosophy
Spencer’s first published work was on politics and ethics. In The Proper Sphere of
Government (1843) he argued in favor of what is sometimes called the “night‐watchman
state”—a political system whose only function is to protect individuals and their
property from physical harm or theft, and to enforce contracts. In Social Statics (1850)
he grounded these proposals in a theory of individual rights based on what he called
“the law of equal freedom,” which called for personal autonomy limited only by the
rights of others to the same liberty. Spencer made his first arguments for social
Darwinism in Social Statics, almost a decade before Darwin published his Origin of
Species:
Inconvenience, suffering, and death, are the penalties attached by nature to
ignorance, as well as to incompetence—are also the means of remedying these .
. . . Partly by weeding out those of lowest development, and partly by subjecting
those who remain to the never‐ceasing discipline of experience, nature secures
the growth of a race who shall both understand the conditions of existence, and
be able to act up to them.10
However, Social Statics was not all negative. Spencer also tried to develop a scientific
ethics based on the individual’s right to fulfill all his needs and desires, and predicted
the future perfection of man and society.11
Spencer adopted the theory of evolution as a young man. In his next major work,
The Principles of Psychology (1855) he firmly identified the mind with the brain, and

10

Herbert Spencer, Social Statics; Or, the Conditions Essential to Human Happiness Specified, and the
First of them Developed (London: John Chapman, 1850), 378 (hereafter cited as SS).
11

SS 409‐411, 436.
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explained intelligence through evolution, as the accumulation of countless
interconnected experiences from a long line of ancestors, human and animal. Most of
the work, however, was a detailed analysis of the basic operations of subjective
thought. Hard work on the Psychology led Spencer to have a mental breakdown which
left him unable to work for over a year. During this time the idea of evolution grew in
importance for Spencer, and in 1857 he published “Progress: Its Law and Cause” which
argued that “the law of organic progress is the law of all progress.”12 Spencer combined
the nebular hypothesis (which argued that stellar and planetary bodies formed through
the coalescence of finely distributed matter), biology, anthropology, and socio‐cultural
development to argue that all phenomena develop from a relatively homogeneous and
simple state to a heterogeneous, complex state thanks to the law that each individual
force has multiple effects. These ideas formed the core of his evolutionary philosophy.
Inspired, Spencer developed a grand plan to explain evolution’s workings over
the course of ten volumes. His previous books had not been remunerative, so he
devised a method to fund this project: he would solicit subscribers, and publish the
work in sections before combining them in volumes.13 It was this system that came to
be known as The Synthetic Philosophy. Many Americans were among the subscribers,
thanks to the efforts of a few American enthusiasts, most notably author and scientific

12

Herbert Spencer, Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative, vol. 1 (London: Longman, Brown,
Green, Longmans, and Roberts, 1858), 3.
13

The prospectus Spencer worked up can be found in many of his volumes, including his
autobiography. Herbert Spencer, An Autobiography, vol. 2 (London: Williams & Norgate, 1904), 479‐484.
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lecturer E. L. Youmans. Spencer’s American publisher issued a short volume of his essays
on education in 1860, which garnered much American attention. The first volume of the
Synthetic Philosophy, First Principles of a New System of Philosophy (1862), was even
more popular.14 The book began with a statement about the limits of human knowledge
in which Spencer attempted to prove the existence of an Absolute, Infinite Power
underlying phenomena that is impossible to comprehend: the Unknowable. Most of the
book discussed the various aspects of universal evolution, physical, biological, and
social. Spencer developed a definition of evolution, which, after some modification in
the second edition of First Principles (1867), read like this: “Evolution is an integration of
matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an
indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during
which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation.”15 Spencer extrapolated
many sub‐laws from this and gave copious examples of each one in action.
In the next few volumes of the Synthetic Philosophy Spencer summarized current
knowledge of biology (2 volumes), psychology (2 volumes), and sociology (3 volumes),
adding many theories of his own. These works were supposed to illustrate the law of
evolution, and they sometimes did, although much of Spencer’s ordering of phenomena
and hypotheses thereon were not dependent on development from the simple to the

14

The book was not published in America until 1864, but the sections available to subscribers had
attracted attention long before this.
15

Herbert Spencer, First Principles (New York: D. Appleton, 1869), 396.
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complex. In The Principles of Biology (1864, 1867) Spencer adopted Darwin’s theory of
natural selection, coining the phrase “the survival of the fittest” as an alternate
expression.16 However, he argued that another process was also responsible, the
inheritance of characteristics acquired during the life of the parent. The Principles of
Psychology (1870, 1873) expanded his original work into two volumes, including a great
deal of speculation on what today we would call neuroscience. In The Principles of
Sociology (1876, 1883, 1897) Spencer traced the growth of complex modern societies
from simple, primitive social systems, finding the origin of many contemporary
institutions and habits in ancient ones. Spencer compared society to an organism, with
many different organs (division of labor), a nervous system (leadership), and a
circulation system (trade). Generally speaking, Spencer regarded cultural phenomena
like political and religious ceremonies from a functional perspective, as encouraging
organization, cooperation, and steady leadership, all essential in societies subject to the
dangers of war.
Spencer argued that societies are not made, but grow, and can only change
slowly, as the character of the citizen changes. This justified his distaste for the state’s
attempts to “fix things” by regulation. The final volumes of the Synthetic Philosophy, The
Principles of Ethics (1892, 1893) explored this more fully. In his ethical writings Spencer
elaborated on Social Statics, but also developed basic ideas of morality that were

16

Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Biology, vol. 1 (New York: D. Appleton, 1864), 444.
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missing from his earlier work. Spencer’s ideas about justice were still tied to the law of
equal freedom, but in his second volume he discussed charity as well. To Spencer,
justice occurred when each individual experienced the natural consequences of his
actions without interference, whether positive or negative. Charity, or beneficence as
Spencer called it, should be restricted to helping the unfortunate who suffered hardship
through no fault of their own. Spencer’s core social and political values did not change,
nor did his belief that human improvement necessitated suffering.
Social Darwinism as American Mythology
Modern belief in the importance of social Darwinism in the Gilded Age can be
traced back to Richard Hofstadter’s influential book Social Darwinism in American
Thought. Hofstadter wrote as if the term “social Darwinism” were unproblematic; to
him, perhaps, it was, because scholars rarely used the expression before the appearance
of his book. The term originated in France as “Darwinisme sociale” in 1880; it first
appeared in an American academic setting in the mid‐1890s, in reviews of European
works that used the term.17 Only in the context of World War II and the struggle against
fascism did the concept of social Darwinism solidify in the academic community. From
the beginning, usage was almost entirely pejorative.18 The appearance of Hofstadter’s
book did much to promote the use of the term, as well as furthering its association with

17

Robert C. Bannister, Social Darwinism: Science and Myth in Anglo‐American Social Thought
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1979), 3‐4.; Hodgson, “Social Darwinism,” 436.
18

Hodgson, “Social Darwinism,” 445‐446.
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Herbert Spencer, which had been rare before the book appeared in 1944.19 To the
extent that he defined it at all, Hofstadter understood social Darwinism as the
application of Darwinian or other biological theories to social thought.20
While noting that the Darwinian theory of evolution could be used to support a
number of different ideologies, Hofstadter believed that the first to do so in America
were conservative defenders of the status quo, who “wished to reconcile their fellows
to some of the hardships of life and to prevail upon them not to support hasty and ill‐
considered reforms.”21 Hofstadter, perhaps influenced by a streak of political radicalism
nursed by a childhood in the Great Depression, 22 saw America as the perfect breeding
ground for Darwinian ideas:
With its rapid expansion, its exploitative methods, its desperate competition,
and its peremptory rejection of failure, post‐bellum America was like a vast
human caricature of the Darwinian struggle for existence and survival of the
fittest. Successful business entrepreneurs apparently accepted almost by instinct
the Darwinian terminology which seemed to portray the conditions of their
existence.23
However, as Irvin Wyllie pointed out in an influential paper presented at the Annual
Meeting of the American Philosophical Society in 1959, Hofstadter’s citations of actual

19

Hodgson suggests that this was because Social Darwinism was originally associated with
imperialism, to which Spencer was adamantly opposed. Ibid., 447.
20

Hofstadter, Social Darwinism, 4‐5; Bannister, Myth of Social Darwinism, 5.

21

Hofstadter, Social Darwinism, 5. For Darwinism as value neutral see p. 201.

22

For Hofstadter’s background and its influence on his thought see Foner, “Introduction,” x‐xiv.

23

Hofstadter, Social Darwinism, 44.
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businessmen were rather few.24 Wyllie’s thorough reading of statements made by
Gilded Age businessmen suggested that they were not well educated enough to be
comfortable with the new evolutionary ideas. Typically, businessmen credited
traditional values such as industry, frugality, and good character as crucial to their
success, rather than intelligence, ruthlessness, or some other variety of innate fitness.25
Some of the scholarly debate about social Darwinism’s role in America and in the
thought of Herbert Spencer results from a disagreement about the meaning of the
expression itself. In Social Darwinism: Science and Myth in Anglo‐American Social
Thought, Robert Bannister expanded Wylie’s argument to include intellectuals as well.
Bannister found that few Gilded Age writers actually cited Darwin or used phrases such
as “survival of the fittest” or “struggle for existence” to bolster their social theories.
Instead, the invocation of a Darwinian social order was typically a strategy used by
critics of laissez‐faire conservatism to demonize their opponents.26 However, many
scholars have criticized Bannister’s definition by key phrase or citation as too narrow.27
For example, in Social Darwinism in European and American Thought, 1860‐1945, Mike

24

Irvin G. Wyllie, “Social Darwinism and the Businessman,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical
Society 103, no. 5 (1959), 632.
25

Ibid., 630‐634.

26

Bannister, Social Darwinism, xvi‐xviii, 9‐12, 110‐114.

27

Bannister, xvii, recognizes this criticism but states that he is simply using the definition implied by
those who began the use of the term.

12
Hawkins proposed a broader definition of social Darwinism based on concepts rather
than phrases. According to Hawkins, social Darwinists assumed the following:
(i) biological laws govern the whole of organic nature, including humans; (ii) the
pressure of population growth on resources generates a struggle for existence among
organisms; (iii) physical and mental traits conferring an advantage on their possessors in
this struggle (or in sexual competition) can, through inheritance, spread through the
population; (iv) the cumulative effects of selection and inheritance over time account
for the emergence of new species and the elimination of others. These are essentially
the tenets of biological evolutionism; but Hawkins added a fifth assumption to social
Darwinism, the belief that biology also rules the social existence of human beings and
conditions psychological or cultural domains like religion and morality.28
A problem that both of types of definition share is that Darwin’s work did not
appear out of thin air, but grew from a large body of pre‐existing evolutionary thought,
much of it non‐scientific.29 For example, Darwin gained a key insight into his theory of
natural selection from a famous work of classical economics, Thomas Malthus’s Essay on
the Principle of Population.30 Ideas about the necessity of struggle are as least as old as
Adam Smith (whom Darwin also read); the idea that the poor perish because they are

28

Mike Hawkins, Social Darwinism in European and American Thought, 1860‐1945: Nature as Model
and Nature as Threat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 31.
29

Michael Ruse, Monad to Man: The Concept of Progress in Evolutionary Biology (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1996), 82.
30

Bowler, Evolution, 161‐162
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unfit or unworthy existed before Darwin as well.31 To put it simply, social Darwinism as
most people understand it was not a product of Darwin’s thought alone. In many cases
Darwinian biological models simply reinforced currently existing habits of thought.32
Thus concepts that can be considered Darwinian, such as population pressure on
resources or life as a competitive struggle, may be shared with older belief systems.
Furthermore, Darwin was not a strict Darwinist in the modern sense of the word.33 The
definition of Darwinism has changed over time; in scholarly usage it is synonymous with
the theory of natural selection that is Darwin’s main claim to fame, while historically it
was often used to refer to evolutionary thinking in general, whatever the mechanism
that drove it forward.34 Darwin himself believed that the inheritance of acquired
characteristics also played a role in species change.
For present purposes, Darwinism will be used in its modern sense; the older idea
will simply be called evolutionism (which, it should be noted, encompasses more than
just biological evolution). Social Darwinism will be defined as a theory that “transposed

31

For a non‐analytical but informative history of unfitness see Elof Axel Carlson, The Unfit: A History of
a Bad Idea (Cold Spring Harbor, N.Y.: Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press, 2001).
32

Gregory Claeys, “The ‘Survival of the Fittest’ and the Origins of Social Darwinism,” Journal of the
History of Ideas 61, no. 2 (Apr., 2000), 223‐224.
33
34

Bowler, Evolution, 179.

Michael Ruse, “Darwinism,” in Keywords in Evolutionary Biology, eds. Evelyn Fox Keller and Elisabeth
A. Lloyd (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 74‐80. As Spencer’s onetime assistant William
Henry Hudson wrote, “in the common speech of the day the word Darwinism is almost invariably
employed as if it were absolutely synonymous with the word evolution…” William Henry Hudson, An
Introduction to the Philosophy of Herbert Spencer: With a Biographical Sketch, 2nd ed. (London:
Routledge/Thoemmes Press, 1996 [1897]), 55.
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the Darwinian ‘struggle for survival’ from the animal kingdom into the social sphere, and
held that the evolution of society depended upon the operation of the law of natural
selection of favourable heritable variants, a process best secured by allowing unfettered
laissez‐faire.”35 This definition, like Bannister’s, preserves a conservative meaning and
strict ties to natural selection without ruling out statements that do not use Darwin’s
name or contain specific phrases. The definition can be further simplified: social
Darwinism is the belief that natural selection should be allowed to operate within and
between societies in order to improve the human race. As we will see, Spencer was
clearly a social Darwinist in this sense, though his thought was too nuanced for the label
to be applied without some qualification.
Studying Spencer’s American Reception
This study is premised on the idea that Spencer’s texts had multiple possible
interpretations for American readers. Since Roland Barthes announced “the death of the
author” students of literature have felt free to ignore writers’ supposedly singular,
conscious intentions and explore a medley of possible meanings for literary texts.36 I
wish to extend this privilege to works of non‐fiction, namely, Spencer’s writings. It is
true that some texts are more “open” to multiple interpretations than others, which are

35

Michael W. Taylor, Men versus the State: Herbert Spencer and Late Victorian Individualism (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1992), 71‐72.
36

Roland Barthes, “The Death of the Author,” in Image‐Music‐Text, trans. Stephen Heath (1977: Hill
and Wang, 1977), 142‐148. For a classic rejection of authorial intent see W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe
Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy,” in The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry (Lexington:
University of Kentucky Press, 1948), 3‐18.
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more “closed” and straightforward.37 However even relatively closed texts like works of
non‐fiction can be understood differently by different readers. The variance is often
slight, but in writings as complex as those of Spencer, readings can diverge enough to
result in interpretations which are noticeably dissimilar.
Not that Spencer’s intended meaning can be completely ignored. Knowledge of
an author’s purpose is one restraint or perspective on individual interpretation; as an
“author‐function,” awareness of which can affect the sense of the text for the knowing
reader.38 However, even if a reader could know the writer’s intention perfectly, this
would not completely control the text, because writers do not always say what they
intend to say. Once Spencer’s works were finished he had limited influence over how
they would be decoded and appropriated—although Spencer, more than most authors,
attempted to combat what he considered “misrepresentation” by critics. Envisioning
meaning in this fashion ultimately puts the burden on the reader rather than the
writer—after all, a book only “signifies” for particular readers at particular times.
Whether this is freeing or frustrating for an interpreter is a matter of personal
disposition.39 A work can be understood not as an object but as an event, endlessly

37

For “open” and “closed” texts see Umberto Eco, The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the Semitics
of Texts (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979), 47‐66.
38

Michel Foucault, “What is an Author?” in Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post‐Sturcturalist
Criticism, ed. Josue V. Harari, trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1979), 141‐160.
39

John Maynard, Literary Intention, Literary Interpretation, and Readers (Peterborough, Ont.:
Broadview Press, 2009), 3, 25.
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repeated with each reading but never in the same way twice.40 Spencer was read, and
sometimes re‐read, but these readings were separate events that led to a variety of
understandings.
Two of the most important elements accounting for differences in interpretation
were the reader’s system of beliefs and values, and their style of reading. Religious faith
was the most important determiner of attitudes towards Spencer in his nineteenth‐
century audience, whether orthodox or flexible, conservative or liberal, active or
passive, strong or weak. A second important factor was how the reader understood
science and its value. In his work, Spencer positioned himself as both a philosopher and
a man of science, who was interested in facts, not faith. Sometimes his writing made it
explicitly clear that he was not a Christian, and he could be highly intolerant of what he
saw as Christian hypocrisy. Thus beliefs about science and religion greatly influenced the
attitude Spencer’s audience adopted towards the work, whether positive, questioning,
critical, or dismissive. The way reading was done was also important. Spencer was
perused, scanned, browsed, examined, and studied. Each individual reader came away
with a picture of what Spencer had written whose comprehensiveness largely depended
on how much time was spent with a book. Both of these elements combined to
determine what readers found memorable about Spencer’s work, which could be a turn
of phrase, a line or two, an argument, a theory, or something larger and more vague. To

40

Hans Robert Jauss, Toward an Aesthetic of Reception, trans. Timothy Bahti (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1982), 32.
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put it simply, what a reader absorbed from one of Spencer’s books varied in amount
based on reading style, and in content based on beliefs and interests.
Obviously, there are great difficulties in the way of turning such a theory of
reception into the practice of analyzing particular readings of Spencer. Determining
what the average reader thought is problematic, because records of these opinions
either do not exist or are buried deep in archives and family collections, in diaries and
letters. “The dead do not speak very openly or extensively about their reading acts,” as
James Machor writes.41 There is one accessible source for multiple readings of Spencer,
however: reviews of his books. These are primarily found in periodicals of the period,
though occasionally newspapers ran substantial critiques as well. Reviewers were
different than ordinary readers in a number of ways: they were usually better educated
than much of their audience, and they often had a limited time to read the book.
However, there are advantages to looking at critics as well. The space they had available
to discuss a particular text was restricted, making selectivity necessary and thus making
it easy to see what they thought most vital. More importantly, their roles put them in a
position to influence readers. Critical reaction reveals not just what the writers thought,
but also what messages they sent to their audience. To put it more generally, it is
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important to remember that periodicals are constructive of culture as well as reflective
of it.42
Discussion of Spencer’s work appeared in a variety of periodicals, from the
general interest magazines that covered everything from politics to art to the scholarly
quarterly reviews. Religious publications took a particular interest in Spencer; these
ranged from quarterlies aimed at clergymen and educated laymen to popular weeklies
in newspaper format. Many “secular” periodicals were religious in tone and might even
be associated with a particular denomination. Likewise, many “religious” magazines had
a great deal of secular content. Interest in science was general in the nineteenth century
and many publications of both varieties had departments for scientific news or at least
printed the occasional scientific article. There was no sharp division between “serious”
science and that published in mainstream periodicals for most of the nineteenth
century.43
The years before the Civil War have been called “the golden age of periodicals”
in America.44 During this period, the cylinder press and other technological advances
combined with the growth of the literate population to encourage a “veritable magazine
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tsunami.”45 There were less than 100 in 1825, while about 600 were published in 1850.46
The short lifespan of periodicals during this period (two years was about average)
implies that four to five thousand may have existed at one time or another during these
antebellum decades, many of which have left no trace of their existence.47 The
emergence of a railway network into the West encouraged broad distribution of
magazines, and a number of general interest publications with comparatively large
circulations, such as The Atlantic Monthly, Harper’s Monthly, and Putnam’s Monthly
appeared in the decade before the Civil War.48 Harper’s and Putnam’s were associated
with the publishing houses of the same name, and served to promote and retail literary
material.49 It was a profitable arrangement and other publishers soon followed,
resulting in Scribner’s Monthly, Appletons’ Journal, Potter’s American Monthly and the
like. By the time of the Civil War, when Spencer began to attract serious notice in
America, there were many points from which his views could be reshaped and
rebroadcast.
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Let me summarize several points on my methodology. First, only the most
important of the periodicals and newspapers can be covered with any regularity here. In
theory this means those with the largest circulations (like Harper’s Monthly) and those
with the most influence (like the North American Review). In practice it has meant
whatever can be found in text‐searchable digital format. Typically the two categories
overlap, although exceptions have been made for important periodicals like Popular
Science Monthly and the National Quarterly Review. Second, I have paid attention to the
use of Spencer’s name outside of review articles as well. This includes casual references
and articles that are not reviews of any particular book, but discuss Spencer’s ideas
either in a general sense or as part of a topical argument. Important books that discuss
Spencer’s theories are also included in this study. It is important to remember that for
every reference in the most important publications there were hundreds of similar ones
in smaller, local magazines and papers—and also many singular, idiosyncratic takes on
Spencer that are lost to history. Third, the presentation is chronological, for several
reasons. Chronological order vividly reveals changes in Spencer’s reputation over time.
Equally important, most studies of Spencer divide his work by topic, making it difficult to
see how his views evolved, and reinforcing the belief that his later books were simply
written to prove an ideology preserved from his youth.
One aim of this work is to understand Spencer and his philosophy in a complex
and nuanced way. Social Darwinsim was only a small part of Spencer’s thought. In fact,
emphasizing such statements, though necessary, has a distorting effect. Contemporaries
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of Spencer were not necessarily primed to notice such utterances or, if they did, to give
them the interpretation a modern reader might. Before the term “social Darwinism”
was coined, the concept existed as a set of ideas which only gradually coalesced and
came into focus. One might say that the idea of social Darwinism evolved, in a broad,
Spencerian sense, from an inchoate mass into an orderly set of distinct concepts
connected in a particular fashion. As this occurred, Americans became more aware of
the Darwinistic aspect of Spencer’s beliefs about the poor and unfortunate. Even so,
Spencer’s religious ideas and his doctrine of evolution were much more widely
discussed in America during his lifetime than any other factor of his thought. Americans
knew Spencer as a philosopher and scientific thinker first and foremost. It was in these
arenas that reactions to his work played out.

CHAPTER ONE
HERBERT SPENCER’S EARLY LIFE AND WRITINGS
The past is a lost continent whose inhabitants can only be known through the
texts they leave behind—messages in bottles to which there is no possibility of reply.
Among these texts are those which purport to narrate the writer’s life—poems, diaries,
autobiographical fiction, and autobiographies. These fascinating yet fragmentary,
narratives often tell the reader as much about how the writer wanted to be
remembered as they do about his actual life and personality. Certainly this is the case
with Herbert Spencer’s massive An Autobiography, and to a certain extent also true of
his authorized Life and Letters, written by onetime assistant David Duncan. To insure his
posthumous privacy, Spencer gathered most of his correspondence for these works, and
stipulated their destruction upon publication. A few letters escaped the general
conflagration; comments by his contemporaries also give clues. But for the most part,
what we know of Spencer is what he and his biographer wanted us to know.
No autobiography is wholly trustworthy. While complete objectivity is not to be
expected in any text, the autobiography is especially slippery in this regard because the
materials of its construction are human memories. Further, autobiographies are often
written as much for the writer as for the reader. Spencer’s autobiography is no
exception. Spencer called it “a natural history of myself,” implying an objective,
22
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scientific perspective.1 He believed that autobiography could avoid the factual errors
and mistaken interpretations to which biography was prey.2 The author of his Life and
Letters, David Duncan disagreed, writing “to say nothing of the limitations of memory,
the mere assumption of the attitude of narrator of one’s own life is unfavourable to
correct representation.”3
Students of Spencer have taken a range of positions on An Autobiography. Some
are uncritical; others argue that it is at least in part a consciously fabricated work.
According to Michael Taylor, “its primary purpose [was] to ensure that the image he
sedulously cultivated during his own lifetime would persist beyond the grave: that of a
world‐famous philosophical genius who had spun his system from his unaided brain as a
spider spins his web.”4 Mark Francis, on the other hand, saw the Autobiography was a
warning to future readers about the dangers of repressed emotions.5 While there is an
element of truth to both claims, some of the features that strike the modern reader as
odd—especially the often detached quality of the work—were endemic to the genre of
autobiography in the Victorian period. Spencer’s Autobiography may have been one of
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the most extreme examples of Victorian tendencies (it was certainly one of the longest)
but it is at least partially explicable via these expectations.6
The Victorian era witnessed an efflorescence of autobiographies. By the end of
the period it was de rigeuer for a major writer to produce some sort of autobiographical
work, whether non‐fictional, fictional, or poetic.7 What caused the newly felt need to
leave a literary epitaph? Many Victorians undoubtedly lost faith in a literal resurrection;
“self‐authorship” may have provided a substitute in an “authorless world.”8 The
Romanic Movement made such emphasis on the self more acceptable.9 However,
where the Romantic writer idealized unleashed individual potential, the Victorian
tempered this with the notion that progress was only possible through responsibility
and productivity.10 Victorian autobiographers were expected to be sincere while
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concealing personal details and the elements of their interior lives not relevant to their
public positions and ideas.11 If they did discuss mental development it was primarily to
explain their public engagement, which for professional writers meant explaining the
origins of their works.12 For the Victorians, there was a “strong sanction against self‐
revelation” in an autobiography—it was not a means of self‐expression but a public
document.13
Spencer generally conformed to these expectations in An Autobiography. The
development of his character and beliefs concerned him most—external events were
important for the man of action, but internal events were the key to the man of
thought.14 He was mainly focused on the sources of his ideas and intellectual
tendencies. For example, like John Stuart Mill, Spencer included few details about his
mother in his autobiography, because unlike his father, she was not an intellectual
companion to him.15 Nor did he discuss his personal relationship with either parent. As
Duncan put it, Spencer “shrank from parading the more attractive and lovable aspects
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of his character—thus permitting an apparent justification for the opinion that he was
‘all brains and no heart.’”16 After all, a natural history of the self required observation,
not sentiment. Personal revelation was low on Spencer’s list of priorities, while tracing
his development as a thinker was high.
Spencer’s focus on his intellectual trajectory led to two major distortions. First,
he engaged in “Whig history.” He believed that the seeds of his later thought were
latent in his earlier work, which led him to exaggerate the importance of some of his
early ideas while downplaying others. Mostly this manifested itself as a tendency to
identify evolutionary thought in material written before his ideas about universal
evolution had been formed. For example, Spencer considered his first book, Social
Statics, to contain an evolutionary argument about humanity’s gradual adjustment to
the social state.17 But not all change over time is evolution, even by Spencer’s broad
definitions. Second, Spencer was obsessed about his own originality. This led him to
focus on those elements of his personality that made him an original thinker while
downplaying the role of reading and discussion in the development of his ideas.
Spencer’s extremely sensitivity about his debts to Auguste Comte is only the most
conspicuous of numerous examples.18 By taking these distortions into account, it is
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possible to reach a view of Spencer’s intellectual development that is more balanced
than the vision of an untutored genius he himself offered.
A Child of Nature Tamed: Spencer’s Youth
While most autobiographers discuss their families to demonstrate their status or
explain the conditions of their childhood, Spencer had an additional goal. He believed
that mental characteristics are in large part inherited, not just developed through
personal experiences. Thus the tendencies of his ancestors could explain much about his
personality.19 He thought that his disrespect for traditional ways of thinking was derived
from the religious dissenters found on both sides of his family tree. His mother’s
ancestors were Bohemian Hussite refugees to France who later became French
Huguenot refugees to England. The family eventually turned to Methodism and several
became Wesleyan preachers.20 His father’s side was also Methodist and included some
of Wesley’s earliest followers.21 Spencer believed that religious nonconformity in his
family translated into his personal mental nonconformity.
Spencer did not credit his ancestors for his intellectual gifts, however. He did not
consider any of his grandparents intellectually superior, but those he knew best (his
paternal grandparents) he praised for their fine moral qualities, good temper, and
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conscientiousness.22 The same focus on moral characteristics such as sympathy and
gratitude characterized Spencer’s treatment of his father’s siblings, with the exception
of one brother and sister he considered self‐serving and egotistic.23 Simply put, in these
passages Spencer gave primacy to character over intellect, though he did not explicitly
claim to have inherited any of this moral superiority. Spencer also noted that his uncles
were, as Duncan put it, “characterized by individuality almost amounting to eccentricity,
by pugnacious tenacity in holding to their opinions, by self‐assertiveness and by
disregard for authority,” all of which qualities their nephew inherited with interest.24
Spencer’s description of his father fell just short of hero worship. William George
Spencer was a teacher, like his father before him.25 He also had some investment
capital, putting him solidly in the ranks of the respectable middle class. He was an
imposing man, 6 feet tall, with a good walk and a serious demeanor.26 He took the
family nonconformity seriously, and would never take off his hat for anyone or address
them by a title other than “Mr.”27 In fact, Herbert Spencer considered himself inferior to
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his father, save for certain intellectual abilities.28 George Spencer’s biggest flaw was his
impatience with his wife Harriet, who was sweet, self‐sacrificing, and guileless. In a rare
display of emotional honesty, the son wrote of his mother:
The familiar truth that we fail properly to value the good things we have, and
duly appreciate them only when they are gone, is here well illustrated. She was
never sufficiently prized. Among those aspects of life which in old age incline the
thoughts towards pessimism, a conspicuous one is the disproportioning of
rewards to merits. Speaking broadly, the world may be divided into those who
deserve little and get much and those who deserve much and get little. My
mother belonged to the last class; and it is a source of unceasing regret with me
that I did not do more to prevent her inclusion in this class.29
More than one scholar has blamed a difficult home environment for Spencer’s
emotional detachment.30 However, little evidence suggests that Spencer was mistreated
by his parents or that his childhood was anything other than happy. Spencer wrote that
“irritability and depression checked that geniality of behavior which fosters the
affections and brings out in children the higher traits of nature.”31 Yet he still admired
his father, wrote frequently, and visited home often as an adult. He believed that his
moral and intellectual traits were inherited from his father and not his mother.32
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Herbert Spencer was born on April 27, 1820, little more than a year after his
parents’ marriage. His place of birth was Derby, a small but thriving industrial town in
England’s Midlands. Spencer was, in effect, an only child: he had four brothers and four
sisters but all died in infancy except his younger sister Louisa, who died aged two.
Spencer scarcely mentions these siblings, nor does he discuss his own feelings or those
of his parents regarding them, except to say that “it was one of my misfortunes to have
no brothers, and a still greater misfortune to have no sisters.”33 He was not baptized,
nor was a name decided upon, until about half a year after his birth. His father’s disdain
for convention was demonstrated by his disapproval of the ritual used in Church
baptism and of naming children after their relatives or ancestors.34
Spencer was sickly as a child—or at least his parents thought he was. Anxiety
over children was no less common in the late Georgian period than today; in fact, given
that around a third of children died before the age of 10 throughout most of the
nineteenth century, parental anxiety was probably significantly worse.35 As a result,
Spencer was kept out of school because his father felt he could not bear school
discipline. Instead, like Hawthorne’s Pearl, he was a child of nature, allowed to wander
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through the gorse bushes and bluebell‐filled meadows near home. Neither parent made
any serious attempt to educate him. As a result, he scarcely knew his letters at age five
and did not learn to read well until he was seven years old.36 Such parental pampering
was merely an extreme form of a parenting style encouraged by magazines and manuals
in the late Georgian and early Victorian age. In this vision of the family, parents guided
their children by friendship, encouragement, and example rather than through anger,
passion, and punishment. Rational explanation and persuasion took the place of
command and control.37 George Spencer played this role in the classroom as well as at
home.38
Some of Spencer’s adult qualities made their first appearances in his youth. He
developed a love of nature, and his father encouraged him to make drawings of his
entomological discoveries.39 Natural history was a British national obsession during
much of the nineteenth century, and collecting and preserving specimens was a hobby
shared by many.40 From his childhood Spencer also dated his respect for personal
freedom (which manifested itself as a dislike of bullies), his aversion to rote learning,
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and his rich interior life, or as he put it, a tendency for “castle building.”41 On the subject
of learning by rote, Spencer wrote “The mere authoritative statement that so‐and‐so is
so‐and‐so, made without evidence or intelligible reason, seems to have been from the
outset constitutionally repugnant to me.”42 As he grew older, Spencer began to read
widely. His father received various periodicals, from medical journals like the Lancet to
general interest weeklies like Chambers’s Edinburgh Journal, and young Spencer read in
these haphazardly.43 His expositor William Henry Hudson contrasts his upbringing to
John Stuart Mill’s: “Mill’s mind was forced as in a hot‐house; Spencer’s was allowed to
develop in the open air with the least possible pressure from without.”44 Spencer
learned by absorption rather than by application, a habit he carried over to his
adulthood. He also learned to think for himself about the causes of things, a predilection
he credited to his father’s tutelage in his autobiography.45
Spencer was a not an obedient child, and he admitted as much. In his
autobiography he acknowledged the grief his disobedience caused his parents. He also
noted that he was not punished as other children were, but simply scolded, which had
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little effect on him at that age.46 In 1833, soon after he turned thirteen, his parents
arrived at a solution to both his behavior problems and his desultory education. They
agreed to board and educate the son of his uncle Henry, while sending young Herbert to
be educated by another uncle, Thomas, an Anglican clergyman. Such arrangements
were not uncommon, especially if the purpose was educational. Visiting was an
important part of middle‐class family life in nineteenth‐century Britain, and on average
ten percent of the adult residents of a household were family members staying for
extended periods.47 However, Spencer was not informed of the arrangement. Instead,
on the pretext of taking a midsummer vacation, the whole family spent a month with
Thomas Spencer and his wife Anna at Hinton, close to Bath. Herbert was surprised to
learn that rather than chasing butterflies, he was to spend the month studying Euclid.
He was even more surprised at the end of the month when his parents left for home
without him.
As Spencer put it in his Autobiography “I had never before been under anything
like so strong a control.”48 He was also homesick, as an undated letter from father to
uncle makes clear.49 One morning he woke at six and with nothing more than a couple
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of shillings in his pocket began to walk home. He completed his journey three days later,
having walked one hundred and fifteen miles with very little food and water.50 Letters
from his father and mother to his aunt and uncle show just how emotionally
overwrought young Spencer was after his ordeal.51 However, in his Autobiography
Spencer merely comments that the physical strain must have had a permanent effect on
his system, resulting in “a falling short of ultimate perfection of structure.”52 In a few
weeks, when he was judged to have recovered, his parents took Spencer back to his
aunt and uncle’s house.53
Spencer learned to cope with life away from his parents’ house, and later
considered the three years he spent at Hinton profitable. He had a tendency to laziness
and lack of self‐direction, and would not apply himself unless pushed, especially when it
came to subjects he disliked, such as Latin.54 As a result, he never learned much Latin or
Greek, his French was inadequate, and he knew no German. However he worked
harder at geometry and mathematics, and learned what he could of the physical
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sciences.55 Spencer also noted in his autobiography that there were moral benefits to
his aunt and uncle’s tutelage:
It was better to be under a control which I no doubt resented, but to which I had
to conform, than to be under a control which prompted resistance because
resistance was frequently successful. The best results would have been achieved
by one who had my father’s higher ideal along with my uncle’s stronger will.56
Far from feeling that his spirit had been broken, Spencer thought he owed his aunt and
uncle thanks for making such an effort with “intractable material—an individuality too
stiff to be easily moulded.”57 Duncan remarked that it was this individuality which
allowed him to hold his own against the constant flow of advice and moral suasion to
which he was subject.58
It was during his stay with his uncle and aunt that Spencer wrote his first
published articles. Thomas Spencer was a writer of “tracts” or small pamphlets on
religious, political, and social issues. These were sixteen pages long and sold for two
pence; eventually he published almost two dozen, most of which sold between ten and
twenty thousand copies.59 During Herbert’s stay, Thomas was working on the proofs for
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some of these, and asked his nephew to check them for typographical errors (it is a
measure of his self‐confidence and lack of reticence that he critiqued his uncle’s style as
well.)60 Herbert was inspired by this, and when a small local periodical invited his uncle
to contribute material, young Spencer secretly sent in a letter himself. “Crystallization”
duly appeared in The Bath and West of England Magazine; it described the results of an
experiment in crystallizing salt through evaporation. Upon seeing his letter in print, with
the initials “H. S.” below, the fifteen‐year‐old Spencer “began shouting and capering
around the room until my uncle and aunt did not know what was amiss…”61 Spencer had
discovered the joys of authorship. Reading in that same issue a short article in support
of poor laws, he quickly wrote a letter in reply, which was published in its turn.62
Though Spencer did not learn much of languages, history, or literature while
staying with his aunt and uncle, his years there were very valuable in other ways. His
grasp of mathematics and geometry would serve him well in the next stage of his life.
He learned how to write carefully and well by imitating his uncle. Most importantly,
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Thomas Spencer instilled the self‐discipline and work ethic that made his nephew’s
voluminous writings possible. Thankfully, this did not come at the price of repressing
young Spencer’s intellectual independence. His impatience with received authority
combined with brash self‐confidence led him to constantly seek new explanations for
the phenomena around him.
“My Miscellaneous Life”: Early Adulthood
Spencer “graduated” from his uncle’s tutelage in 1836. Now sixteen years old, he
was uncertain about what profession to pursue. His father provided little guidance,
other than to suggest that Spencer try teaching. At that time, children of the middle
classes were often given space to experiment with various occupations before marriage
necessitated settling on a respectable career.63 Spencer became an assistant to his
childhood teacher for a short while, but a boom in rail building soon provided him with
another career opportunity. The London and Birmingham Railway was under
construction, and one section of track was under the care of a former pupil of his
father’s, Charles Fox (later famous as the designer of the Crystal Palace). Fox had formed
a favorable opinion of young Spencer during a visit to the Spencer household; but as
Spencer modestly noted, “friendship for my father was, I suspect, the chief motive for
offering me the appointment.”64 Family connections gave Spencer a start in life, and
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would serve him well at several crucial junctures in the future.65 However, hard work
and ability were the ultimate keys to success. Spencer proved himself a model
employee: sober, hard‐working, and intelligent—though something of a know‐it‐all,
unafraid to critique even the work of his superiors.66 By 1838, he was in charge of
drawing up plans for new railway stations and supervising eighty laborers.
Spencer decided to quit engineering in 1841, despite his success. He returned to
his parents’ home in Derby with his modest savings. In An Autobiography he wrote that
engineering was a “loss of time” as far as his future progress was concerned, and he
seems to have had a similar intuition as a young man.67 He had greater ambitions, which
at that point meant a career as an inventor, for Spencer had gotten into the habit of
daydreaming about patents and the wealth that potentially flowed from them.68 His
father was working on an “electro‐magnetic engine” and father and son corresponded
about this for some time.69 Bringing this project to fruition was a major reason for the
younger Spencer’s abandonment of engineering. However, after his return to Derby,
research in scientific magazines convinced him that electro‐magnetism would never be
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as efficient as steam power.70 After this disappointment he worked on various projects,
a young man at loose ends whose “constitutional idleness” made it difficult to work
without some large goal in mind.71 At one point he thought of founding a weekly paper
called The Philosopher.72 Another moment found him working on a system of shorthand
devised by his father, with a view towards publication.73 He read Thomas Carlyle’s Sartor
Resartus and a section or two of John Stuart Mill’s System of Logic.74 He enjoyed Ralph
Waldo Emerson, but put down Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason mostly unread because he
disagreed with its fundamental principles.75 He sculpted a creditable bust of his uncle
Thomas, and even suffered from “the verse‐making disorder” for a brief period, later
commenting “no one should write verse if he can help it.”76 Spencer also continued to
dream of taking out a patent. He invented a machine to make printing type by
compression rather than casting, and a “cephalograph” to make accurate phrenological
measurements.77
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Writing also found its place in this mishmash of activities. During his stint as an
engineer, Spencer published several short articles on technical subjects such as viaducts
and arches. Most of these proposed new methods of performing common engineering
and surveying tasks, or described improved tools and instruments.78 He published a few
more articles in 1842. One of them, “On Architectural Precedent,” was a short stab at
those architects who reworked classical designs—in typical fashion Spencer argued for
abstract principles of beauty and fitness to purpose.79 In a follow‐up letter in the next
issue, Spencer complained about the British system of classical education, which
produced men “infected with the admiration for martial glory” who knew “little or
nothing of the grandeur of modern science...of the gigantic mass of knowledge collected
by the philosophers of the present day.”80 The articles show Spencer’s distaste for
intellectual conservatism and militarism, and his vast respect for modern science.
During this period Spencer’s became directly involved in political activities, not
surprising for a young man with ideals and time on his hands. He became honorary
secretary of the Derby branch of the Complete Suffrage Union, founded by anti‐slavery
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activist and Quaker Joseph Sturge in 1841.81 The Union was intended as a bridge
between radical, working‐class Chartism and the middle‐class Anti‐Corn Law League. It
called for an extension of suffrage partly based on the belief that the alternative was
revolution in the French style.82 Spencer wrote a number of articles on the social and
political turmoil of the day for a weekly paper, The Nonconformist, whose publisher
Edward Miall was a close ally of Sturge.83 Perhaps copying the style of other writers for
the Nonconformist (whose slogan was “The Dissidence of Dissent and the Protestantism
of the Protestant Religion”84), Spencer indulged in some extended exhibitions of purple
prose. “The framework of legal regulations, within which the soul of freedom lies
encaged, is everywhere being cracked and shivered‐‐its timbers giving way before the
irresistible expansion of its occupant,” Spencer wrote, and
The buoyant spirit of independence can never more be repressed; and we defy
all the legislators that either are or have been in the world, with all their cunning
and sagacity, their wily statesmanship and subtle policy, their regulations and
enactments, their soldiers and police, and the multitudinous appliances of state
manœuvring, to subdue its now rising power, to refetter it with the shackles of
aristocracy, or to crush it beneath the stern heel of despotism.85
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The only way to stop social dissolution was to give justice to the people, Spencer
advised.
Letters from the period show that his more conservative friends were concerned
about his future prospects if he continued his radicalism.86 They had little reason to
worry. Spencer’s political phase did not last long. As David Wiltshire puts it, “his
enthusiasm, though genuine, was consolidated by no long‐term temperamental or
intellectual commitment.”87 Such enthusiasm was not often found in his later works,
though he occasionally summoned up the fire of his younger days in his more polemical
writing. The importance of Spencer’s period of political involvement lies not in what it
augured for his future work but in how it demonstrates his youthful uncertainty. He did
not have fully formed political and social opinions when he left home. On the contrary,
he explored possible social and political stances just as he explored different
professions: teacher, engineer, inventor, and writer. Ultimately he chose a less
emotional and direct approach to politics. This was augured in a set of articles he wrote
for The Nonconformist in 1842, a numbered series of eleven letters which he
republished (at his own expense) the following year as a pamphlet entitled “The Proper
Sphere of Government.”88 These letters put logical argument above rhetorical
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flourishes, and rested on basic principles rather than emotional language. They began a
trajectory that let to Spencer’s first book, Social Statics, eight years later.
In 1843 Spencer left Derby for London “in the hope of finding something to
do.”89 By that point he had become interested in writing as a career. However, he had
no luck finding literary work, and his pamphlet sold only 100 copies in the first year of its
release, which, at four pence apiece, meant a vanishingly small return on an investment
of over £10.90 Spencer looked for an engineering position, but found nothing long
term.91 For a short time he worked for The Pilot, a weekly newspaper published for the
Complete Suffrage Union of Birmingham.92 However, he was not a firm enough Christian
to suit the proprietor.93 Spencer lost his religious beliefs gradually during his young
adulthood—so gradually that he was later unable to pinpoint exactly when he ceased
being a Christian. In his autobiography he cited a number of factors, from his dislike of
learning hymns to his growing appreciation for natural law.94
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Another reason Spencer left The Pilot was a new boom in railway construction.
Experienced engineers were in great demand by the end of 1844, and so Spencer spent
the next two years of his life on one railroad project or another. As was true of his first
period of engineering, the work left him little time for writing anything but letters to
friends and family. The “railway mania” was in full swing, and Spencer kept busy. During
this period his employment varied widely; he did surveying work, drew up plans,
assisted in getting those plans approved by Parliament, walked the course of the track
with a level to check its grades, and eventually supervised an office with twenty
assistants.95 However, rampant speculation turned the railway boom into a railway
bubble, which inevitably popped. Not only was Spencer left without a job, but he was
required to testify when his erstwhile employer sued various railway companies for
promised remuneration.
Fortunately, Spencer had some financial resources—his supervisory position had
paid him £24 per week, a not inconsiderable sum. His financial position gave him the
wherewithal to enter another of those periods of Derby idleness that punctuated his
young life. Once again, he determined to pursue the life of an inventor. His ideas ranged
from the ambitious (a flying machine, quickly abandoned) to the mundane (a “binding
pin” to hold the pages of a newspaper together during reading).96 The latter was his only
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successful patent, and was profitable enough to offset the losses he incurred in
researching and seeking patents on other inventions. Though he now had time to write,
Spencer did not produce much during this period of his life—only two short articles
from 1845 to 1847. One was an attack on state education, once again railing against
aristocratic greed and dishonesty.97 Another, reprinted in his autobiography, was strictly
scientific in nature.98 Spencer always had a diverse array of interests; political theory
and natural history were two of the biggest.
In 1848, a new phase of Spencer’s life began when he became employed as a
sub‐editor on an Anti‐Corn Law journal, The Economist. Looking back, Spencer
considered his life beforehand “miscellaneous and rather futile,” though it did give him
experience and time to increase his knowledge.99 Of course, this is the kind of judgment
that could only be made in hindsight—at the time, he did not know that he was not
destined to become an engineer or an inventor. Also, Spencer did some significant
writing in this period, all in the form of articles for newspapers and journals. This forced
him to develop and articulate ideas that were of vast importance to his later thought.
These articles demonstrate how early Spencer developed some of the convictions of his
mature thought, but also make clear that some of these ideas were in flux. Spencer’s
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young adulthood may not have added up to much financially or professionally, but it
was a vastly important time for his intellectual development.
Seeking the Laws of Life: Early Social and Political Writing
Numerous Spencer scholars have argued that Spencer’s mature political
philosophy was an explication and defense of attitudes he absorbed in his youth. As one
writer put it, “Herbert Spencer’s theory of natural and social evolution emerged out of,
and scientifically rationalized, a set of previously formed socio‐political principles.”100
While family opinion and cultural environment certainly had an impact, they were not
the source of all of Spencer’s ideas. An examination of Thomas Spencer’s tracts, which
scholars have largely ignored, provides some insight into Spencer’s adoption of familial
attitudes. However, it should not be forgotten that Herbert received some of his
education from his father, and learned much from listening to the conversations of his
father with his uncles or with other visitors.101
Unsurprisingly, Herbert Spencer’s 1843 letter on poor laws owed much to the
ideas of his uncle. Thomas Spencer felt that poor laws corrupted the morals of the
people and encouraged idleness, not an uncommon attitude among the middle classes
at the time. He wrote, “All experience goes to prove that by far the greater part of the
poverty incident to human nature, is the result of idle, dissolute, and improvident
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conduct; and they who, by their injudicious treatment, encourage such conduct, are the
poor man’s enemies, and not his friends.”102 Similarly, his nephew argued that “there is
a natural tendency in human nature to lean upon any support that may be afforded”
and that the administration of the New Poor Law demonstrated that many supposedly
infirm people would readily work when the alternative was the workhouse.103 On the
cause of poverty in Ireland they were both in agreement—whisky.104 Herbert Spencer
also quoted scripture, though not as freely as his uncle, who talked about the “depravity
of human nature” in Biblical terms and believed that “the destitution of age is generally
the consequence of idleness, vice, and improvidence in early life, and that the Divine
Being intended that is should be so.”105 One major difference was that Thomas Spencer
spoke from years of personal experience administering relief funds locally and in Bath,
so his work was dotted with anecdotal evidence. His nephew would later use his uncle’s
experience with the New Poor Law, which eliminated most relief outside of workhouses,
as evidence for his own views about poverty.
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Thomas Spencer espoused very conservative opinions about charity, but he was
liberal in many other ways. He supported the abolition of the Corn Laws because they
raised the price of food for the working class, and also on the general principle that
landlord and laborer have no right to legislate against each other.106 He preached in
favor of international peace and free trade. He believed in the extension of the suffrage
to the lower classes, and in government reform generally.107 Yet intermingled with the
progressive was the regressive, sometimes stated in terms the modern reader cannot
help but find shocking from a man of the cloth. He defended child labor, approving of
children being sent to work in the fields when eight or nine years old, and wrote that
such children could attend school in the evening, which would seem like recreation after
a long day’s work.108 He argued against a ten hour day, and complained of government
that “in its pity it has dismissed women from collieries and children from factories,
where they earned their own living.”109 He considered labor a commodity, believed that
those who were underpaid should simply emigrate elsewhere, and wrote that “A
labourer has to let, not the strength of a horse, but the strength of a man, which, being

106

Thomas Spencer, “The Prayer Book Opposed to the Corn Laws” (London: John Green and Bath:
Samuel Gibbs, 1843), 7.
107

In fact Thomas Spencer included the Declaration of Independence in his pamphlet on “The People’s
Rights: And How to Get Them” (London: Charles Gilpin and Bath: Samuel Gibbs, 1844).
108

Thomas Spencer, “Reasons for a Poor Law Considered: Part II” (London: John Green, Bath: Samuel
Gibbs, 1843).
109

Thomas Spencer, “Evils of Undue Legislative Interference,” London: Charles Gilpin, and Bath:
Samuel Gibbs, 1848 [Dated Nov 25, 1848; first printed May 15, 1848], 16.

49
less than that of a horse, is let for less price…”110 After his uncle’s death in 1853, Herbert
Spencer wrote of him:
The uniform success which attended him throughout the whole of his life until
within the last few years, and the consciousness that this success was due to his
own intelligence, energy, and uprightness, had generated in him the belief that
good conduct would, in all cases, insure prosperity, and this led him to pass
somewhat severe judgments on the unsuccessful. His intimate knowledge of
pauperism, which he saw to be in nearly all cases traceable to idleness and vice,
confirmed him in this view.111
Despite the implicit tone of reproach, Herbert Spencer certainly acquired his uncle’s
habit of tactlessly passing “severe judgments on the unsuccessful.” His books contain
passages of great hope and optimism—but also passages of astonishing cruelty.
While Herbert Spencer agreed with many of his uncle’s social positions, some
important differences developed. Political and social involvement was a lifelong
commitment for Thomas Spencer. By contrast, Herbert dropped his direct involvement
in causes while still young. He gradually stopped referring to a Creator or Deity. Most
importantly, he based his social view on a very different foundation than his uncle.
Where Thomas Spencer used religion as the basis for his views, Herbert Spencer slowly
came to feel that he needed some other justification. He came to the conclusion that
the natural laws of the universe dictate human social arrangements. This belief
developed over a long period—in 1850 he was still citing God’s will as warrant for his
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basic axioms of social life—but ultimately it led Herbert Spencer to new moral theories
as well as modifying some older ones. For example, both men strongly believed that
individuals must bear personal responsibility for their actions. Both agreed that those
who acted foolishly should suffer the consequences and those who acted providently
should not be denied the full rewards. But Herbert’s belief in inevitable social evolution
absolved him and his readers of direct responsibility, while personal involvement in
reform movements was a way of life for Thomas. Furthermore, social progress implied a
better future, perhaps even a perfect one, an idea foreign to Thomas Spencer’s religious
worldview.
The move from God’s law to natural law had already begun by 1842, when
Spencer wrote his most substantial early work, the letters collected as “The Proper
Sphere of Government.” These discussed a variety of subjects, from poor laws to state
subsidized religion to education. For the first time Spencer based his arguments on a
single principle: that government’s sole purpose is to defend man’s natural rights—”in a
word, to administer justice.”112 Following Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean‐Jacques
Rousseau, Spencer wrote that early government developed out of man’s need to
protect himself and resolve disputes with his fellows.113 But rather than understanding
government as an abstract “social contract,” he argued that the laws that govern society
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are of the same kind as those that govern the rest of nature, from inorganic matter to
living things. In fact, Spencer already had vague ideas about “the laws of the social
organism,” foreshadowing his later use of organic analogies in discussions of human
society.114 Much as with Adam Smith’s laws of the marketplace—and Spencer owed
much to Smith—the laws of society tend to keep things in balance. Social ills generally
rectify themselves without the interference of political powers. In fact, because of this
self‐regulating tendency legislation often does more harm than good: “as the
interference of man in external nature often destroys the just balance, and produces
greater evils than those to be remedied, so that attempt to regulate all the actions of a
community by legislation, will entail little else but misery and confusion.”115 In short, a
government’s sole job should be to protect rights by ensuring justice, and attempting
anything else would do more harm than good.
Most of “The Proper Sphere of Government” explored the consequences of
these basic ideas. Not surprisingly, Spencer applied them first to the Corn Laws, the
established church, and the Poor Law, echoing his Uncle Thomas’ interest in the same
subjects. However, though he reused many arguments both he and his uncle previously
made, the underlying logic was different. Spencer continued to assert that no person
“whose wickedness or improvidence has brought him to want” can claim a right to
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relief.116 But the basis for this conclusion was no longer common sense or the Bible, but
a developing idea that rights are based on freedom from interference rather than on
positive entitlements. The transition from scriptural sanction to abstract principle let
Spencer in some new directions. He argued that even the victims of misfortune have no
natural right to the property of others.117 He also proposed that man’s “natural birth‐
right—the charter given to him at his creation” is “a subsistence derived from the
soil.”118 In other words, men have no basic right to food and shelter, but they do have
the right to work for their own support. Spencer’s concept of rights in “The Proper
Sphere of Government” was not fully formed—he did not explain their basis nor
enumerate them, but simply adopted the natural rights theories of other sources,
including the Declaration of Independence. He did not develop his theory of rights fully
until his first book, Social Statics, published in 1850.
“The Proper Sphere of Government” was an early work, and contained many of
Spencer’s political ideas in chrysalis.119 For example, he showed a strong dislike for war,
violence, and the aristocracy he considered responsible for them. Armed conflict,
Spencer wrote, is an atavism of the feudal spirit which takes man’s energy away from
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industry, commerce, science and the arts. Without war the nobility would be exposed as
“mere drones in the hive, and long since would they have ceased to glory in their
shame.”120 In another article from this period, Spencer declared:
Religious freedom will never be secured until mankind shall be wholly governed
by moral power. Every resort to brute force—every exhibition of violence,
however good may be the cause which begets it, will delay the advent of this
happy era, and each friend of humanity must grieve over every such check to our
progress.121
However, at this period he was still content to refer to Christianity—and beating swords
into plowshares—as the main warrant for this conclusion. Likewise, he condemned state
support for colonial ventures on the grounds voluntary settlers unprotected by the
military might of the mother country would be more likely to respect the rights of “the
aborigines.” “Our colonial history, to our shame be it spoken, is full of the injustice and
cruelty, to which the original possessors of the soil have been subjected,” Spencer
wrote, and gave myriad examples.122 Yet again, he was content to appeal to moral
feeling and Christian values rather than to any rationally developed principle.
Spencer wedded his belief in the laws of nature to a vision of nature as
harmonic, beneficent, and progressive. Allowing society to operate naturally brought
the most efficiency because nature itself was efficient. Efficiency let to happiness, and
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ultimately to a higher development. “The grand and irresistible law of human existence,
is progressive improvement,” Spencer wrote.123 Thus allowing social development to
take its natural course might seem unkind at times, but would lead to greater happiness
for future generations.124 Far from repeating the shibboleths of his youth, Spencer
advanced an idea of secular progress that was foreign to the Christian worldview of his
Uncle Thomas.125
Science and Pseudo‐Science: Early Scientific Writing
One of Spencer’s first published articles dealt with social problems; the other
concerned physical science. The first led to a series of articles, then a book. The second
also bore fruit, though at first its produce was somewhat meager. These can be divided
into two classes. The first was a pair of articles on the prehistoric period, on of
paleontology and one on geology. The former, originally published in The Philosophical
Magazine in February, 1844, argued that the proportion of plant to animal life was
higher in the past, and thus the atmosphere contained less oxygen.126 Greater oxygen
has enabled “superior orders of beings”—warm blooded birds and mammals—to
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develop. Spencer saw this as a gradual change, pointing to geological data as a warrant
for his deduction, but he also used the word “creation” several times, blunting any
evolutionary implications.127 The Philosophical Magazine published another article of
Spencer’s three years later, “The Form of the Earth No Proof of Original Fluidity.” This
article, whose title summarizes its argument, is less interesting from a modern
perspective.128
Besides these scientific articles Spencer wrote articles of another class, on
phrenological theory. While phrenology is considered a pseudo‐science today, in the
nineteenth century many people believed it had scientific legitimacy. The theory was
invented in Germany by Franz Joseph Gall at the end of the eighteenth century, and
popularized in part by his disciple Johann Gaspar Spurzheim. In 1931 Spurzheim gave a
series of lectures on the subject at the Derby Philosophical Society, which the eleven‐
year‐old Spencer attended with his father.129 Spencer became a convert, and remained
one for several decades. Phrenologists thought that the brain was divided into many
“organs,” and that the personality of the individual was dependent on the size of these
organs. They believed that the shape of the skull corresponded to the shape of the brain
within. Thus by consulting a chart which showed the function of each organ, the
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phrenologist predict various personality traits, including intelligence, by the shape of the
head and by slight protrusions in the skull—bumps. The ability to “read heads” was one
of the features of phrenology that made it a very popular science and later the element
that attracted the most scorn. Yet the most basic phrenological beliefs—that the brain is
the organ of the mind, and that specific regions of the brain account for different mental
functions—are basic assumptions of modern neuroscience.130 These were ideas Spencer
kept long after he lost interest in the specifics of head shape and cranial capacity.
In the 1840s many scientifically minded people accepted phrenology as a
valuable though controversial advance in human knowledge. Phrenologists made grand
claims, boasting that their “science” provided certain knowledge of man’s inner
workings, since humans were a part of the natural world and could be understood like
any other natural phenomenon.131 Large numbers of doctors and other men of science
supported phrenology, especially those who were young and not yet professionally
established. In phrenology they found a new realm of knowledge that challenged the
orthodoxies of established authorities and offered a “shortcut” to scientific prestige.132
Phrenological doctrines also threatened inherited power and wealth by providing a test
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of mental talents and deficiencies that took no account of rank or position.133 Spencer
was young, scientifically minded, independent, and not fixed in a career—exactly the
kind of person phrenology attracted.134
Spencer was taken enough with phrenology to write three articles on the
subject. Originally he submitted them to the Edinburgh Phrenological Journal, founded
by leading phrenologist George Combe, but they were rejected.135 This may explain why
Spencer never cited Combe’s enormously popular book The Constitution of Man
Considered in Relation to External Objects, though some scholars argue that he owed a
lot to Combe, especially with regard to his ideas about the mental faculties.136 Spencer
found another journal to publish his work, The Zoist. The Zoist became one of the more
important and long lasting phrenological journals, but it was in its infancy when it
printed Spencer’s work. It was founded by John Elliotson, onetime Chair of Medicine at
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University College in London, after he was forced to resign because of his support for
another controversial new science, mesmerism.137
Each of Spencer’s articles considered a particular organ of the brain as
delineated in a phrenological chart, and suggested that the characteristic located there
should be changed. In the first, he argued that the organ of benevolence was really an
organ of “sensitiveness” used to experience pleasure and pain.138 Since this organ was
located next to the organ of Imitation, whose root is sympathy, Spencer determined
that interaction between the two explained benevolence: that is, sympathy for
someone in distress causes pain in the organ of sensitiveness, thus leading to a
benevolent act to relieve the pain. Ultimately, Spencer argued, this “evolution of kind
and compassionate feeling” will be secondary to the organs’ functions in a more morally
developed race: “the direct multiplication of happiness.”139 The connection between
sensitivity and concern for others was something Spencer had imbibed from Adam
Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments.140 It would reappear in one form or another
throughout his writings, as would his faith in the future moral development and
happiness of humanity.
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In the second article, Spencer suggested moving the function of Amativeness (or
“sexual instinct”) from the cerebellum elsewhere, as the cerebellum was a separate
structure while Amativeness itself was not distinct from the other mental powers.141 In
the third essay, he renamed the organ of “Wonder” “Reviviscence” and argued that it
was the basis of imagination and memory.142 Spencer expressed confidence that
observation would bear out his new theories.143 The editor of the journal disagreed. In a
short rebuttal to Spencer’s second article he cited many examples of relationship
between sexual feeling and size of the cerebellum, as well as appealing to the authority
of Gall on the matter.144 Spencer began his third article with a disclaimer:
By way of apology for opposing a received phrenological doctrine, it may be
urged that considering the comparatively short time that has elapsed since the
discovery of a true system of mental philosophy, it is extremely improbable that
the details of that system should be all of them, or nearly all of them, correct.145
Sciences need time to develop, Spencer argued. Eventually the mental powers would be
defined in simple, easily comprehensible and exact ways. Spencer was confident in the
future and in his own ability to correcting scientific problems and discover new truths.
However, Phrenologists were not eager to discard the work of Gall and Spurzheim and
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revise their charts. This hidebound attitude was one of the reasons Spencer lost interest
in phrenology.
Spencer’s phrenological articles reflect his habits of thought in another way: by
their use of a priori argumentation. Spencer often reached his conclusions by beginning
with axiomatic principles and deducing their consequences. He typically listed many
examples to justify his hypotheses, but they were just that—examples, and not points of
data from which a general law was derived through induction.146 Of course, conclusions
reached in this way are only as strong as the principles they are based on. Spencer’s
theories were laid on a foundation of basic phrenological concepts; for example, the law
that mental organs with similar functions are found next to each other and effect each
other.147 Today’s neuroscience is based on different principles, making these articles
completely unconvincing. Actually they stopped being relevant for Spencer himself
when he gave up phrenology, and he never had them reprinted, though he included
some of his other obscure early essays in An Autobiography.
However, all Spencer’s early work is useful to the extent that it reveals Spencer’s
character, methods, and sources. Spencer’s brash confidence (bordering on arrogance)
has already been noted. The breadth of his interests, too, is fairly obvious; it is
interesting to see how easily these can be segregated into the socio‐political and the
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purely scientific. Some of Spencer’s core ideas, which he held throughout his life, clearly
belong to his young manhood. His ideas about poverty, work, and responsibility bear
clear similarity to those of his uncle Thomas. But by his early 20s Spencer was
developing ideas about progress and human development that were foreign to the
religion of his father and uncle. And though he learned from his father to look for
natural rather than supernatural causes of physical phenomena, he was developing a
rationalism and devotion to scientific explanation that was all his own. Of course,
science meant something different to Spencer than it does today, because it included a
priori deduction as well as induction based on observation and experiment. The
distinction was never clearer than in Spencer’s first book, Social Statics, which he
understood as a scientific exploration of politics and morality.148
“The Moral Euclid”: Social Statics
In 1847 Spencer was nearing the end of his 20s and still not settled into a career.
With the decline of railway mania, engineering work was scarce, while literary work was
nowhere to be found. Spencer thought of founding a school, and even considered
immigrating to New Zealand.149 Fortunately his uncle Thomas came to the rescue once
again, with a letter of introduction to James Wilson, the new owner of The Economist.150
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Once an organ of the Anti‐Corn Law League, the publication was a money‐losing
proposition until Wilson bought it and turned it into a respected economic journal.
Thanks to his letter of introduction, Spencer was able to show Wilson The Proper Sphere
of Government. Wilson was a dedicated adherent of free trade and laissez‐faire
principles, and he approved. He asked Spencer if he would be interested in an editing
position should one open up. Five months passed, during which Spencer wrote several
more political articles unfriendly to the aristocratic class and supporting the extension of
suffrage.151 At last, at the end of 1848, Spencer was offered a position as sub‐editor of
The Economist.
Spencer’s new position was ideal because it gave him plenty of time to write. He
could usually get his work done in the morning, relax during the afternoon, and write in
the evening.152 Spencer also found a new set of influences, for The Economist had a
laissez‐faire philosophy of economics that suited him well. Besides James Wilson
himself, Spencer came into contact with several important economic thinkers, most
notably co‐editor Thomas Hodgskin, whose ideas greatly influenced his first book.153
Hodgskin, twenty years Spencer’s senior, was an anarchist libertarian who supported
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both free trade and trade unions, and looked forward to a cooperative future society.154
Precise details about his influence are hard to pin down since Spencer never admitted to
them, but Hodgskin may have contributed arguments against utilitarianism and ideas
about private land ownership.155 He must also have encouraged Spencer’s ideas about
future human cooperation.
Spencer used his writing time to work on a book, an expansion of his earlier work
on government. He felt that his political ideas were flawed because there was no
common ethical justification for them. There must be some basis for moral behavior
besides Christian revelation, which Spencer no longer put much faith in. “I already felt,
in a vague way, that there must be a basis for morals in the nature of things—in the
relations between the individual and the surrounding world, and in the social relations
of men to one another,” Spencer later wrote.156 Several years earlier Spencer had
remarked to a friend that the “moral Euclid” had yet to be written, a statement that
caused great mirth.157 Now he began to think seriously about combining his politics and
his science into a unified whole. With Social Statics, Spencer hoped to develop “a strictly
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scientific morality.”158 Not a few scholars have seen this as an attempt to ground the
values of his youth as set down in The Proper Sphere of Government in a scientific (or
more accurately, rationalistic) epistemology.159 This is fair to a certain extent. Spencer
certainly did not abandon any of the political positions he adopted in his earlier work.
Nevertheless, some surprising and original ideas appeared in Social Statics, many of
which were deduced from primary principles rather than simply justified by them.
Spencer’s book was more than an attempt to rationalize “ideas he had already adopted
by instinct and absorption from his uncle.”160
The title Spencer chose for his book caused him some grief later in his career.
After rejecting titles such as “Demostatics” and “A System of Social and Political
Morality” he accepted a suggestion of Hodgskin’s and called the book Social Statics (the
subtitle was The Conditions Essential to Human Happiness Specified, and the First of
Them Developed).161 This was unfortunate, because as Spencer later learned, “Social
Statics” was the name of a division of Auguste Comte’s sociology.162 The notion that he
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was deeply indebted to Comte would dog Spencer for the rest of his days for a variety of
reasons, and using one of Comte’s terms for his first book certainly did not help
Spencer’s case, no matter how inadvertent it might have been.
Social Statics opened with an attack on Utilitarianism, which Spencer referred to
as “the expedience‐philosophy.”163 This doctrine, first developed by Jeremy Bentham,
classified moral actions as those which lead to the greatest good for the greatest
number.164 Utilitarians argued that there is no transcendental moral law which makes
particular actions “right” or “wrong” regardless of their consequences. Spencer
proposed to find such a moral law, but on the basis of science rather than religion. A
true moral law, Spencer contended, cannot be based on a theory of the greatest good,
because the definition of “greatest good” and “greatest happiness” varies from culture
to culture and even from person to person.165 And even if it was possible to know what
the greatest happiness is, human judgment alone would be incapable of determining
how to achieve it.166 That being so, the idea that government must exist to ensure
greatest happiness is ludicrous, a conclusion that suited Spencer’s dislike of government
interference well.167
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Next, Spencer laid the foundations for his own theory of morals. Paradoxically,
one of the tenets of Utilitarianism was central to this new system: the desirability of the
greatest happiness for all. Spencer came to this conclusion via two paths. The first was
the doctrine of the moral sense, thanks to which a “moral law of society” could be
derived from an “instinct of right.”168 Spencer did not believe that the moral sense alone
was a good guide to right behavior, since people from different cultures believed
different things about right and wrong.169 But he argued that the moral sense could
“originate a moral axiom, from which reason may develope [sic] a systematic
morality.”170 This was the desirability of greatest happiness. Spencer argued that this
conclusion was also the basic idea of religion: “human happiness is the Divine will.”171
Again, he explained that reason could build on this basic truth: “The realization of the
Divine Idea being reduced to the fulfilment of certain conditions, it becomes the office
of a scientific morality, to make a detailed statement of the mode in which life must be
regulated so as to conform to them. On each of these axiomatic truths it must be
possible to build a series of theorems immediately bearing upon our daily conduct...”172
The greatest happiness principle, whether derived from the moral sense or from the
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Deity, was not a rule of thumb for judging actions but a goal, which from which rational
analysis could derive unassailable moral laws.
Spencer later wrote that his use of Deistic terms in Social Statics was not
necessary for the argument.173 In fact, his religious faith had been waning since his late
teens, and he had already lost one friend because of it.174 So why then did he use
religious language so often? When his father questioned him on this subject, Spencer
replied that “some words to signify the ultimate essence, or principle or cause of things,
I was obliged to use, and thinking the current ones as good as any others, I thought best
to use them rather than cause needless opposition.”175 However, despite his attempt to
downplay it, Spencer could not escape from metaphysics, for the desirability of the
greatest happiness principle had to rest on something. If it was not the intention of the
Creator, than it was a moral sense for which Spencer had no rational explanation as yet.
Spencer’s desire to be scientific clashed with the traditional, value‐laden way he
grounded his theories.176 He had not yet fully enunciated his basic belief in natural laws,
“one that regarded them as regulative principles of a well‐ordered cosmos” beneficial to
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man.177 In a universe ruled by beneficent laws, surely man’s greatest happiness would
be the ultimate goal.
But what is happiness? Spencer fell back on his phrenological studies to answer
this question: “happiness signifies a gratified state of all the faculties. The gratification
of a faculty is produced by its exercise. To be agreeable that exercise must be
proportionate to the power of the faculty” and therefore perfect happiness is exercising
all of the faculties precisely in proportion to their power. The idea that happiness comes
from exercise of the faculties can be found in Combe’s The Constitution of Man.178
Another of Combe’s ideas was that failure to obey moral law inevitably brought pain, or
as Spencer explained it, evil resulted from “want of congruity between the faculties and
their spheres of action,” which given the above definition meant unhappiness.179
This understanding of happiness led Spencer to the centerpiece of Social Statics,
what he called “The Law of Equal Freedom.”180 In order to be happy, Spencer wrote, an
individual had to exercise his faculties to their fullest extent. To do so he needed
freedom from constraints. But to ensure the greatest happiness for all, each must
restrict his freedom so as not to interfere with the freedom of others. Thus the law,
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which Spencer stated in various ways, but whose clearest definition is this: “Every man
has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any
other man.”181 Spencer’s concept of rights was weak in “The Proper Sphere of
Government,” but the Law of Equal Freedom gave him a basis from which to derive a
series of more specific rights.182 It also gave him a clearer definition of justice—
protecting the individual from infringement. This stance justified Spencer’s belief that
the state should be restricted to enforcing justice in order to avoid infringing freedoms
unnecessarily.
Spencer contended that to know whether an action is right or wrong simply
requires determining whether it infringed on someone else’s freedom to pursue
happiness (though he admitted that this was not always easy to do.)183 Rights he derived
as “corollaries, or specifications, of the principle of equal freedom.”184 Whatever was
necessary for a person to exercise his faculties, and did not interfere with another’s
ability, Spencer considered a right.185 According to Spencer, the rights to life and liberty
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were self‐evident.186 Others were less obvious. For example, Spencer believed in the
right to own property, but only concerning those things a person produced or improved
himself.187 Natural things, he argued, belonged to all, and thus no one could legitimately
own land, though they might “rent it” from society as a whole since each other person
had the freedom to do likewise.188 For similar reasons Spencer defended the right to
free speech and free exchange, for neither action kept another from exercising a similar
right.
The logical implications of making The Law of Equal Freedom the basis for all
morality led Spencer to some conclusions that startled many readers of his day and
age.189 For one, he declared that women should have all of the rights of men. It is
absurd, Spencer wrote, to believe that women should have only a portion of the rights
of men, for how could one determine the ratio, or where exactly their rights are
circumscribed?190 For Spencer, such a conclusion followed necessarily from a theory of
scientifically derived moral laws. Two sets of scientific principles could not be operative
for two parts of the human race. But Spencer also argued that women were the
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intellectual equals of men, and gave a number of examples.191 He applied the same logic
to the rights of children, who, as he pointed out, have faculties which needed exercise
just like adults.192 A civilization’s level of advancement, Spencer wrote, could be judged
by its treatment of women and children.193
Spencer also came to some radical conclusions about the role of government. He
had already concluded, in his essays on “The Proper Sphere of Government,” that
government should be limited to carrying out justice, that is, to punishing violations of
rights. Now he had a rationale in the moral law. If the government exceeded its bounds,
not only would the protection of citizens suffer, but it would restrict people’s freedoms,
either positively by controlling speech, religion, commerce, and religion, or negatively by
taking away one man’s property to provide for others. Here Spencer covered some of
the same ground as his earlier essays, but he also went farther. He contended that
government should not concern itself with sanitation, for if problems arose people
would help themselves, and if they could not, then perhaps it was part of nature’s plan
that they die of disease.194 He lobbied against a national currency and postal system.
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And from the Law of Equal Freedom he deduced a “right to ignore the state” and choose
“a condition of voluntary outlawry,” much as Thoreau did in “Civil Disobedience.”195
Spencer knew many of his ideas would seem radical, or perhaps ludicrous, to his
readers.196 But he had an explanation ready to hand: such absolute and stringent moral
laws could only be followed by perfect men. Since humanity was far from perfect,
disobedience to the laws could be expected. This did not mean that the disobedient
would escape the consequences of their actions, however. Spencer believed that
denying the faculties or exercising them too much would inevitably cause pain;
furthermore, those who interfered with the rights of others were maladapted which
meant unhappiness even without the threat of punishment by the state.197
Disobedience was inevitable, but disobedience brought pain—therefore unhappiness
was inevitable.198
Nevertheless, Spencer was optimistic, because he believed that “progress...is not
an accident, but a necessity.”199 He reasoned that organisms always adapt to their
environment, both physically and mentally, and the environment of modern man was
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society.200 Human beings were not yet perfectly adapted because we still had
characteristics left over from the days when aggression was necessary for survival.201
But natural law said humanity was slowly adapting to new conditions, and Spencer saw
evidence for this in history, especially in the history of European countries.202 For
Spencer, this was a crucial reason to avoid government meddling—because it interfered
with adaptation when people did not suffer the consequences of their maladaptation.203
“Inconvenience, suffering, and death, are the penalties attached by nature to ignorance,
as well as to incompetence—are also the means of remedying these,” Spencer wrote.204
Pain taught individuals to take care of themselves, while pleasure taught them which
faculties could be safely gratified to the fullest and which could not.205 Eventually,
through this process, the faculties of all human beings must become balanced. Faculties
that could only be exercised at the expense of others would atrophy to nothingness
when they were no longer needed, while those that are helpful to the self and society
must grow larger. With no need to enforce justice any more, the state itself would
wither away:
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To the bad it is essential; to the good, not. It is the check which national
wickedness makes to itself and exists only to the same degree. Its continuance is
proof of still‐existing barbarism. What a cage is to the wild beast, law is to the
selfish man. Restraint is for the savage, the rapacious, the violent; not for the
just, the gentle, the benevolent.206
Spencer’s anti‐government stance now had not just a practical but a philosophical basis,
in a vision of a future utopia where man was perfectly adjusted to coexist with man.
This gave Spencer’s moral system a circular nature. Reason showed the perfect
moral law should be followed, must be followed, and the process of adaptation meant
that it was inevitable that it would be followed. There was a suspicious concurrence
between what should be and what, by Spencer’s reasoning, would inevitably come to
pass. However, Spencer saw no conflict because he believed the laws of the universe
were beneficent.207 Though he did not make such a conception of laws central to his
thesis, the idea was lurking behind the scenes, ready to emerge as a justification as soon
as Spencer’s Theism faded completely. This idea of an ordered, progressive, and
beneficent universe would become a touchstone for Spencer in his later work.
This beneficence was in pursuit of an ultimate goal, however, and it meant that
humankind had to pay a price. In the future might come lofty heights, for “our advance
must be towards a state in which this entire satisfaction of every desire, or perfect
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fulfilment of individual life, becomes possible.”208 In the present, “the forces which are
working out the great scheme of perfect happiness, taking no account of incidental
suffering” must necessarily act through pain and death to diminish irresponsible
behavior.209 Social Statics was at times inspiring and visionary, but just as often Spencer
was harshly pitiless about the realities of his day. Spencer believed poverty was the
result of idleness and improvidence, and argued “were there no drunkenness, no
extravagance, no reckless multiplication, social miseries would be trivial.”210 Thus those
who supported poor laws were like physicians who allowed a patient to die because
operating would cause pain:
That rigorous necessity which, when allowed to act on them, becomes so sharp a
spur to the lazy, and so strong a bridle to the random, these paupers’ friends
would repeal, because of the wailings it here and there produces. Blind to the
fact, that under the natural order of things society is constantly excreting its
unhealthy, imbecile, slow, vacillating, faithless members, these unthinking,
though well‐meaning, men advocate an interference which not only stops the
purifying process, but even increases the vitiation‐‐absolutely encourages the
multiplication of the reckless and incompetent by offering them an unfailing
provision, and discourages the multiplication of the competent and provident by
heightening the prospective difficulty of maintaining a family.211
Passages like these, found in several places in Social Statics, were primarily responsible
for Spencer’s later reputation as a social Darwinist.
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Two strands of thought that run throughout Social Statics mitigate the harshness
of this stance. First, Spencer argued only that the natural consequences of physical and
mental weakness and incapacity should be allowed to operate. Spencer had no desire to
see the strong dominate the weak, which is why he proposed that the state must
dedicate itself to opposing injustice. He despised the use of force, and considered even
the punishment of criminals “remedial measures for a diseased moral state.”212
“Unquestionably war is immoral” he wrote, “but so likewise is the violence used in the
execution of justice; so is all coercion.”213 In marriage, Spencer wrote, “command is a
blight to the affections” and presciently noted that “even as we loathe those barbarian
manners which forbid a woman to sit at table with her lord and master, so may mankind
one day loathe that subserviency of wife to husband, which existing laws enjoin.”214
Spencer was also an avowed anti‐imperialist, and argued that metropolitan rule was not
good for colonists and especially not good for aboriginal populations.215 Though he held
Europeans to be mentally superior to other races, he insisted that “morality knows
nothing of geographical boundaries, or distinctions of race” and that all should be
treated as if they were neighbors.216

212

SS, 113.

213

SS, 269.

214

SS, 165, 163.

215

SS, 364, 367‐370.

216

SS, 297‐298.

77
Secondly, Spencer believed that concern for the happiness of others was
necessary for perfect happiness to be achieved. Not only would men’s full
understanding of their rights make them fully respectful of the rights of others, but also
their happiness would increase if those around them were happy, thus ensuring good
behavior.217 Spencer called this desire to help others “positive beneficence,” and termed
the desire not to annoy or irritate others “negative beneficence.”218 Thus personal acts
of charity, though they slowed the development integral to the natural order of things,
more than made up the balance by increasing the positive qualities of the giver—a
benefit that is not supplied by anonymous government supported relief.219 Though the
idea of beneficence did soften Spencer’s moralizing somewhat, it must be noted that
Spencer rarely referred to this concept in Social Statics. As the subtitle made clear, the
book was only supposed to develop the first of the conditions of human happiness—
justice. References to beneficence were so infrequent that a reader could easily miss
them, or at the very least fail to incorporate them into a lasting impression of the book.
The passages on the necessity of suffering for progress were also scattered, but longer
and much more striking. Spencer did suggest that a book on beneficence might
follow.220 And it did, but only much later, as part of his massive Synthetic Philosophy.
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Spencer’s Intellectual Milieu
Social Statics marked Spencer’s entrance into London intellectual and literary
society. It was widely reviewed and elicited positive critical notice. In his Autobiography
Spencer claimed that it was the best reviewed of all of his books.221 The positive
comments must have been gratifying, since his publisher, John Chapman, required
Spencer to shoulder the burden of any unpaid publishing costs.222 Spencer met
Chapman a few years prior, and had become part of a literary circle centered on the
Chapman household at 142 Strand (very near The Economist’s offices).223 The success of
Social Statics cemented his place at Chapman’s soirees, as well as garnering him a small
measure of public recognition. He became a topic of conversation at Cambridge, was
asked several times for his autograph, and was even compared to John Stuart Mill.224 At
Chapman’s gatherings Spencer met a number of young but well‐regarded writers
Chapman published, including James Froude, author of the controversial The Nemesis of
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Faith (1849) and F. W. Newman, brother of John Henry Newman and author of Phases
of Faith, or Passages from the History of my Creed (1850).225 The well‐known writer of
fiction and political economy Harriet Martineau visited on occasion; during this period
she was working on a translation of Auguste Comte’s Positive Philosophy, which
Chapman published in 1853. However, Spencer never mentioned meeting her, though
he read some of her didactic stories from Illustrations of Political Economy as a boy.226
A member of Chapman’s coterie also wrote one of the most enthusiastic reviews
of Social Statics: George Henry Lewes. Lewes was a fiction and nonfiction writer and the
literary editor of the weekly The Leader. Spencer first met him in the spring of 1850, and
before long the two were going on country rambles and discussing scientific and
intellectual subjects.227 One result of the friendship was that Spencer read Lewes’
Biographical History of Philosophy, published in 1846; it was an early inspiration for
what would be his next book, The Principles of Psychology. The Psychology in turn
inspired Lewes’ own work, The Problems of Life and Mind, written in the 1870s. In his
autobiography, Spencer described Lewes as a quick witted, critical, and original
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thinker—high praise indeed considering Spencer’s preoccupation with his own
originality.228 Lewes, in turn, felt that Spencer inspired him at just the right moment: as
he wrote in his journal,
My acquaintance with him was the brightest ray in a very dreary, wasted period
of my life. I had given up all ambition whatever, lived from hand to mouth, and
thought the evil of each day sufficient. The stimulus of his intellect, especially
during our long walks, roused my energy once more and revived my dormant
love of science. His intense theorising tendency was contagious, and it was only
the stimulus of a theory which could then have induced me to work.229
Lewes was genuinely enthusiastic about Spencer’s work, and regularly made space for
his essays in The Leader.
During the fall of 1851 Spencer met another of Chapman’s circle who had an
equally profound effect on him: Marian Evans, now better known by her pen‐name,
George Eliot.230 Evans was not yet a writer of fiction, but was known instead as the
translator of David Strauss’ controversial Life of Jesus, published by Chapman in 1846.
Born a year apart in the English midlands, Spencer and Evans were much alike; both
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were from Dissenting backgrounds and both were largely self‐educated.231 What Evans
described as a “deliciously calm new friendship” began.232 Spencer’s status as a
journalist entitled him to free admission to theaters and the opera house, to which he
took Evans frequently.233 They also walked together at a quiet spot near the Thames,
“discussing many things.”234 Evans was yet another intellectual peer with whom Spencer
could consult about his theories and arguments. In a letter to a friend, he called her “the
most admirable woman, mentally, I ever met,” and praised “the greatness of her
intellect conjoined with her womanly qualities and manner.”235
This proved to be a troubled relationship, however.236 At the beginning, Evans
wrote to her friends Charles and Cara Bray “we have agreed that we are not in love with
each other, and that there is no reason why we should not have as much of each other’s
society as we like.”237 But others noticed their frequent rendezvous and rumors
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circulated that they were engaged.238 The truth was that Evans had fallen in love with
Spencer. In an emotionally charged letter, she wrote of her “hopeless wretchedness”
and stated “if you become attached to some one else, then I must die, but until then I
could gather courage to work and make life valuable, if only I had you near me.”239 But
Spencer was unable to reciprocate. His reason told him to respond, but his instincts
would not obey. The situation was painful for him, especially since she did not believe
they should stop seeing each other socially. He even suggested that they should marry,
despite his lack of feelings, but she rejected the idea. Eventually she and G. H. Lewes
became enamored of each other, for which Spencer felt great relief. 240
In An Autobiography, Spencer blamed his lack of interest on her plain looks,
about which she was very sensitive.241 “Moral and intellectual beauties do not by
themselves suffice to attract me,” he wrote, “and owing to the stupidity of our
educational system it is rare to find them united to a good physique.”242 But would he
have felt differently if he found her attractive? Spencer was always ambivalent about
marriage. There were times when he considered it a positive good: he expressed
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jealousy for his newly married friends in several of his letters, for example, and when he
briefly considered immigration to New Zealand in his younger days, the possibility of
marriage weighed heavily in favor.243 But he had only one experience that even
approached being a love affair. When he was twenty, he spent time in the company of a
young lady, and he judged that relations between them would have grown more serious
had she not been engaged.244 Otherwise his relationships with women were strictly
Platonic.245 A letter he wrote to his friend Laurencina Potter is suggestive:
You are doubtless perfectly right in attributing my present state to an exclusively
intellectual life; and in prescribing exercise of the affections as the best remedy.
No one is more thoroughly convinced than I am that bachelorhood is an
unnatural and very injurious state. Ever since I was a boy (when I was
unfortunate in having no brothers or sisters) I have been longing to have my
affections called out. I have been in the habit of considering myself but half alive:
and have often said that I hoped to begin to live some day. But my wandering,
unsettled life, my unattractive manners towards those in whom I feel no
interest, my habit of arguing and of offending opponents by a disrespectful style
of treating them, have been so many difficulties in my way.246
Here Spencer gave his usual excuses for not marrying, but the real truth may have been
that he really was “half alive” and his wait for someone to rouse his affections would
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necessarily be in vain. Similarly, Evans wrote to him “no credit to me for my virtues as a
refrigerant. I owe them all to a few lumps of ice which I carried away with me from that
tremendous glacier of yours.”247 It may be that Spencer was simply not capable of
romantic love.
In 1852 Spencer met another lifelong friend who profoundly influenced his
intellectual development: Thomas Henry Huxley. Huxley, newly returned from his
voyage to Australia as assistant surgeon on the Rattlesnake, was presenting some of his
scientific work while seeking funding to publish the findings from his voyage. Spencer
had recently written an essay on the “Theory of Population”; feeling that Huxley’s work
supported the theories therein, he sent him a copy.248 The intellectual overture was the
beginning of a long if sometimes tempestuous friendship. Like Lewes, Huxley acted as a
sounding board for Spencer. As a professional scientist whose area of expertise was
biology, Huxley corrected Spencer’s scientific errors and put a damper on some of his
wilder flights of theoretical fancy. For example, before the publication of Darwin’s Origin
of Species, evolution was a much‐maligned theory. Spencer believed the theory was true
because the alternative was supernatural creation, which was unsupported by facts and
“intrinsically incredible.” Huxley, with his superior knowledge of biology, was able to
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continually demolish Spencer’s arguments in favor. Of course, this did not keep Spencer
from trying to convince him.249
Spencer’s years at The Economist were formative, if not transformative. He
published a book that clarified some of his earlier ideas and pointed the way to future
work. He made some lifelong friends that were also important to his continuing
intellectual growth. Finally, time as an editor cemented his decision to pursue a career
in letters. Spencer himself acknowledged the importance of this period in crystalizing his
ideas.250 However, an immensely important area of his thought was still
underdeveloped: his ideas about evolution. It was the work of Spencer’s thirties that
finally cemented this last piece of the puzzle into place.
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CHAPTER TWO
SPENCER IN HIS THIRTIES
By 1850, when Spencer turned thirty, his adult personality and intellectual
tendencies were fairly well fixed. He had launched his career as a writer and was making
a name for himself. He was beginning to acquire a circle of friends in London that
sustained him emotionally as well as intellectually. Though he was not settled
domestically—instead leading a peripatetic life in which he divided his time between
boarding houses, his parents’ home, the estates of wealthy friends, and other vacation
spots—certain places became regular haunts, such as his friend Octavius Smith’s house
on Loch Aline in Scotland, and the country estate of Richard and Laurencina Potter. He
minimized his personal possessions as much as possible, “my love of freedom showing
itself, among other ways, in aversion to that passive tyranny which material possessions
exercise over one.”1
In his career as an engineer Spencer was brash, confident in his own abilities,
unafraid to criticize his superiors, and always looking for better ways of doing things. As
a writer, these tendencies manifested themselves as fearlessness about proposing new
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theories, and as confidence that he had something new and valuable to say. Similarly,
he was bold enough to retain some of the eccentricities of dress that were a hold‐over
from the radical days of his youth—days when ignoring the social niceties due to the
upper classes was intended as a political statement.2 Yet he was punctilious about
certain types of polite behavior. According to Spencer, he did not swear until he was 36
years old (a tangled fishing line was to blame.)3 He did not drink to excess, gamble for
money, or have any scandalous love affairs. As J. D. Y. Peel notes, he internalized the
moral assumptions and obligations of his evangelical roots until they seemed natural; he
espoused personal freedom yet his own life was “quaintly consistent and rule
governed.”4 Many of his contemporaries noted that Spencer had a keen sense of justice.
He could be persnickety, as when he insisted that a coachman drop him off at a milepost
rather than at his inn to avoid paying an extra fare.5
Mark Francis argues that Spencer was “a precursor of the modern taste for self‐
doubt and alienation.”6 However, it is strange to think of the egotistical Spencer nursing
an inferiority complex. It is more accurate to describe, as Francis does elsewhere,
Spencer as overly analytical and not afraid to point out his own flaws—at least, some of
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them.7 For example, he recognized his tendency to be argumentative and his confidence
in his own opinions. Spencer knew he lacked tact, and admired those like Richard Potter
with affable dispositions.8 His “irritabilities and perversities” grew with the nervous
ailment that afflicted him more and more as he aged, but the seeds existed long
before.9
Spencer was not short of social contacts despite his sometimes querulous
nature. As his onetime assistant David Duncan remarked, “he was not made to be
alone.”10 “I can do pretty well without seeing friends for some time, if I am within hail of
them,” Spencer remarked, “but the consciousness that they are inaccessible is soon
followed by depression.”11 Sometimes he even went so far as to board with a family, for
he felt that living alone was not good for his psyche and he enjoyed exercising his
“philoprogenitive instinct” by caring for children. He especially liked little girls, and
regretted not having any sisters.12 The fact that family life appealed to Spencer is just
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more evidence of a lack of sexual impulses on his part. Love of children gave him a
powerful reason to marry, yet he continued as a bachelor.
Spencer may have lacked romantic instincts, but he was not an emotionally
shriveled human being. By his 30s, Spencer enjoyed a busy social life. He liked games,
especially billiards. He had a good sense of humor, and at the theater preferred
comedies and farces to dramas.13 While on vacation, besides his usual walks, he
sunbathed, collected and examined biological specimens, and, fished.14 Spencer had a
passion for fly fishing, and he pursued it in his own unique way. Not content to rely on
the advice of local fishermen, he would tie flies to his own specifications and then judge
their success by the number of fish caught.15 Once he told his friend Marian Evans about
his theories, explaining that did not try to mimic particular insects, but aimed for an
average or ideal fly. She responded “yes, you have such a passion for generalizing, you
even fish with a generalization.”16 In most areas of his life, Spencer had healthy
appetites.
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A Love for Generalization: Spencer’s Intellectual Style
Spencer’s intellectual tendencies were fully developed by his thirties. This does
not mean his opinions were fixed, for he revised several of his works in later years.17 But
all of his basic habits of mind were by this time on display: his self‐confidence, lack of
respect for authorities, and rejection of traditional ways of thinking. Such attributes are
essential for an original thinker, and Spencer very much saw himself in this role. He
believed strongly in independent thought, admired it in his friends, and felt it should be
encouraged in education and in professional life.18 He was quite sensitive about his
reputation in this regard, especially later in his life, but the tendency to forget the
contributions of others can be seen in his failure to acknowledge Thomas Hodgskin as
the source of some of the ideas in Social Statics.19
This reticence about intellectual debts must be understood in its context.
Scholarly works of the Victorian age did not have anything like the kind of intellectual
apparatus that takes up so much room in modern books. At this stage of his life Spencer
did not take elaborate notes, nor did he write even so technical a work as The Principles
of Psychology with a library by his side.20 What books he did read he usually borrowed.
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In any event, he was unable to read scholarly material for long periods of time, even as a
boy—he likened this to having a small intellectual digestive system.21 Much of his
knowledge came from conversations with friends, snippets of data he picked up here
and there, and haphazard skimming of what materials came his way.22 Similarly, for
Spencer the process of developing his own ideas involved a great deal of unfocused
thinking, both in solitude and with peers. He especially liked to think (and talk) during
walks, noting that “the quickened circulation consequent on moderate exercise,
produced in me...a flow of ideas difficult, if not impossible, to stop.”23 His racing mind
was one cause of the insomnia he suffered from a young age.24 As he noted in one of his
early essays, “scenes vividly pictured to the mind, in direct opposition to the will” are
well known to anyone who has suffered sleepless nights.25
Spencer’s method of developing theories was not to seek solutions to problems,
whether through research or reason, but to let facts and ideas run freely through his
brain until some type of synthesis arose. The process might take weeks or even months.
In the early days of their companionship Evans once expressed surprise that, after all
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the thinking he must have done in writing Social Statics, there were no lines in his
forehead. “I suppose that is because I am never puzzled,” Spencer replied, which Evans
not surprisingly took as a sign of arrogance until he explained what he meant.26 Spencer
was an intellectual magpie, whose beak only seized facts likely to demonstrate a larger
rule of nature.27 Ultimately evidence would suggest a general rule, and various rules
would suggest even broader rules, until all the disparate bits of knowledge were pieced
into one theoretical structure. As Peel puts it, Spencer was “a cultural handyman on an
enormous scale.”28 It is clear, then, how he could have been unaware of what he
borrowed from others. When he argued for priority, he was not simply being defensive,
but was genuinely convinced of his own originality. “He visualized a stream of
autonomously‐developing theory with a few tributary sources,” as David Wiltshire puts
it.29
Spencer’s love of theories made him popular with readers. He seemed to have a
logical explanation for everything. However, he sometimes built his speculative
structures on very little evidence. As a friend once wrote to him, “You talk of your power
of writing a long letter with very little material; but that is a mere trifle to your facility
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for building up a formidable theory on precious slight foundations.”30 Spencer valued
deduction more than induction. It was not enough for him to discover what is true, he
needed to know why it was true, and he needed to find other laws which could be
deduced from its truth. A reader once noted that the inductive part of one of Spencer’s
arguments stand without his deductions; Spencer was “struck with the strangeness of
his implied belief that the empirical stage of a generalization may be contentedly
accepted as its final stage.”31 Gathering facts was only the first and less important part
of developing a theory that accounted for them, not just as regular and predictable
phenomena, but as signs of a higher organization to the cosmos.32 In his writing, this
orientation manifested itself as a tendency to put a conclusion first and then follow it up
with evidence demonstrating its truth. But by doing so, he conveyed the impression that
facts were used as examples of a theory rather than its basis.
Spencer was often reluctant to revise his conclusions once he made them,
despite any evidence that might later appear. As Huxley once quipped, “Spencer’s idea
of a tragedy is a deduction killed by a fact.”33 To use an oft cited example, in a letter to a
friend Evans reported “I went to Kew yesterday on a scientific expedition with Herbert
Spencer, who has all sorts of theories about plants—I should have said a proof‐hunting
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expedition. Of course, if the flowers didn’t correspond to the theories, we said, ‘tant pis
pour les fleurs.’”34 Spencer believed that observations would always be distorted or
incomplete without a true principle to guide them, as he argued in one of his essays,
“The Valuation of Evidence.” Without knowledge of what to look for, he wrote, sense‐
impressions are random and misleading.35 One should put his use of evidence in
context, however. Spencer was not a working scientist by today’s definition. Only one of
his many publications was the result of careful observation under controlled conditions.
He did not do much fieldwork of his own. Nor was he a member of the most important
British scientific societies, the Royal Society and the British Association for the
Advancement of Science. Spencer’s source of facts were the books he read, his personal
experiences, scientific and medical journals, and what he gleaned from newspapers,
magazines, and other popular sources of information. He himself admitted that those
bits of information which fit into a theoretical structure he readily absorbed; evidence
that did not fit into his system, while not rejected, might be treated with indifference
and soon forgotten.36

34

“So much for the flowers.” Gordon S. Haight, ed., The George Eliot Letters, vol. 2 (New Haven, Conn.:
Yale University Press, 1954), 39 (hereafter cited as GEL).
35

Herbert Spencer, Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative, vol. 1 (London: Longman, Brown,
Green, Longmans, and Roberts, 1858), 414, 417 (hereafter cited as Essays). Modern philosophy of science
recognizes that scientific observations are always theory‐driven to some extent. See Valerie A. Haines,
“Spencer’s Philosophy of Science,” The British Journal of Sociology 43, no. 2 (Jun., 1992), 161‐62.
36

Spencer judged this the nature of those who think for themselves. AB, 1:277‐278.

95
The Final Pieces: Spencer’s Evolutionary Ideas Coalesce
After finishing Social Statics Spencer spent “an idle year” in 1851 without literary
production.37 He continued working at The Economist, not certain that he could make a
living from writing alone. He had ideas for books and articles, but made no effort to get
them into print. The next year his literary output was much greater, but he had turned
from books to essays. His new literary contacts helped when it came to publication:
Chapman became publisher of a quarterly review in 1852, and G. H. Lewes was already
editor of The Leader. Spencer contributed anonymously to both. For a review like the
Westminster anonymity was the standard; The Leader did include signed letters from
correspondents but Spencer had was reluctant to have his name appear in a weekly that
supported socialism.38
Spencer’s contributions to The Leader began in January 1852, and went under
the collective name of “The Haythorne Papers.” The first was “Use and Beauty,” in
which Spencer argued that in the course of human progress things once useful become
ornamental, and thus beautiful, while anything practical to modern life cannot be
beautiful.39 Further editions of the Haythorne papers for 1842 discussed “A Theory of
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Tears and Laughter,” “The Sources of Architectural Types,” and “Gracefulness.” These
were organized like the first, with Spencer positing a theory and then elaborating upon
it and giving examples. On tears and laughter, for example, he began with the general
rule that visible emotions are signs of biological processes, such as quickening of the
circulation or respiration.40 After a many examples of situations causing laughter and
tears, he described the working of the circulatory system. Spencer’s conclusion was that
tears are caused by “temporary cerebral congestion” and are “a spontaneous and
economical kind of blood‐letting,” while laughter’s role is to expel air, reducing oxygen
in the blood and thus relieving “high cerebral excitement.”41 Similarly, in his essay on
architecture Spencer determined that classical architecture is inspired by the symmetry
of animal forms, gothic by vegetable forms, and castles by mineral forms.42
With regard to Spencer’s later work, the most important Haythorne paper was
the second, on “The Development Hypothesis,” published in March. Here he made a
bold statement in support of the theory that species change over time—the theory of
evolution.43 He argued that special creation was not supported by any facts, that its
partisans could not explain or even visualize how it might have actually happened, and
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that it was unlikely that the 10 million different species he estimated had walked the
earth were all created separately.44 Needless to say, the article was more rhetorical than
scientific. Still, it created a sensation, or so Spencer assured his father, and copies were
sent to prominent scientists like Charles Lyell, Richard Owen, and Adam Sedgwick.45
Spencer did not use the word evolution at the time because it had not yet taken
on its modern meaning for most readers. The Latin evolvere refers to unfolding, as with
a scroll; the word came to be associated with embryonic development at a time when
the embryo was understood to contain all the features of the adult organism in
miniature.46 Extending the term to cover species change was not yet common in 1852.
Spencer did use “evolution” in this sense in a letter to his lifelong friend Edward Lott less
than a month before his article appeared. It is typical of Spencer’s preoccupations that
he used the word in a progressive sense, calling humanity “the highest result yet of the
evolution of life on the earth.”47 He also changed the words “the theory of Lamarck and
his followers” to “the Theory of Evolution” in the version of the article published in the
first volume of his collected essays, published in 1857.48
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Spencer had been an evolutionist at least since his early twenties, though the
source of his evolutionary ideas is subject to some debate. His father was a member of
the Derby Philosophical Society, founded by Erasmus Darwin, Charles Darwin’s
grandfather and an early evolutionary thinker. Erasmus was one of the first to integrate
his belief in progressive species change with a theory of cosmological development.49
His opening address, which included a summary of his evolutionary views, was printed
in the front of every edition of the Society’s library catalogue.50 Since William George
Spencer was honorary secretary, it would be surprising if he had not read this address.
However, it is not clear whether George Spencer agreed with the evolutionary
viewpoint or discussed it with his son. Herbert Spencer was always careful about his
reputation for originality, and later denied that his father taught him anything about the
development hypothesis.51 The most that can be said with certainty about the influence
of the Derby Philosophical Society is that young Spencer read haphazardly among its
books and journals, and listened to conversations between his father and other
members.52
Spencer’s most important source of evolutionary knowledge was the work of
Jean‐Baptiste‐Pierre‐Antoine de Monet, Chevalier de Lamarck. A nobleman, philosophe,
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freethinker, and collector of shellfish, Lamarck preached evolution in books and lectures
in the early nineteenth century.53 His most influential work was Philosophie zoologique,
first published in 1809, in which he argued that organisms pass on traits they acquire in
life to their offspring, leading to gradual species change over time.54 This theory is
known as “Lamarckism” today. The classic example is that of a giraffe: by stretching its
neck to get leaves at the tops of trees, it slightly elongates it, causing its children to have
longer necks. Before Darwin developed his theory of natural selection, this was the only
complete and consistent evolutionary theory available.55
Lamarck was marginalized in his own country by the great French naturalist
Georges Cuvier, a conservative who disliked the radical and atheist tenor of his
theories.56 Lamarck, however, found followers in England. Ironically, the most important
channel for his influence was a long refutation of his claims made in the 1830s by
geologist Charles Lyell as part of his groundbreaking Principles of Geology. Lyell’s
uniformitarian theory of geology was aimed against the currently popular
catastrophism, which attributed geological formations to vast natural disasters and
encompassed the entire history of the earth in six thousand years. Lyell believed the
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contours of the earth to be the product of uniform, ongoing natural processes, such as
the movement of wind and water—processes no different than those which could
currently be observed in nature. Despite the fact that his arguments for an “old earth”
opened the door to long‐term processes like evolution, Lyell rejected Lamarck’s ideas.57
However, he treated evolution at such length and with such fairness that not a few of
his readers became converts, including Charles Darwin, who read Principles of Geology
on his famous voyage on the Beagle.
Spencer read Lyell when he was twenty, and with his usual contrariness
dismissed Lyell’s objections to evolution.58 From then on he was a convinced
evolutionist. Spencer was also influenced by another book that used Lamarck’s ideas,
Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation, published in 1844.59 The author, who long
remained anonymous, was Scottish publisher, writer, and phrenologist Robert
Chambers. As a result of its controversial subject matter and the mystery of its author,
Vestiges caused a sensation when it appeared. 60 This bestselling, skilfully written book
Michael Ruse has called “the Big Mac of popular science—very tasty, very filling, very
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accessible, and (in the opinion of the authorities) of very dubious value to one’s
health.”61 Chambers took a cosmic view of space and time. He envisioned a universe
where nebulous dust formed into our “astral system” (galaxy) and many others, each
formed out of the same elements by the same physical laws as our own. He posited
many worlds, and suggested that all of them (including the moon) were capable of
supporting life.62 Like Lamarck, he believed the development of complex life forms was
linear and progressive by nature, a many‐stepped pyramid culminating in Man.63 Unlike
Lamarck, Chambers’ theories had a distinctly religious slant; he argued that the gradual
development of intelligence was all part of God’s grand design for the world.64 Still,
Vestiges was attacked as impious by religious writers and as shoddy science by
scientifically minded reviewers.65 This did not keep it from being wildly popular, of
course, especially after a cheap “people’s edition” was printed.66 While Spencer’s
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attitude toward the book was ambivalent, his cosmological and progressive form of
evolution certainly owed something to Chambers.67
Practical Evolution: Writing for the Reviews
Spencer’s interest in evolution surfaced again in his first attempt at “review
writing” for the quarterly reviews, those most prestigious of Victorian periodicals, the
bearers of culture of all types to the educated classes. Writing for reviews was a
mainstay for many intellectuals, especially those just embarking on a career. The
reviews generally paid well and accepted surveys of books on a wide variety of
subjects.68 This included scientific subjects, since for most of the Victorian period
science was not a specialist enterprise restricted to niche magazines and the
publications of professional societies.69 Spencer’s entree into this field came through
John Chapman, who purchased the Westminster Review in 1851 and restarted the
publication with volume one at the beginning of 1852.
The Westminster was founded almost thirty years previously by Jeremy Bentham
and James Mill as a radical alternative to the Whig Edinburgh Review and the Tory
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leaning Quarterly Review.70 It went through a number of owners and editors, including
John Stuart Mill, who continued to be a contributor after Chapman purchased it.71 The
new Westminster was to have the same intellectual heft as the old. Marian Evans was
brought in as an editor; later Huxley joined the enterprise as science editor. The first
issue contained a prospectus, mostly written by Evans, which explained the review’s
broad scope and its liberal political stance.72 It is hard not to see Spencer’s influence in
statements like “the fundamental principle of the work will be the recognition of the
Law of Progress” and “the institutions of Man, no less than the products of nature, are
strong and durable in proportion as they are the results of gradual development.”73
However, a draft of the prospectus was circulating by June of 1851, before Spencer and
Evans met.74 Evans may have been inspired by Social Statics, but the depth of influence
in the other direction should not be underestimated.75
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Spencer’s first task at the Westminster was a review of six books on biology, one
of which, the third edition of William Carpenter’s Principles of Physiology (1851) was an
important source for Spencer in his later works. Spencer used the occasion as an excuse
to launch into a theory of population pressure, a reaction to the ideas first put forth in
Thomas Malthus’ famous Essay on the Principle of Population (1798). The strategy was a
time‐honored one among writers for the reviews, as Joanne Shattock points out: the
book or books were known as a “peg” from which to “hang” the essay, in order to
preserve the illusion that it was really a review.76 Since the essay both shows the
persistence of some of Spencer’s early ideas and introduces some new concepts, it is
worth treating at some length.
Spencer’s view of nature in “A Theory of Population” was no less idealistic than it
was in Social Statics: he continued to believe that the natural order of things was
beneficent. Thus a theory that concludes that humanity must suffer from some
imbalance forever cannot be a correct one (Malthus’ theory is clearly indicted here,
though Spencer does not do so by name).77 Every species is affected by two influences:
the natural tendency towards death and the maintenance of life through the organism’s
natural abilities and through reproduction. These forces tend towards equilibrium, since
the greater the species’ numbers the more starvation and hungry predators will affect
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it.78 So much is familiar from Malthus. Spencer diverges in considering that the
complexity of “higher organisms,” especially those with complex nervous systems, gives
them a greater ability to maintain their own equilibrium between life and death without
the need for natural regulation.79 In large part this is because more complex organisms
reproduce more slowly.80 Thus, “from the fact that the human race is in a state of
transition, we may suspect that the existing ratio between its ability to multiply, and its
ability to maintain life, is not a constant ratio.”81 Advancing in civilization and technology
to meet the needs of greater numbers of people means advancing in mechanical skill,
intelligence, and morality, which all lead to decreased breeding, either through
biological adjustments or self‐discipline.
Thus as human beings progress they will achieve an equilibrium of population,
with couples producing only enough children to replace themselves. However, Spencer
did not believe that all were destined to share in the coming golden age of balance and
satisfaction of human needs:
All mankind in turn subject themselves more or less to the discipline described;
they either may or may not advance under it; but in the nature of things, only
78
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those who do advance under it eventually survive. For, necessarily, families and
races whom this increasing difficulty of getting a living which excess of fertility
entails, does not stimulate to improvements in production—that is, to greater
mental activity—are on the high road to extinction; and must ultimately be
supplanted by those whom the pressure does so stimulate. . .For as those
prematurely carried off must, in the average of cases, be those in whom the power
of self‐preservation is the least, it unavoidably follows, that those left behind to
continue the race are those in whom the power of self‐preservation is the
greatest—are the select of their generation.82
This cogent expression of the law of natural selection predated the publication of the
Origin of Species by seven years. However, Spencer did not link selection to species
change.83 Also, as he admitted in his autobiography, at that time he did not think to
extend the application of the theory beyond the human race.84 Still, it is notable that once
again Spencer expressed the core ideas of social Darwinism before Darwinism even
existed. But in this case a key principle was lacking—Spencer did not argue against human
interference in the process, only that what he would later call “the survival of the fittest”
was the natural order of things, at least for the present.
“A Theory of Population” was pregnant with ideas to which Spencer would
return in the future. His next essay for the Westminster, “The Philosophy of Style,” does
not so well illustrate the development of his ideas. It was one of Spencer’s most popular
essays, however. As before, a review of a number of books on grammar and style served
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as an excuse to theorize. Since “no general theory of expression seems yet to have been
enunciated,” Spencer wrote, it would be helpful to find “some simple first principle”
from which all other rules could be deduced.85 The principle found was a theory of
mental scarcity—Spencer argued that intellectual effort is a limited commodity, so that
the clearest and simplest language, which taxes the mind least, leaves the most
brainpower left over to contemplate the images or ideas conveyed.86 Poetry naturally
follows this rule, Spencer felt, and complimented Coleridge, Shelley, Carlyle, and others.
In January 1853 Spencer’s uncle Thomas Spencer died of a stroke. Spencer
inherited 500 pounds, which gave him enough financial security to resign from the
Economist, a step he had been contemplating for some time. It was now two years after
the publication of Social Statics, yet he was spending only part of his time writing.87 Still,
he recognized that his tenure at the Economist had been valuable, for developing ideas
and friendships that would influence his life and work.88 Spencer did not immediately
get to work, but used his new resources to fund a two month walking tour of
Switzerland with his friend Lott. This was supposed to be partially for his health, but he
overexerted himself several times on the trip despite his resolution not to do so. On
returning he felt an “enfeebled action of the heart,” from which he never fully
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recovered.89 During that year and the next Spencer worked on expanding the number of
reviews that employed him. The Westminster Review continued to be his mainstay, but
he eventually placed articles in the North British Review, the British Quarterly Review,
and the prestigious Edinburgh Review.
Spencer’s topics continued to vary, from primitive religion to politics to business
practices. For the Westminster he wrote a piece on “Over‐Legislation” that expanded on
the arguments made in On the Proper Sphere of Government and Social Statics. In those
works he concentrated on the duties of government in the abstract; here he focused on
its failings in reality.90 The state, he argued, has a miserable record when it takes on
tasks outside of its mandate to protect its citizens. “Non‐governmental agencies” like
cooperatives or private enterprises are more efficient, because those that are not simply
cease to be employed.91 Furthermore, they are formed with greater spontaneity and
thus better equipped to meet the immediate needs of citizens. Spencer reasoned that
needs should not be met until it is profitable for private enterprise to do so—the market
is the most efficient way of determining which needs are most pressing, and thus which
should be addressed given limited resources.92
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Adulation for the free market was nothing new. What made the essay interesting
to readers were the many examples of government follies, corruption, waste, and
unintended consequences. “Officialism is stupid,” Spencer complained, and it invariably
becomes corrupt. “Despotism would have its advantages could we ensure a good
despot.”93 Dependence on government makes people timid and pacified.94 But Spencer
doubted whether most would perceive the truth of his arguments. Faith in the state is
organic; it cannot be changed, but must be outgrown. The worship of power, Spencer
believed, was simply natural given the current stage of human evolution.95 Spencer
voiced a similar sentiment in Social Statics, where he argued that humanity’s
transformation into perfect social beings had to be long and painful.
Yet Spencer was not blind to the faults of private enterprise. In “Railway Morals
and Railway Policy,” published in the Edinburgh Review of October 1854, he excoriated
railroad companies, their managers, and their boards for their corruption and greed.
Most of these men were no worse than average, Spencer wrote. The large corporate
enterprise encouraged dishonesty because ownership was divided from control and
because the harm of corruption was indirect, felt mostly by stockholders too ignorant
and too isolated from each other to effectively object.96 Some modern scholars have
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used “Railway Morals” as proof that Spencer did not support big business as is often
claimed.97 However, Spencer’s criticism of capitalist enterprise must be put into its
proper context. He had personal experience with the industry, both as an employee and
as advisor to his father and his Uncle Thomas, both of whom invested in railway
stocks.98 In this instance Spencer succumbed to the temptation to protect his own
family from the harsh realities of natural selection, which weed out the gullible and ill‐
informed no matter how good‐hearted they may be.99 As Wiltshire points out, Spencer
did not return to the issue of corruption in free enterprise in his later writings.100
Furthermore, Spencer identified similarities between the workings of railway
companies and the workings of the State, and in both cases argued that their actions
should be restricted to their proper functions. Though Spencer did not make this
explicit, there is clearly an analogy between a rail company constructing an expensive
and unnecessary extension and a government undertaking a new social program.
Spencer’s proposed solution was the same for both: restrict the organization to its
original purpose. For business, this meant that a company would not be permitted to do
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anything other than what it had originally been founded to accomplish.101 Spencer did
not see any contradiction in calling on the government to enforce such restrictions,
because he interpreted it as the enforcement of a contract, which fell within the
government’s purview of administering justice.102
For the most part, Spencer’s political and economic theories from this period
simply elaborated on arguments he previously made. Other articles plumbed original
territory. He had touched on man’s transition from savagery to civilization in Social
Statics; now he spun theories to explain the details. In the Leader, he published an
article on “The Use of Anthropomorphism” which argued that religious conceptions
such as the concept of a personal Deity are simply those which are needed at early
states of human development, just as despotism, slavery, and warfare were necessary
or even beneficial to primitive man.103 The savage needs a savage god; the dread of
torture for those who misbehave is all that keeps him in check.104 Spencer did not
specifically reference Christianity, but the connection is clear.
In a longer essay in the Westminster for April 1854, Spencer elaborated on the
development of human culture, this time in regard to “Manners and Fashion.” Spencer
was always an iconoclast when it came to dress and comportment; one can only
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imagine his glee as he demolished current usages for being atavisms of ancient
despotism. “All regulations, formal or virtual,” he announced “have a common
character: they are all limitations of men’s freedom.”105 Spencer’s overarching theory
here was that law, religion, and manners have the same origin; worship of a deity, chief,
and priest who were one and the same person.106 Manners have their origins in signs of
respect for this leader; over a long period of time, they have come to apply to a greater
and greater number of the people, and have likewise attenuated in severity.107 The bow
is simply an abbreviated form of prostration, as is curtsying or kneeling in church.108
Fashion is simply our attempt to imitate the leader, and as with manners it has spread
down the social ranks.109 Spencer believed that both manners and fashion would fade
away as democracy increased and humanity fully adjusted to social conditions.110
Sources: Spencer’s Intellectual Debts
One further essay bears mentioning. At the beginning of 1854, at the urging of
his friends Evans and Lewes, Spencer read Auguste Comte’s positive philosophy, now
available to him in a translated and greatly condensed form courtesy of Harriet
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Martineau.111 At least, he read the first few sections, for in his autobiography he claimed
never to have read Comte’s biological and social divisions.112 The foundation of Comte’s
work was the idea that human knowledge has passed through three stages: the
theological, where phenomena are explained by reference to supernatural entities; the
metaphysical, where phenomena are explained by reference to abstract forces, and the
positive, where absolute notions like first causes are rejected, and the search for
knowledge only encompasses the scientific laws of nature.113 Comte divided human
knowledge into a number of departments, from mathematics and astronomy through
biology and ultimately to “sociology,” a term he coined to replace his earlier term
“social physics.” He arranged these sciences in the order in which they became
“positive” or fully scientific, which was determined by their complexity and
independence from the other departments.114 Sociology, being the most involved of the
sciences, has not yet reached the stage of positivity, Comte stated, but when it does the
Positive Philosophy will serve as the basis for social reorganization.115
Never one to respect received authority, Spencer immediately dissented from
the fashion in which Comte divided the sciences. In “The Genesis of Science,” published
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in the July edition of the British Quarterly Review, he complimented Comte on his far‐
reaching views and his clear reasoning but disagreed with his partitioning of
knowledge.116 Each science is dependent on discoveries in the others, he argued, and
thus cannot be arranged in a linear order.117 To demonstrate this, Spencer gave a
detailed account of their development, starting with the first intellectual processes of
primitive man—the concepts of likeness, number, measure, and the like.118 Ultimately,
he concluded that divisions in the sciences are not just abstract but arbitrary, for there
are no such divisions in nature.119
Spencer was more indebted to Comte than he wanted to admit. The historian
Michael Taylor correctly argues that the Synthetic Philosophy was an attempt to merge
evolutionary deism with the positivism of the Chapman circle.120 However, this does not
mean that Spencer’s entire philosophical system was essentially Positivist.121 In his later
work, he categorized certain metaphysical questions as “Unknowable,” but this did not
lead him to reject all metaphysics. For Spencer, the law of evolution was both a first and
final cause: it explained both the current state of the universe and its endpoint or goal in
a teleological sense. Furthermore, Comte rejected the reduction of phenomena in the
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universe to a single law, given the limitations of the human mind.122 By the time he
began his Synthetic Philosophy, Spencer believed that he had formulated such a law.
Still, looking at Spencer’s great project, with its divisions of biology, psychology,
sociology, and ethics, it is difficult to believe Spencer was not influenced by Comte’s
earlier attempt to organize all human knowledge. Spencer claimed that his only debt to
Comte was “the indebtedness of antagonism,”123 but antagonism can inspire just as
surely as agreement. To disagree with how a project is managed implies that the project
is worth doing in the first place.
Comte was not the only influence on Spencer during the first half of the 1850s;
these were years in which Spencer incurred some of his deepest intellectual debts. Two
books contributed greatly to shifts in his thought in the years leading up to the writing
of The Principles of Psychology: Lewes’s history of philosophy and John Stuart Mill’s
Logic. Taylor exaggerates when he argues that the remainder of Spencer’s career as a
philosopher was spent “filling in the details” of a system conceived in conversations with
his friends in the Chapman circle revolving around Comte, Mill, and phrenologist George
Combe.124 But there is an element of truth here; intellectual foundations for the future
were being laid. Both Evans and Lewes were impressed by Comte’s Philosophie Positive,

122

Comte, Positive Philosophy 16, 141. Comte did state that this was the proper goal of the
philosopher, impossible though it was.
123
124

AB, 1:517.

Taylor, The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer, 27. Taylor judges this the only period of sustained study
in Spencer’s life. Ibid., 17.

116
and tried to kindle enthusiasm in Spencer. Spencer was reintroduced to Mill’s System of
Logic by Evans, who loaned him her copy.125
George Combe may also have been an important influence, though the evidence
is circumstantial. Combe’s book The Constitution of Man (1828) was incredibly popular,
and a young man with Spencer’s interest in phrenology most likely would have read it.
However, given Spencer’s reading habits it is not safe to make categorical statements
about anything Spencer “must have read.” Even books that are cited in his work or
mentioned in his Autobiography are not above suspicion about how thoroughly they
were studied. Spencer did not always finish the books he started. He certainly would not
have spent hours on the kind of close reading James Secord describes in his book on
Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation.126
Spencer used phrenological terms and concepts like “the faculties” in Social
Statics and The Principles of Psychology. But here we must tread carefully as well. The
historian Robert Richards is persuasive in his argument that Combe was likely the
originator of the idea, expressed in Social Statics, that the exercise of mental faculties
and their adjustment to fit the environment leads to happiness.127 However, Spencer
also used the word “faculties” multiple times in Principles of Psychology, yet he had
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quietly but firmly rejected phrenology by the time it was written, instead arguing that
“Intelligence has neither distinct grades, nor is constituted of faculties that are truly
independent...the classifications current in our philosophies of the mind, can be but
superficially true.”128 The same can be said for the concept of adaptation to the
environment, which has a major source in the work of 18th century French naturalist
Georges‐Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon. The fact is that it is difficult to demonstrate
Combe’s influence conclusively, but Spencer’s knowledge of his work seems likely.
Combe was part of the circle around Chapman; he knew Evans well and had even
studied her skull.129 Spencer was a good friend to Cara and Charles Bray, phrenology
advocates and friends of both Combe and Evans.130 The evidence suggests he knew
George Combe and his work.
Whatever the case may be, Spencer’s interest in phrenology was waning in the
years leading up to his work on The Principles of Psychology. In part this was due to his
reading of Lewes’s Biographical History of Philosophy, which gave him new sources for
ideas that he had once seen as phrenological in origin. Lewes was not as enthusiastic
about phrenology as Evans; though he accepted the basic idea of mind as manifestation
of the brain, he did not agree with specific claims about the localization of faculties in
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various organs.131 In Lewes’ book Spencer could read about the subjective, introspective
way of studying the mind that had been a feature of Western philosophy since
Descartes.132 He was also able to learn about Kant secondhand, after giving up on his
Critique of Pure Reason when younger. In The Principles of Psychology, Kant’s notion of
the necessity of fixed mental categories for abstract ideas such as time, space, and
causality replaced the phrenological view of fixed modes of thought corresponding to
organs of the brain.
Spencer conjured up a school inspired by John Locke in opposition to the school
of Kant.133 Locke’s theories were extended in the work of John Stuart Mill, whose book A
System of Logic had a great impact on Spencer and others of his circle.134 Mill, like other
utilitarians before him (including his father James), took Locke’s position that the mind
starts as a “tabula rasa” and that all knowledge and thought processes are the result of
sensations that have impressed themselves on the mind (a theory also called
“associationism”). In his Logic he tried to establish a system of objective thought on
associationist principles. Spencer admired the attempt and outlined his own idea on
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how to derive truth from subjective experience in an essay for the Westminster in
October 1853, “The Universal Postulate.” This was purportedly a review not just of Mill’s
Logic, but of works by Thomas Reid, William Whewell, George Berkeley, and Henry
Mansel, with David Hume’s A Treatise on Human Nature and Kant’s Critique of Pure
Reason thrown in for good measure.135 However, as usual, most of the essay was taken
up with Spencer’s own ideas. While he agreed with Mill’s basic position, that all
thoughts and beliefs are the consequences of basic sense perceptions, he proposed his
own standard of truth. Spencer argued that the fundamental test of truth is whether it
is possible to believe otherwise. In other words, if we cannot conceive of the negation of
a belief—if we cannot imagine a state in which the opposite of a belief is the case—then
the belief must for all intents and purposes be true (though Spencer, guided by Mill,
stopped short of saying that the belief necessarily corresponds to objective reality).136
A Philosophy of Mind: The Principles of Psychology
“The Universal Postulate” gave Spencer a foundation from which to work out his
theories about the processes of the human mind, and in a slightly modified form it
became the first section of his next project, The Principles of Psychology. After getting a
hydropathic cure at the end of June, 1854, he was ready to devote himself to the
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work.137 Thanks to the inheritance from his uncle, he could afford to do some of his
writing in France, at the seaside and in Paris. But Spencer’s command of the language
was not good, and he pined for the intellectual stimulus provided by his friends. He was
back in London by the end of October.138 Discovering that no publisher would take a risk
on an abstruse work on the philosophy of the mind, Spencer understood that once again
he would have to foot the publishing bill, and moved back to Derby to economize.139
With the exception of an excursion to Wales, it was there that he wrote the rest of his
book.
It may seem surprising that a self‐educated man with no clinical pedigree should
write a book on psychology, and even more strange that he expected people to read it.
But in the 1850s psychology was a new field of knowledge, not yet bounded by the
academy or professional organizations. Even the word seemed modern, having rarely
been used at the turn of the century.140 As Rick Rylance points out, this “high‐Victorian
psychology” of the period from 1850‐1880 was a discourse open to an audience of
generalists, who did not consider the issues discussed to be of only specialized
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interest.141 Knowledge of the mind, especially that which spoke to the problem of the
mind’s relation to the body and the freedom of the will, was considered of interest to
all.142 Spencer’s book addressed both issues, but also engaged in the kind of psychology
that from a modern perspective we might rather call “the philosophy of the mind.”
Incidentally, this was the kind of psychology Comte disapproved of—as he put it, “it
pretends to accomplish the discovery of the laws of the human mind by contemplating
it in itself,” a fair enough description of Spencer’s method and that of many
contemporary students of the subject.143
Spencer divided The Principles of Psychology into four parts, each taking a
separate viewpoint on the same “great aggregate of phenomena.”144 Part I, the
“General Analysis,” was the essay on the “Universal Postulate” with a few changes and
additions. Thus from the outset Spencer made it clear that this was a work whose
foundation would be an introspective analysis of the workings of consciousness—an
examination of the experience of sensation, thought, and belief. Having demonstrated
that the universal postulate, though it cannot be proved, must be taken as true for there
to be any possibility of rational argument, Spencer moved on to the “Special Analysis” in
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part II.145 This was a fine‐toothed inspection of various mental processes, from
qualitative and quantitative reasoning (the mental act of determining equality and ratio)
to classification to the perception of space, time, motion and resistance. Spencer
posited that the fundamental mental act used in reasoning is not establishing the
equality of two things, but the equality of two relations, such as the relations between
the lines and angles of an isosceles triangle (which always has two equal sides).146 In
Spencer’s words, “every ratiocinative act is the establishment of a definite relation
between two definite relations.”147
As for our perceptions, Spencer wrote that to consciously perceive an object is to
classify it or recognize it, and he considered the classification of things to involve the
same mental process as reasoning.148 Perception of an object is always complex,
because it always involves unconscious classification and combination of a thing’s
various attributes (like height, width, number of sides, color, etc.) from the raw visual
data.149 As for the perception of space, time, motion, and resistance, as well as
coextension, coexistence, “cointension” (two things alike in intensity), and “connature”
(abstract feelings of warmth, blueness, sweetness, etc.) Spencer attempted to trace
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these back to the way they first manifest themselves to the infant consciousness, to
demonstrate that they are not conceptions pre‐fixed in the mind, but are modes of
thought built up from unfiltered experience. For Spencer there was a “unity of
composition” in intelligence that made it resolvable into intuitions about similarity and
dissimilarity. “These intuitions are foreshadowed in the very first steps of an incipient
consciousness,” he wrote, and argued “that the very earliest and simplest experiences
are those which furnish the raw material of these intuitions.”150 Thus Spencer took the
side of the associationists, like Mill, against what he identified as the school of Kant.
From infancy, our intelligence is built up out of constant experiences of likeness and
unlikeness in the relations between things connected in time, space, through qualities,
etc.
Spencer’s technique in this section is elaborate, exhaustive, and exhausting. Take
for example the following example of perception:
...when watching the evolutions of a ballet, there is a consciousness not only of
the multiplied relations of coexistent positions which constitute our notions of
the distance, size, figure, and attitude of each dancer—not only of the various
like relations between each and the several colours of her dress—not only of the
relations of position among the respective dancers; but also, of the numerous
relations of sequence which the body and limbs of every dancer exhibit in their
movements with respect to each other; and of those yet more involved relations
of sequence exhibited in the movements of every dancer with respect to the
rest.151
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Spencer was thorough because he was trying to disassemble the mechanisms of thought
into the smallest possible component pieces, and then demonstrate how these mental
atoms could have arisen out of primitive sense perceptions acting on a receptive
medium. This set the stage for the second half of the book, where he demonstrated
how these pieces are assembled in the first place, through an evolutionary process.
In the second half of The Principles of Psychology Spencer relied less on forensic
examination of mental states and more on external, biological minds, as they have
developed over time:
It is a dominant characteristic of Intelligence, viewed in its successive stages of
evolution, that its processes, which, as originally performed, were not
accompanied with a consciousness of the manner in which they were
performed, or of their adaptation to the ends achieved, become eventually both
conscious and systematic.152
What were once instincts have become thoughts, and thoughts have developed into
more complex forms as the stages of rationality are ascended, from the primitive
classifications of aborigines to “methods”—consciousness of what reasoning processes
are used and systematization of them—of which Spencer regarded science as a high
form.153 Spencer did not comment on his use of the word “evolution” here, but he made
it clear later in the book that he was referring to the growth of intelligence itself through
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various gradations over time, not the development of an infant into an adult.154
However, we should beware of assuming that Spencer used the word in its modern
sense. There is no clear reference to species change, heredity, or ancestry, so Spencer
could have been referring to human development alone.
Spencer argued that the various grades of intelligence exhibited by humans and
animals shade into each other so imperceptibly that it is impossible to say exactly where
“intelligence” begins. He cited the apes, “hosts of whose actions are quite as rational as
those of school‐boys” and domesticated animals as particularly exhibiting limited
reasoning powers.155 Spencer’s object was to show the link between intelligence and
corporeal processes like reflex action, to demonstrate that mental and physical life are
aspects of the same thing. His definition of life elaborated on Coleridge’s, expressed in
Hints Towards the Formation of a More Comprehensive Theory of Life, that life is “the
principle of individuation, or the power which unites a given all into a whole that is
presupposed by all its parts.”156 Since Coleridge saw life as a continuum, from the barely
alive stone to the fully alive human, Spencer modified this idea to be more specific,
coming up with the definition “the definite combination of heterogenous changes, both
simultaneous and successive, in correspondence with external coesxistences and
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sequences.”157 That is, living beings continually internally coordinate with external
events. This definition remained central to Spencer’s concept of life in all his future
writing.
Spencer kept Coleridge’s idea of progressive levels of life, however, for it fit his
tendency to think of complex forms of life like humans as superior to lower forms.158
Tracing the levels of life from simple protozoans through plants to increasingly complex
animals, he demonstrated that divisions between grades of life are subtle, not clear cut.
Repeated use of the word “evolution” in these sections, as well as terms such as
“primordial tissue” and “the purely physical processes with which life commences”
against suggests that Spencer was speaking of species change over time, though again
he did not mention of heredity or give any mechanism for the changes.159 Without doing
much violence to the text, it is possible to imagine that Spencer was simply tracing out a
great chain of being, with infinitesimal steps between immutable species. Evolution
would thus mean “unfolding” or “unrolling,” its original definition before it came to be
used of the development of the embryo.
In Spencer’s view, human beings were the highest example of the various
specialized correspondences needed in more and more complex environments. As the
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senses advanced in sophistication so did the ability to judge correspondences like
distance and time. “Even the most transcendent achievements of rationality are but the
carrying still further that specialization of the correspondences between the organism
and its environment, which is displayed in the evolution of life in general,” Spencer
wrote.160 Intelligence was simply highly developed reflex. Psychology and Physiology
were aspects of the same thing.161 For Spencer, the mind was a property of the physical
brain.
Intelligence is different than other physical properties in some ways, and
Spencer used part IV of his book to elucidate. He pictured consciousness as multiple,
with “a great number of nascent consciousnesses, of different intensities, existing at the
same moment.”162 Multiple strands make up the thread of consciousness, but these
threads are united so that intelligence seems to be a series of changes rather than many
simultaneous occurrences.163 Spencer defined psychology, then, as the principles
underlying this series of mental acts. To discover these principles, he traced the
evolutionary path of mental abilities, from reflex action to instinct, then to memory, and
finally to their highest form, reason.
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This is where the most important and original aspect of Spencer’s psychology
finally becomes clear—his use of evolution as a way to bridge the gap between Locke’s
associationism and Kantian “forms of thought.” In his discussion of instinct, Spencer
pointed out that organisms which often experience the same mental states in a
particular order will associate them in that order, until the tendency becomes an
automatic connection.164 Suggesting that readers had probably already noticed that he
supported “the development hypothesis,” he declared his belief that life arose “by a
progressive, unbroken evolution.”165 Gradual changes took place not just in physical
form, but in mental abilities as well. In short, in a Lamarckian fashion reflexes developed
during the lifetime of one individual could be transmitted to its successors, who might
develop more complex reflexes on those foundations, eventually evolving into instincts,
memories, and finally, human reason.166 As Spencer put it, “the brain represents an
infinitude of experiences received during the evolution of life in general.”167 All its
contents originate from the formation of mental associations, but the associations made
by many ancestors count as much as the experience of the individual.
Clearly Spencer “buried the lead.” His reconciliation of Locke and Kant, which he
promised at the beginning of the book, was dispensed with in less than ten pages at the
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end of a chapter on reason. Spencer later pointed to this section as containing the
fundamental argument of the book, but this was hindsight.168 The remaining two
chapters were on the feelings and the will. Like some phrenologists, Spencer denied the
freedom of the will. He argued that actions are free, but the desires that lead to actions
are determined by the psychical connections made through the experiences of the
individual or his ancestors.169 The ego is nothing more than the existing state of
consciousness, and its changes obey natural laws. Spencer pronounced these laws
beneficent, as leading to greater and greater complexity, which, by allowing increasingly
complete adjustment to the environment, meant higher life and greater happiness.170
Thus the psychology ends on the same note as Social Statics, with a vision of future
human perfection.
“A Sensation in my Head”: Spencer’s Breakdown
“One morning soon after beginning work, there commenced a sensation in my
head‐‐not pain, nor heat, nor fulness, nor tension, but simply a sensation, bearable
enough but abnormal,” Spencer wrote.171 He was in Wales, working on the last part of
the Psychology; careful about overwork, he had been writing only five hours a day, but
did not take into account the time spent thinking during his afternoon walk, correcting
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proofs in the evening, and reading Thackeray’s latest novel at night.172 Feeling that
something was seriously wrong, he threw down his pen, resolved to take a week’s rest,
and went fishing. But the damage had been done—a “break‐down” commenced, from
which he never fully recovered.173 The next eighteen months he considered lost, though
he did manage, painfully, to finish The Principles of Psychology.
Spencer was always sensitive about his health, but after 1855 he grew more and
more obsessed with his symptoms. These were mostly mental, involving insomnia,
frayed nerves, and inability to concentrate. Physically he remained fairly healthy and
active until very late in life—his remedies for his health often involved exercise, such as
riding, fishing, and even splitting up tree‐stumps.174 This suggests something beyond
simple hypochondria, subtle as his symptoms may have been at times, for
hypochondriacs are generally at least partially bedridden.175 Psychosomatic illness might
be a better way to characterize it, as several writers on Spencer do.176 But ruling out the
possibility of a real physical malady is a mistake, given the paucity of the evidence
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outside Spencer’s own Autobiography. Neuroscientist Martin M. Raitiere, in a flawed
but intriguing book, suggests epilepsy, or more accurately “Autosomal Dominant Partial
Epilepsy with Auditory Features,” perhaps caused by a lesion.177 However, much of his
argument rests on the identification of characters in George Eliot’s work that are
partially based on Spencer, a dangerous procedure especially since Eliot was mostly
silent on the matter.178 Whatever the cause may have been, the physical symptoms
Spencer suffered were real enough.
Spencer blamed his nervous collapse on overwork. For the next eighteen
months, reading or writing for any length of time produced the mysterious “abnormal
sensations,” “feeling in the head,” or “fulness in the head” that told him something was
wrong.179 Social occasions at which there was likely to be intellectual conversation or
argumentation he avoided.180 He saw a doctor, who could prescribe nothing better than
living in a farmhouse where there were horses to ride, a remedy Spencer duly tried.181
Some of his friends prescribed marriage, which Huxley facetiously called “gynœopathy”
while admitting “the remedy had the serious inconvenience that it could not be left off
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if it proved unsuitable.”182 There were phases to Spencer’s illness: at times he was
optimistic about his improvement, but some ill‐advised behavior would always cause
another relapse. It was something of a vicious cycle which continued throughout his life:
impaired judgment due to a failing nervous system led him to take on more than he
could handle, which in turn led to worse symptoms.183
Spencer was not alone in suffering from nervous disorders. Many Victorian
intellectuals, such as Darwin, Huxley, J. S. Mill, Faraday, and Kingsley suffered such
ailments at one time or another in their lives. The symptoms often started in their
thirties, as they did with Spencer, and some, like Darwin, were affected quite
severely.184 Because of his own health problems Spencer thought he saw the signs of
overwork everywhere, especially in his own family. He blamed it for his father’s
illnesses, his mother’s chronic exhaustion later in life, and his uncle’s death at age 56.185
The Victorian context is also important. As historian Mark Francis points out, Spencer’s
obsession with his health was not odd to his contemporaries—it was socially acceptable
to talk about migraines, weakness, and the like—and some of his “cossetting” of
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himself, such as his habit of taking his pulse, was regarded as an amusing eccentricity,
especially by his friends.186
In January of 1857 Spencer had not made a complete recovery, but felt that
more rest was not the answer. He had written nothing remunerative in over two years—
Principles of Psychology had only sold 200 copies out of the 750 printed, which meant
Spencer had to absorb a loss.187 In part this was because of the abstruse nature of the
book, in part because it was perceived as atheistic and materialist.188 Spencer wrote an
answer to one such review, in the Nonconformist, arguing that his book showed that
both internal and external phenomena could not be perceived in themselves, but only
through the relationships between them. Thus science ultimately ends in insoluble
mystery, an early statement on what he would later term “the Unknowable.”189
Doubtless the editors would have been relieved to learn that Spencer was only an
agnostic, had Huxley yet publicized the word.
Spencer went back to work on an essay on development that he had promised
the Westminster Review years before. He made painfully slow headway, a page a day if
that. Three hours was the most he could hope for without wrong feelings in the head,
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and the three‐hour workday became part of his routine from then on.190 However, by
the end of three months he had “Progress: Its Law and Cause” ready to publish.191 This
was one of Spencer’s most important essays because it set the stage for his massive
system of philosophy. However, at the time it was just a step towards his return to full
functionality as a writer. The ideas he set out in “Progress” continued to develop,
resulting in a prospectus for his system in 1860. Meanwhile, Spencer published essays
on a variety of subjects, some in the Westminster, some in other reviews.
A Theory for Everything: Return to Review‐Writing
Spencer continued to be an irrepressible theorist. For Frazier’s Magazine, he
wrote an essay on “The Origin and Function of Music” which argued that music
developed from emotional expressions like howls and shouts.192 Things like loudness,
timbre, and pitch Spencer connected with the intensity of a feeling and its changes and
the mental state involved.193 Spencer’s historical evidence was scanty—which was true
of much of his early work, done before he had research assistants to gather historical
and ethnographical references. His argument hung on his theory’s ability to explain why
music rouses emotion in us. Spencer could be emotionally self‐contained, but in this
essay he praised music for its ability to evoke feelings and stressed the importance of
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emotional language for human happiness, since sympathy for others undergirds the
social system.194
Spencer later used his essay on music as an example of the evolutionary tenor of
his thought at that time. However, the development of an art form over time is not
“evolutionary” by most standards. Another of his essays provides a more fitting
example. “The Ultimate Laws of Physiology” (later retitled “Transcendental Physiology”)
dealt with general principles of life common to many organisms—for example, the fact
that organisms primarily descend from a “fertilised germ” and resemble their parents.195
Evolution, Spencer argued, involves differentiation of an organism’s mass into
specialized organs, each with its own structure.196 This specialization is what separates
higher organisms from lower. Higher organisms are more differentiated from their
environments, for example, mammals are not surrounded by a substance that carries
nourishment like aquatic animals, and maintain a body temperature different than their
environment.197 Specialization is a process that begins with the development of the
seed, which is a homogenous body and thus inherently unstable (a notion that became
central to Spencer’s later evolutionary thinking.)198 Heredity explains why the germ
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develops into a particular organism, a process Spencer did not think science would ever
be able to explain. However, he did make the case that that offspring inherit the adult
characteristics of their parents. Like Lamarck, he argued that the use or disuse of
individual organs or parts in reaction to environmental conditions has hereditary
ramifications.199
At the end of his essay on physiology Spencer drew an elaborate parallel
between societies and organisms, going so far as to argue that this is a time‐honored
way of investigating physiological phenomena. For example, he noted that both
complex organisms and complex societies work on the principle of the division of labor.
Both contain parts that are codependent and others that are rivals, growing at each
other’s expense.200 Spencer’s view of organisms as collections of semi‐independent
parts meliorates the obvious conflict between his belief in the social organism and his
extreme individualism.201 The use of organic analogies became central to Spencer’s
work, underwriting his idea that societies are not made, but grow. Spencer clarified his
views in an 1860 essay, “The Social Organism.” In “Transcendental Physiology” Spencer
did not enumerate the differences between social and organic, creating the impression
that the relationship was more than just an analogy. In “The Social Organism” he listed
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many important distinctions, correcting this view. Spencer did not reason directly from
biological to social—that is, he did not argue that a social structure must behave a
certain way because a corresponding biological structure did so. Though the line was
blurry at times, Spencer understood his concept of the social organism as a useful
comparison, not a positive fact of nature. The social and organic worlds worked in the
same fashion because they both were subject to the law of evolution, not because
society was literally an organism.
In “The Social Organism” Spencer pointed out that both societies and organisms
start out as small simple aggregations and grow immensely larger. During this process,
both become more complex and diversified, and as they do, parts become
interdependent while others become rivals for resources.202 Both societies and
organisms also continue to live as their parts gradually die off and are replaced. Spencer
also made the distinctions clear: most important is the fact that unlike the body, a
society is composed of individual parts that are conscious, but is not conscious itself.
Thus while the parts of the body live for the whole, the society exists for the sake of
individuals.203 The difference seems fundamental, but Spencer did not discuss it, turning
instead to vacuous though entertaining comparisons between the blood and commerce,
circulatory systems and railways, and nerves and telegraph wires.204 Spencer did not
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theorize about organisms based on his observations of societies, or come to new
conclusions about society by referencing biology, so the comparisons seem like little
more than interesting coincidences. At most, the similarities cemented the truth of his
theories in Spencer’s mind.
Spencer’s interest in political and economic issues resurfaced during this period,
and he wrote a number of essays on government and the financial system for the
Westminster Review between 1857 and 1860. In “Representative Government: What is
it Good For?” Spencer returned to some of the themes he first explored in his early
work, The Proper Sphere of Government. Representative Government was seen as weak
because citizens do not pick representatives wisely (and here Spencer echoed a
common complaint of the time, that the British House of Commons, supposed to
represent the people, was stocked with the titled nobility, military officers, and other
members of the upper classes).205 The representatives chosen are too diverse a body,
with too many individual interests and little wisdom necessary to coordinate or carry
out the diverse plans they attempt.206 A personal monarch is more efficient, because
one man makes the decisions and he is liable to select the most able councilors, for his
own sake.207 But personal rule is only fit for a “vicious” state of man; Spencer argued
that “no human being, however wise and good, is fit to be sole ruler over the doings of
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an involved society,” for even with good intentions terrible results are likely to occur.208
The dilemma is resolved by noting that the people are at least likely to pick
representatives that will protect their persons and property. Representative
government is thus the best form for ensuring simple justice, which is the only function
government should really be assigned.209
The social Darwinism apparent in Social Statics emerged again in another
Westminster article, “State Tamperings with Money and Banks.” As in the previous
essay, Spencer sought to demonstrate the failure of government regulations, in this case
of cash and credit. He argued that the financial market must be allowed to regulate
itself naturally, for it is impossible for government to prevent a financial crisis, though it
can certainly cause one.210 State regulation cannot turn bad individuals good, and it
cannot prevent men from being dishonest, rash, or stupid and thereby endangering
their own financial security and that of others. Furthermore, it should not, for insuring
against risk simply makes people more willing to expose themselves to ruin. “We have
no patience with the mawkish philanthropy which would ward‐off the punishment of
stupidity,” Spencer writes. “The ultimate result of shielding men from the effects of
folly, is to fill the world with fools.”211 Discussing this essay in his autobiography,
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Spencer is even clearer: “This was a tacit assertion, recalling like assertions previously
made, that the survival of the fittest operates beneficially in society.”212 For human
beings to evolve, failure must bring its natural consequences.
Yet Spencer did not glorify success at any cost. His standard of fitness did not
include cunning, rapacity, or greed. In his 1859 essay “The Morals of Trade,” he
complained that the mendacity of the commercial world meant that even honest men
must sacrifice their principles or “go to the wall.”213 Once a crooked practice is adopted
as a standard in an industry, employees are forced to adopt it by their employers, and
business owners in related industries must put up with it or lose trade. “It has been said
that the law of the animal creation is—’Eat and be eaten;’ and of our trading community
it may similarly be said that the law is—Cheat and be cheated,” Spencer wrote.214 “Why
in this civilized state of ours, is there so much that betrays the cunning selfishness of the
savage?” he asked, and answered: the indiscriminate respect for wealth, however
gained, is to blame, for social status is the real enticement behind the desire for the full
wine cellar and fashionable address.215 But he had hope, for as society matures it
becomes increasingly self‐aware, and less tolerant of dealings that are not above
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board.216 However, Spencer ended on a negative note: this current state of things
seemed necessary to the current level of progress, in which social activity is focused on
material development through industrial growth.217 This was an oft repeated refrain for
Spencer, who thought real social progress was only possible in the long term.
In 1860 Spencer published yet another essay in the Westminster, this one on
“Parliamentary Reform: The Dangers and the Safeguards.” This essay, like
“Representative Government,” shows that Spencer’s political principles had not
changed much in the decade since Social Statics. Spencer still believed that all classes
were about equal in moral qualities; the poor might steal, but the wealthy did too, if
only indirectly through dishonest trade practices and class‐specific legislation. Thus in
his essay, Spencer maintained that the danger of expanding the franchise was not that
property rights may be violated, but that the working classes would do what the upper
classes had been doing all along, and pass legislation that favored themselves. The
activities of trade unions showed what this legislation was likely to be: laws restricting
working hours and mandating certain levels of pay. In his arguments against trade
unions and their attempts to restrict freedom of contract Spencer was at his most
conservative:
Men who render up their private liberties to the despotic rulers of trades‐unions,
seem scarcely independent enough rightly to exercise political liberties. Those
216
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who so ill understand the nature of freedom, as to think that any man or body of
men has a right to prevent employer and employed from making any contract
they please, would almost appear to be incapacitated for the guardianship of
their own freedom and that of their fellow‐citizens.218
Like many nineteenth‐century thinkers, including his Uncle Thomas Spencer, Herbert
Spencer understood labor as a commodity which the worker sells and the capitalist
buys. Laissez‐faire principles demanded that the cost of labor be left to regulate itself.
The essays Spencer wrote in the five years from 1856 to 1860 show that his
political and social views had not changed much since his youth. Yet there were
subtleties in his thinking which indicated that his allegiance to English Radicalism was
waning and a cynical conservatism was taking its place. Spencer’s loathing for
government was the same as before, but where once he railed against specific
legislation, like the Corn Laws and the Poor Law, now his fulminations were more vague
and amorphous, suggesting a nameless fear of an advancing threat he would later label
“socialism.” He still complained of the idle rich, but his distrust of the lower classes was
more evident as well. And where his early essays were imbued with a powerful sense
that change was coming, the essays of this later period displayed a certain pessimism
about the development of civilization.
One reason for this change was Spencer’s class interests. He clearly identified
with the middle class, having absorbed its culture and values in his youth. In those
younger days, Spencer was passionate about the extension of democracy in part
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because it was middle‐income, educated families like his that stood to benefit. At
middle age, he was less zealous, for it was the masses who stood to benefit from further
liberality of the franchise. Spencer’s belief system had a great deal to do with these
developments. His support for natural rights was sapped by his dismay over how people
used those rights. Furthermore, he had seen previous extensions of political power fail
to bring many hoped‐for changes. What his earlier books had suggested, Spencer was
beginning to take to heart: that social development takes place over extended periods
of time, and that political institutions may change on the surface, but real political
change can only keep pace with shifts in social mores and expectations.
Early American Reactions to Spencer
Social Statics caused scarcely a ripple in the American literary pond upon
publication. Horace Greeley’s New‐York Tribune briefly noticed it in a column on English
works, and quoted the law of equal freedom.219 But for the most part the media ignored
the book, though a few almost random references did appear. One periodical printed
one of Spencer’s arguments against Proudhon, while several others repeated his
observation that Englishmen no longer took of their hats for “God Save the Queen.”220
Social Statics was sometimes misread as “social statistics,” leading one writer to
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mention a new essay on population “from the pen of the great statistician, Herbert
Spencer.”221
A few Americans did read Social Statics later in the 1850s. De Bow’s Review, not
yet an advocate of secession, published an article by G. F. Holmes which stated “modern
abolitionism and modern political economy have but one panacea for those threatened
with starvation: by the mouth of Herbert Spencer, both say, let them die or rot. With
such an alternative, slavery is the more rational and the more humane.”222 Holmes had
obviously been reading Spencer with a critical eye, and he later cited him on crooked
trade practices and land reform.223 Doubtless few of his readers would have known
what “by the mouth of Herbert Spencer” meant, but the general argument was a long
familiar one: that slaves, fed and cared for in old age, were better off than Northern
factory hands discarded when they could no longer work.224 There was some irony here,
because De Bow’s, one of the South’s most important periodicals, was a champion of
commercial and industrial development.225
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Principles of Psychology had few readers in England beyond a small circle of the
cognoscenti. It received even less attention in America. One of the few reviews from the
period simply stated “Mr. Herbert Spencer has published ‘The Principles of Psychology;’
wherein he thinks he has annihilated Scepticism, and evolved the fundamental
principles of human knowledge.”226 A review of Sara Sophia Hennell’s Thoughts in Aid of
Faith argued that she adopted Spencer’s psychology uncritically, especially his “sterile”
definition of life, suggesting at least some knowledge of Spencer’s work on the part of
the reviewer.227 Hennell was a good friend and frequent correspondent of Marian
Evans; she knew Spencer and often asked after him in her letters.228 Her interest in his
psychology is easily explained. In America, however, Spencer did not have intellectually
curious acquaintances to spread the word about his book.
Thus despite the shift in his interests towards the phenomenon of development,
in the late 1850s Americans continued to associate Spencer with political and social
policies—when he was mentioned at all. For example, in 1857, Social Statics was cited in
support of an article arguing that education does not reduce crime.229 The next year, the
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North American Review, a Boston‐based quarterly with connections to Harvard,
published a review essay arguing the opposite.230 The North American was America’s
most important quarterly review, having since 1815 published contributions from the
“cream of New England intellectuals.”231 Despite its pedigree, in the 1850s it had a small
circulation and a reputation for dullness.232 Still, it was influential with the educated
elite, and its discussion of Spencer was likely to be the first its readers had heard of him.
The North American’s critic took Spencer to task for his anti‐government theories,
linking him to the ideals of The Economist and disparaging the idea that a long, slow
reformation of men’s natures was the only way to truly end crime.233
Spencer’s distaste for “over‐legislation” was the most noticed aspect of his
writing, though the brief comments in the North American article show that some had
picked up on his view of social development, if only in a cursory fashion. Unitarian
minister Joseph Henry Allen’s review of the first volume of Spencer’s essays in the
Christian Examiner of 1859 was even more vague, noting the merit of thinkers who
apply scientific principles and methods to the study of humanity, but warning “their
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fault or danger is a hard, excessively intellectual, somewhat dry and materialistic way of
regarding the phenomena of human life, passion, will, and history.”234 The Christian
Examiner was one of the most successful of the many religious periodicals which
comprised a large proportion of the antebellum magazine market, making up with sheer
variety what they lacked in circulation.235 Like the North American, it was loosely
associated with Harvard, and some of its editors and contributors were Harvard faculty.
The Examiner, and Allen himself, became regular, though not uncritical, supporters of
Spencer.
Becoming Known to the People: American Reactions to Education
Spencer’s American reputation would never have reached the heights that it did
without the patient efforts of E. L. Youmans. The son of a farmer and wagon‐maker,
Youmans, like Spencer, was almost entirely self‐educated. He became interested in
science at a young age, and despite recurrent episodes of blindness (which were at least
partially psycho‐somatic) he immersed himself in the scientific knowledge of the day. He
became a sort of missionary, sublimating the religious urges instilled by his upbringing
into a crusade for recognition of the value of science.236 As his friend and fellow writer
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John Fiske put it, “In Youmans the approaching better era found its John the Baptist.”237
He believed that scientific practice was dedicated to truth, and the best route by which
to find truth, and thus argued that scientists must be allowed autonomy and
professional respectability, rather than being labeled as atheists, materialists, and
infidels.238 These beliefs, and the drives they fostered, made Youmans the ideal
promoter of Spencer’s works; and in addition, he was also a skilled popular lecturer and
an able promoter. Furthermore, he had a close relationship with a publisher, D.
Appleton & Co., whom he advised on scientific matters.239
Youmans’ introduction to Spencer came through a reading of The Principles of
Psychology. When Spencer began looking for supporters for his great system of
philosophy, Youmans became a sort of unofficial spokesman. The two began to
correspond, and the connection ripened into a friendship that went far beyond a simple
relationship of disciple and master. Youmans pressed Spencer to publish some of essays
he had written on education in America, for as he told Spencer, “upon taking hold of the
matter I encounter the difficulty to which I anticipated: it is that you are almost
unknown to the people.”240 Eventually four essays on education and child‐rearing were
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collected into a book, which was published in America the year before it was available in
Britain. Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical was a call for modern educational
techniques and modern subjects. The first essay, “What Knowledge is of Most Worth?”
threw down the gauntlet before classical education, comparing it to the tattoos, colored
beads, and trinkets favored by native peoples.241 Spencer argued that education should
be useful for more than impressing one’s peers; it should aid in the attainment of
personal welfare and happiness. He proposed to study, in a systematic way, the
comparative worth of different kinds of knowledge and the difficulty in attaining
them.242 His ultimate conclusion was that in all ways, from the cultivation of the
aesthetic senses to understanding of the self and the workings of the body, science is
the best knowledge to have.243
The remaining three essays explored education in the broadest sense of the
child’s mental, emotional, and physical well‐being. “Intellectual Education” argued that
the content of education must conform to the level of development of the child, citing
Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi as the source of this doctrine.244 Since the mind grows “like
all things that grow…from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous,” education must
also go from the simple, concrete, and empirical to the complex, abstract, and
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rational.245 Allowing a student to learn in self‐directed fashion makes the process one of
“self‐evolution” and gives the child “moral culture”: perseverance, concentration,
courage, and the like. Furthermore, this method make education pleasurable, and
“unless we are to return to an ascetic morality, the maintenance of youthful happiness
must be considered in itself a worthy aim.”246 Punishment, if it must come, should be in
the form of natural consequences, to teach correct conceptions of cause and effect—
otherwise, children will just misbehave again when adults are not around.247 Spencer’s
attitudes about discipline and control were the same as when he wrote Social Statics:
Anger between parent and child weakens the sympathy which makes authority
beneficent.248 Nevertheless, Spencer tried to remain realistic: with society as it is, some
parental anger and blows are natural consequences of juvenile delinquency, for “the
barbarous children of barbarous parents are probably only to be restrained by the
barbarous methods which such parents spontaneously employ.”249
A number of critiques ran throughout Spencer’s four essays. He complained that
the typical educational regime did not prepare children for happy lives as adults. For
example, Spencer noted that children were not taught about being parents, and thus
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ignorant mistakes were repeated rather than corrected.250 Students were taught little
about the physiology of their own bodies, making it harder to take proper care of their
health.251 Similarly, without knowledge of physiology parents did not understand the
harm of pushing their children too hard. Spencer felt that play is necessary for strong,
healthy bodies, and that girls as well as boys should engage in “sporting activities”
outdoors.252 But instead, many parents kept their children inside studying, leading
inevitably to weakness and break‐downs. Spencer cited his own case as a sad example:
Various degrees and forms of bodily derangement, often taking years of
enforced idleness to set partially right, result from this prolonged over‐exertion
of mind. Sometimes the heart is chiefly affected: habitual palpitations; a pulse
much enfeebled; and very generally a diminution in the number of beats from
seventy‐two to sixty, or even fewer. Sometimes the conspicuous disorder is of
the stomach: a dyspepsia which makes life a burden, and is amenable to no
remedy but time. In many cases both heart and stomach are implicated. Mostly
the sleep is short and broken. And very generally there is more or less mental
depression.253
Here Spencer’s concern for overworked children invoked his obsession with his own
health, so that the two threads blend‐‐for Spencer was certainly not overworked as a
child himself.
Education was well written, and contained numerous entertaining epigrams. For
example, Spencer wrote of “the transcendental distinction between right and wrong, of
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which wise men know so little, and children nothing;” and said “the first requisite to
success in life, is to be a good animal.”254 However, many of the ideas were not original,
though they may have been more strongly stated here than elsewhere. He owed much
to his father, though he did not acknowledge this debt in his essays.255 William George
Spencer’s pedagogical technique emphasized cooperation, collaboration, and
conversation; disciplinary measures were often determined by a jury of the offender’s
peers, with the teacher’s role to moderate the resulting sentence.256 It is fair to say that
Herbert Spencer had internalized his father’s methods and opinions to such an extent
that he looked on them as his own.257 However, as with his political ideas he found
general laws, usually physiological or psychological, which explained the superiority of
his methods.
William George Spencer’s ideas had their origins as well, and Herbert Spencer
cited many of these authorities in Education, a practice that was by no means usual for
him at this stage of his career. His main sources were Pestalozzi, Irish reformer Thomas
Wise, and French consul Claude Marcel, all of which he relied on heavily.258 Spencer’s
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own teaching experience, and his personal observation of children should not be ruled
out.259 Spencer argued that an outside observer sometimes has a better vantage point,
and he spent plenty of time among families with small children, most significantly
Laurencina and Richard Potter’s troupe of daughters.260 It is hard not to think of these
girls when Spencer writes “every botanist who has had children with him in the woods
and the lanes must have noticed how eagerly they joined in his pursuits, how keenly
they searched out plants for him, how intently they watched whilst he examined them,
how they overwhelmed him with questions.”261 Yet some critics have claimed that
“Spencer hardly ever thought of education in terms of the child” or that he did not
understand children.262
Education proved popular in America and Spencer’s name began to mean
something to Americans, just as Youmans predicted. Because it was published by an
American company—and for reasons of copyright, published a year before the British
version became available—Education was much more widely reviewed in America than
Spencer’s earlier works. Furthermore, the subject of scientific education was one
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Americans found interesting. Even before Education was in circulation, “What
Knowledge is of Most Worth?” was reprinted in whole or in part by several American
periodicals. Not only did magazines like The Eclectic Magazine of Foreign Literature run
it, but a sizable portion also appeared in the New York Times, which called the essay
materialistic but practical.263 In general, this first essay was the most popular in
Spencer’s book, though excerpts from the other sections found their way into other
periodicals.
Reviews of Education were cursory at best. One of the first of these appeared in
the Albion, another recycler of British and other foreign material. The Albion had
recently republished Spencer’s essay “The Physiology of Laughter” from MacMillan’s
Magazine, where Spencer argued that the signs of mirth were physiological expressions
of excess nervous excitement, often caused by something incongruous interrupting the
normal train of thoughts and feelings.264 With regard to Education, the reviewer was
short and vague, applauding the republication of such useful articles, “though the bold
thinking and plain speaking of the author may startle a certain number of timid and
sluggish minds.” The reviewer noted that the book introduced many ideas that were
already widely known, without specifying what these were, and praised Spencer for

263

[Herbert Spencer], “What Knowledge is of most Worth,” Eclectic Magazine of Foreign Literature 48,
no. 2 (Oct. 1859), 145‐169; [Herbert Spencer], “What Knowledge is of most Worth,” New York Times, Aug.
9, 1859.
264

Herbert Spencer, Illustrations of Universal Progress (New York: D. Appleton, 1864), 194‐195, 201‐
204; Herbert Spencer, “The Physiology of Laughter,” Albion, A Journal of News, Politics and Literature 38,
no. 13 (Mar. 31, 1860), 145‐146.

155
arranged his concepts into a complete system resting on inductions from recognized
laws.265 Similarly, a Massachusetts teachers’ magazine called the work a boon to
educators, noted that Spencer was not well known in America, and mentioned his
projected philosophical system and its list of distinguished subscribers, all without
discussing the essays themselves.266 A reviewer in The Crayon, a monthly journal of art,
considered the book especially important for Americans, who received instruction at
school but little of what he called education. “Our outward and material life
impoverishes our family growth,” he complained, and “our pride, independence,
ambition, and even in many cases, our avarice, provoke us to make frightful sacrifices to
get money, as without money, according to our present standard of thinking, there is no
place for us in society.” The reviewer considered Spencer’s book a tonic, but again
discussed its actual contents little.267
A more substantial critique appeared in The Biblical Reparatory and Princeton
Review in 1861. Founded and edited by Princeton Seminary professor Charles Hodge,
this quarterly was the main voice of the Old School Presbyterians and expounded a
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brand of orthodox Calvinism that would become known as “the Princeton theology.”268
The article criticized Spencer’s upcoming system of philosophy as “deeply tinctured with
sensism, utilitarianism, and positivism,” but found Education valuable despite the fact
that it ignored religious education.269 The author disagreed with Spencer’s more
extreme proposals, such as eliminating education in grammar for young children, but
endorsed what Spencer’s arguments against overworking young minds.270 The
curriculum was to blame; science education was demanded along with everything else,
causing “wear and strain upon the cerebral functions.”271 The author noted the
competitive nature of modern business as well.
The overall impression found in these reviews is contradictory. On the one hand,
many praised Spencer’s writing as forceful and clear, but complained that his
educational ideas were not particularly original.272 On the other hand, Spencer was
praised as a thinker, sometimes extravagantly, as when the New Orleans Daily Picayune
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labeled him “eminent among the pioneer thinkers of the age.”273 Some publishers gave
their readers the opportunity to make up their own minds, by printing excerpts of the
book. Scientific American published one encouraging the teaching of science in
schools.274 The weekly Saturday Evening Post began publishing a series of excerpts at
the beginning of 1861, starting with the first line of the first essay and ranging
throughout the book over three months.275 Each magazine brought Spencer to the
attention of thousands of subscribers. Scientific American was more of a mechanic’s and
artisan’s magazine than the forum for popular science it became later; still, its New York
location and lavish illustration attracted a circulation of 14,000 by 1850.276 The Saturday
Evening Post was not yet into its glory days, but still claimed 20,000 subscribers in the
1860s.277 Education hardly became a blockbuster as a result, but it sold respectably for a
specialized work. In 1864 the Christian Examiner claimed that 6,000 copies had sold in
America while only 200 were purchased in England—”this, too, at a time when the
general mind here was supposed to be possessed with civil fury, and driving straight to
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barbarism.”278 Spencer’s name was now “known to the people” and interest in his
System of Philosophy began to grow.
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CHAPTER THREE
FIRST PRINCIPLES
As Spencer was writing the many essays he published between 1857 and 1860, a
larger conception was growing in his mind—an idea that would tie all his work together
as fruits of the same tree. Spencer laid the foundation for this system in 1857, in his
Westminster Review essay “Progress: Its Law and Cause.” Shortly thereafter he
developed a master‐plan for the massive undertaking that absorbed most of his working
hours for the rest of his life. He called it, simply, A New System of Philosophy. Later he
devised a less generic title: The Synthetic Philosophy. This mammoth project gained
Spencer a worldwide reputation as a philosopher and thinker; above all, Spencer’s
philosophical system was what captured the imagination of Americans.
Dress Rehearsal: “Progress: Its Law and Cause”
Spencer’s essay “Progress: Its Law and Cause” was an immensely important step
in the development of his thought. Executed in the first three months of 1857, the
article was the first piece of work Spencer attempted after his breakdown. In it he
pieced together his ideas about universal evolution for the first time.1 The structure of
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overarching principles that informs all of his later work descended, with modification,
from this article. Spencer himself recognized the centrality of the essay for his later
thought, and incorporated parts of it into the first volume of his System of Philosophy.
The article also featured prominently in the various intellectual biographies he sketched
out during his lifetime.2 In “Progress,” Spencer argued that the law of evolution is the
law of all processes in the universe, from the formation of stars and planets out of
nebular matter to the development of language, art, and culture by human beings. All
progress is a development from simple to complex, necessitated by the basic physical
laws of the universe, both inevitable and good.
The basis for “Progress” was embryologist Karl Ernst von Baer’s observation that
every organism develops from a structurally homogenous state (the seed) to a
structurally heterogeneous one.3 Spencer learned of von Baer’s theories from William
Carpenter’s Principles of General and Comparative Physiology, which he read in 1851 or
1852 (he was putatively reviewing the fourth edition of Carpenter’s work, among other
things, in the original article written for the Westminster Review.)4 In “Progress,”
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Spencer argued that this physiological principle is simply one example of a broader and
more profound law governing all development in the universe. Much of the essay
consisted of various examples of this development from homogeneity to heterogeneity,
whether in the physical structure of the universe, the evolution of more complex
organisms through time, or the evolution of man.5
Spencer’s use of the word “evolution” in this essay is important because it was
he, not Darwin, who popularized the term. “Evolution” in the sense of species change
was a neologism, which Darwin among others did not at first embrace. In fact, Darwin
only employed the term once in the first edition of the Origin of Species, in the passive
voice on the last page.6 Most of Darwin’s reviewers and critics took his lead and did not
use the term either.7 “Progress,” on the other hand, discussed “evolution” both in the
sense of species change, as Lyell did in Principles of Geology, and of embryonic
development, as Hamilton did in Principles of Physiology.8 Spencer treated the term
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similarly in The Principles of Psychology. Such a usage was not peculiar to Spencer—
most of those who wrote of “evolution” at all tended to use the word for both the
growth of a single organism and of new species from old, often in the same text.9 But
Spencer made the connection explicit by taking embryological development as a
singular case of an all‐pervasive pattern which covered species change as well.
But if evolution was the law of progress, why was this so? Spencer’s intellectual
predilections always led him to look behind patterns of phenomena to their causes. In
“Progress” he argued that just as Kepler’s laws of planetary motion are explained by the
fundamental principles of gravitation, so the various cases of evolution are explained by
an equally fundamental physical law: “every active force produces more than one
change—every cause produces more than one effect.”10 Thus homogeneity must ever
turn to heterogeneity as the forces that act on homogenous bodies multiply. For
Spencer, the principle he later called “the multiplication of forces,” explained the
condensation of stellar gas, the evolution of complex organisms from simple ones, and
above all the development in human society. In effect, the more complex the society,
the more complex the forces acting upon it.11
Spencer never argued that change from simple to complex is good in and of itself
in this early essay. However, the examples he used ensured that readers would make
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the connection. His nineteenth‐century British audience was almost certain to do so—
Victorians were quite confident in their place at the pinnacle of human progress. While
belief in historical progress has a long history, stretching back at least as far as Greek
and Roman culture, it was the dominant secular idea in Western social, political, and
economic thought by the mid‐eighteenth century.12 All cultures were put on a linear
scale, which for the British culminated in them. More primitive civilizations were simply
less developed versions of European ones, the cultural equivalent of England’s own
primitive cultures thousands of years ago according to current anthropological theory.13
Greater civility, advances in education, political freedoms, and economic growth
fostered by laissez‐faire capitalism all provided signs of society’s improvement for
anyone to see.14 Thus Spencer was compelling when he argued that thanks to the
fundamental laws of the universe, “progress is not an accident, not a thing under human
control, but a beneficent necessity.”15
The development hypothesis already had some progressive connotations
because of its connection to French radicalism. After all, Lamarck was stifled by the
politically conservative Cuvier in part for his free‐thinking and his radical political
sympathies. In early nineteenth‐century England, evolution was a fringe belief; few
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respectable people believed in the idea.16 Part of the reason was lack of scientific
legitimacy; as Michael Ruse argues, evolution was a pseudo‐science, not backed by
proper inductive methods but attractive to some because of its cultural relevance in the
struggle against the conservative Anglican establishment. Evolution, as part of a whole
structure of anatomical knowledge imported from France, was supported by political
and social outsiders in the field of medicine, and struggles over issues of
professionalization and place also entered into the debates among men of science.17
Spencer’s detailed discussion of the “nebular hypothesis” in his essay also linked
his theories about the behavior of matter to social progressivism. This hypothesis grew
from Pierre Simon Laplace’s astronomical calculations and William Herschel’s
observation of stellar nebulae. The theory was that these nebulae were remnants of the
particulate material that, in our own galaxy, had congealed and compressed to become
stars and planets. In spite of Herschel’s prestige the hypothesis was initially rejected by
mainstream astronomy, in part because it both replaced divine creation and fostered a
view of cosmic progression which some conservative establishment figures found
threatening.18 A modified version called “the nebular cosmogony” also played an

16

A businessman like Robert Chambers was afraid to openly avow his evolutionism, for example.

17

For evolution as a pseudo‐science see Michael Ruse, Monad to Man: The Concept of Progress in
Evolutionary Biology (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 8‐12, 82. For the social and
professional concerns of early evolutionists see Adrian J. Desmond, The Politics of Evolution: Morphology,
Medicine, and Reform in Radical London (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 3‐9, 374.
18

Simon Schaffer, “The Nebular Hypothesis and the Science of Progress,” in History, Humanity and
Evolution: Essays for John C. Greene, ed. James R. Moore (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989),
131‐34, 144‐48.

165
important role in the controversial Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation, which
postulated a “universal Fire Mist” as the source of all creation.19 Nevertheless, despite
observations from newer, more powerful telescopes that cast doubt upon the theory,
the nebular hypothesis grew in popularity. In America, in particular, amateur scientist
and mathematician Daniel Kirkwood developed a formula which seemed to provide
strong evidence in its favor.20 Spencer’s use of the theory in “Progress” and other work,
and his defense of it in the face of cutting‐edge telescopic observations, was a sign of his
commitment to a progressive view of the universe.21
However it may look to the modern reader, Spencer believed he had reached the
general theory of evolution from homogeneity to heterogeneity inductively. Various
classes of phenomena showed similar patterns, he believed, patterns that could be
described with broader terminology. The explanation for these patterns—the law of the
multiplication of effects—he reached by a shift from empirical investigation to a
rational, deductive method, something Spencer considered essential to any complete
explanation.22 Spencer continued to write essays on mundane topics for the next several
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years, but all the while he was considering how his work could all be mustered together
under the banner of a universal cosmic law.
“Make No Small Plans”: The Prospectus
After writing “Progress” Spencer felt that the ideas underlying his various essays
and books, which he had been developing for years, were now coming together as a
coherent set of principles. In the first week of 1858 he drew up a plan for a new system
of philosophy, enumerating the principles in which he had come to believe, and
encompassing the many subjects on which his written work had touched. Afterwards,
he wrote to his father: “Within the last ten days my ideas on various matters have
suddenly crystalized into a complete whole. Many things which were before lying
separate have fallen into their places as harmonious parts of a system that admits of
logical development from the simplest general principles.”23 Evolution, Spencer found,
was a universal pattern seen in a wide variety of phenomena, and the basic laws of force
and matter were the cause.
However, serious obstacles confronted Spencer. One was his continuing ill
health. Spencer had recovered somewhat from the time when he could write only a few
pages a day; now, as he wrote his mother, he could work all morning without strange
feelings in his head.24 But this only amounted to some three hours a day, and there
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were still some days when he could not work at all. The other problem was financial.
Having “frittered away” most of his legacy from his Uncle Thomas—much of it searching
for health through travel during his time as an invalid—he was ill equipped to begin a
venture that did not pay his way.25 As he later wrote, “I am obliged to admit that to any
unconcerned bystander my project must have seemed almost insane.”26
What he did have was a network of friends and contacts. Initially, he hoped to
leverage these into a government position with light duties that would leave him
enough time to labor on his grand scheme.27 But John Stuart Mill was not sanguine, and
testimonial letters from Mill, T. H. Huxley, John Tyndall, and others were of little use.28
More fruitful was another idea—to publish by subscription, which would provide a sure
income if Spencer could attract enough subscribers. Spencer spent some time soliciting
the opinion of friends, including “the Leweses”—by then Marian Evans and G. H. Lewes
were married in all ways except before the law, and she preferred to use his last
name.29 Recently, the scrupulously honest Spencer had unwillingly “outed” Evans by
declining to reply when his old publisher John Chapman asked point blank if she was
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George Eliot.30 Despite some hard feelings over this, the three remained friends, and the
Leweses were among those that helped Spencer work out the details of his new plan.
The prospectus that finally emerged bore a strong resemblance to the outline
Spencer showed his father in 1858. It introduced the ten volume series book by book,
listing the major divisions within each book as well. The first volume was to be titled
First Principles, and following would be two volumes on biology, two on psychology,
three on sociology, and two on morality (in the 1858 draft this was termed “rectitude”).
Gone were the sections on Astronomy and Geology, for the work was already ambitious
enough, Spencer noted, and the need to deal with “Organic Nature” was more pressing.
However, Spencer would put many speculations on stellar formation and geological
processes in First Principles. At the end of the manuscript Spencer described the
individual parts (5 or 6 sheets octavo, 80‐96 pages,) listed the price per part (half‐a‐
crown) and provided a form for the recipient to cut out and send in requesting a
subscription. By the time Spencer published this program, he had solicited friends and
acquaintances and so was able to attach an impressive list of subscribers. Heading the
list was John Stuart Mill, always a steadfast supporter of Spencer’s work. Many other
names stand out, as well—among them classical scholar George Grote, Charles Darwin,
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William B. Carpenter, Charles Lyell, Charles Babbage, Charles Kingsley, and Spencer’s
friends Huxley, Hooker, Tyndall, Evans, and Lewes.31
The response was gratifying. Spencer attracted between 300 and 400 British
subscribers by the end of spring, and he eventually reached 440. He felt this was
sufficient response to merit going ahead with the project. Spencer was certainly being
too sanguine; later he had to remove some from the rolls for non‐payment, while some
gave up their subscriptions after he finished First Principles.32 Spencer later pilloried his
less‐than‐faithful subscribers in The Study of Sociology: he expressed surprise that such
well‐educated and presumably moral individuals would accept something for which they
did not pay. He calculated that clergymen, physicians, and secularists were all about
equal in the percentage that never paid anything—about thirty percent for each group.
Spencer used this as proof that education does not necessarily promote morality.33
Fortunately for Spencer, some Americans were willing to support his ambitious
project. After asking an American acquaintance whether any subscribers were likely to
be found in his country, he learned that an American writer and lecturer, E. L. Youmans,
was working on his behalf. Thanks to these efforts more than 200 American subscribers
were brought into the fold, giving Spencer hope that a sufficient income would be left to
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him after printing costs.34 Many of these subscribers were churchmen, professors, and
other men of letters—”most of our leading scientific and literary men” according to one
paper.35 Among them were many Americans who are still remembered today, such as
William H. Seward, Millard Fillmore, Charles A. Dana, Horace Greely, Benjamin Silliman
Jr., Asa Gray, Henry Ward Beecher, John William Draper, and George Bancroft.36
Spencer clearly had the attention of many prominent Americans when he began his
project.
Evolution in America
Spencer’s prospectus was attractive to Americans in part because interest in
evolution was high, thanks to Charles Darwin’s groundbreaking book On the Origin of
Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the
Struggle for Life (1859). Though the initial program for Spencer’s System of Philosophy
did not emphasize the centrality of his theory of evolution, his summary of his
intentions for The Principles of Biology certainly made his adherence to biological
evolution clear. A scientifically robust argument for the development hypothesis of
species change could only help Spencer’s cause. Furthermore, the timing was
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propitious. Darwin’s book was released on November 24, 1859, while Spencer’s
prospectus was printed in January of the next year and distributed in March.37
Darwin’s theories had a great impact on Spencer. Darwin had been working on
his theory since 1838, but it was 20 years before it was publically presented as a paper
before the London Linnaean society, along with a paper outlining a similar theory
developed by Alfred Russell Wallace. Hearing of these developments, Spencer sent
Darwin a copy of his first collection of Essays (Essays: Scientific, Political, and
Speculative, published in 1857) calling the naturalist’s attention to the opening piece,
“Progress: Its Law and Cause.” Darwin returned a flattering letter—too flattering for
Spencer to print in his autobiography, though he made sure his biographer David
Duncan had access to it. “I treat the subject simply as a naturalist, and not from a
general point of view; otherwise, in my opinion, your argument could not have been
improved on, and might have been quoted by me with great advantage,” Darwin
wrote.38 He reciprocated by sending Spencer a copy of the Origin once it was published.
Spencer was quite pleased about Darwin’s defense of biological evolution, and read the
book as soon as it reached him.39 Origin changed his biological thinking drastically.
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Though he retained his faith in the hereditary transmission of acquired characteristics,
he saw instantly that natural selection explained a lot about species change.40
The reception of Origin shows that an audience existed for Spencer’s work.
Origin was a complex book, containing considerable detailed biological evidence that
Darwin had amassed over decades. Yet all 1,250 copies printed were purchased by
booksellers by the end of the first day.41 Origin’s popularity illustrates a feature of mid‐
nineteenth‐century intellectual life in both Britain and America: the educated lay
reader’s interest in science. Science was not a cloistered trade in Darwin’s day, but
rather a field comprised mostly of amateurs. In fact, the word “scientist” itself was not
coined by William Whewell until 1833, and used irregularly before the end of the
century.42 Terms like “natural philosopher” or “man of science” were employed to
describe someone with a keen interest in scientific subjects, and that person was more
likely to be a country squire (like Darwin) or an Anglican priest (like Whewell) than to be
a professional scientist.43 Men of science typically had broad interests. They wrote their
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books to appeal to the scientifically‐minded reader, for there were few specialists in any
field. Even a multi‐volume work like Lyell’s Principles of Geology was written with an eye
to public accessibility. Spencer’s success as a review‐writer depended on the educated
reader’s interest in scientific topics and willingness to accept the work of a self‐educated
outsider. His System of Philosophy, steeped in the latest scientific principles, also
assumed a general interest in scientific subjects.
Since the transmutation of species was already a widely known hypothesis,
Darwin’s task was to convince more than to explain. And of course, he was trying to
convince his readers of two things: that species change was a real phenomenon with
great explanatory power, and that natural selection was the mechanism that caused it.
The development hypothesis was gaining popularity in England. Fifteen years previously,
Robert Chambers felt it necessary to publish anonymously despite the fact that his book
was overtly theistic. Now even a wealthy country squire like Charles Darwin could
publish a defense of evolution which said very little about God, yet still maintain his
social position.44 In part, of course, this was because Darwin was a respected man of
science thanks to his book on the voyage of the Beagle and his work on barnacles.

scientific professionals, though he disliked the word “scientist.” See Paul White, Thomas Huxley: Making
the “Man of Science” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
44

For a discussion of Darwin’s life choices as they affected his social position see James R. Moore,
“Darwin of Down: The Evolutionist as Squarson‐Naturalist,” in The Darwinian Heritage, ed. David Kohn
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), 435‐481.

174
Origin, unlike Vestiges, was taken seriously by most readers from the beginning.
Darwin had gathered a mountain of evidence over twenty years, some of it from odd
sources such as cattle breeders and pigeon fanciers. Those twenty years also gave him
time to hone his arguments and anticipate objections. Altogether, Darwin elevated
evolution from a pseudo‐scientific hypothesis, held by political radicals and progress‐
worshipping theists, to a working theory worthy of being debated by men of science.45
This is not to say that Darwin’s theory was entirely scientific by the standards of the day.
Some argued that Darwin’s method was not properly inductive because no observer
could witness one species turning into another, or the beginning of life on earth.46
On the Origin of Species caused a different kind of stir than Vestiges of the
Natural History of Creation. Reviewers could not summarily reject it for lacking scientific
rigor. They had to take its arguments seriously or risk appearing to take a stand against
science itself. This does not mean that scientists all lined up to support the book. A
number of key figures in the British scientific community harshly criticized Darwin’s
work, including Richard Owen, then curator of the scientific collection at the British
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Museum and a very influential figure in the London scientific community.47 Besides
writing a hostile critique in the Edinburgh Review, Owen publically clashed with Huxley,
Darwin’s most vociferous supporter, over the origin of man—which was of central
importance to the debate, even though Darwin skirted the issue in Origin and did not
fully engage it until he published The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex in
1871.48
Many of the arguments against the Origin came from scientists who were also
clergymen, such as geologist Adam Sedgwick and botanist John Henslow; evolution as
Darwin preached excluded God’s direct influence over nature in favor of natural law.49
Most of the negative reviews were cautious and balanced; rather than damning Darwin
outright, they disputed his evidence, raised counter‐examples, or simply cast doubt on
the possibility of evolution, natural selection, or both. Reviews came from many
supporters as well, of course, such as botanist Joseph Hooker, physiologist William
Carpenter, and Huxley (writing in both the Westminster and the Times).50 As for the
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general public, their interest waxed and waned; it was particularly strong whenever
man’s ape‐like ancestors were discussed.51
In America, the presidential campaign, secession crisis, and ultimately the Civil
War distracted attention from Origin of Species.52 Thus reaction was somewhat delayed,
and more muted when it came. Among men of science, the chief advocate of Darwin’s
work was botanist Asa Gray, while his chief opponent was America’s leading naturalist,
Louis Agassiz—both on the faculty at Harvard College. Gray was one of the few men
with whom Darwin discussed his theory prior to presentation before the Linnaean
society; Agassiz was a former pupil of Lamarck’s nemesis Georges Cuvier. Both were
devout Christians, though neither was a biblical literalist. Their debate began in early
January, 1860, at a meeting of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in Boston;
from there it progressed to dueling reviews in the American Journal of Science.53 Gray
eventually published a long review stretching over three issues of the Atlantic Monthly,
bringing the scientific issues before a larger audience. The Atlantic was a new but
already highly respected magazine from Boston, edited by James Russell Lowell.54 The
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appearance of Gray’s article is a good example of how easily serious scientific debate
made its way into the public realm through magazines for the educated layman.
There was plentiful discussion of the religious issues as well. At that time, both
men of science and men of religion—often enough one and the same—understood the
fragility of the relationship between the two and worked to preserve it.55 In the
antebellum period, American Protestants maintained a broad consensus about the
relationship of science and religion which borrowed much from natural theology. The
book of nature was a complement to the book of revelation; science was considered a
practical field, not an appropriate source for metaphysics.56 A few events shook this
consensus: there was a flurry of controversy over Vestiges, and concern that new
geological theories contradicted the Bible. But Chambers’ book was condemned by most
scientists, and geology and the Bible were reconciled by means of compromises like the
“day‐age” theory imported from Europe by Yale geologist Benjamin Silliman. This theory
argued that the seven days of creation in Genesis were not literally days, but could each
have been hundreds of thousands of years long.57
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Darwin’s book was not as easy to fit into a system of theology. The idea that God
did not directly create life, but brought it into existence through natural law, overlapped
and intersected other naturalist theories such as the nebular hypothesis, which
explained the existence of the earth and stars by reference to the basic qualities of
matter. The implications for human kind, on the other hand, were more difficult. If
human beings were made of normal matter and subject to natural law, what did this say
about human intelligence? Or about the soul? What did it portend for man’s
relationship with God? Also troubling were the implications of Darwin’s mechanism,
natural selection. If evolution occurred only when unfit organisms perished, that
suggested that pain and death were necessary evils. Natural selection replaced “the
benevolent, spirit‐impregnated nature of the transcendental vision” with “endless
panoramas of anguish and extinction.”58 And it replaced the guiding hand of a heavenly
father with the essential randomness of a material universe where life and death could
only be understood as statistical probabilities.
Still, the idea of an all‐out war between science and Christianity was mostly a
figment of the nineteenth‐century imagination, fostered above all by two books: John
William Draper’s History of the Conflict between Religion and Science (1874) and Andrew
Dickson White’s A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom
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(1896).59 Modern historians have mostly debunked the “conflict theory” as an
overstated and simplistic view of what was a multifaceted and continuously negotiated
relationship. The traditional view that Darwinism caused “fear and shock” and that
religious critics were “overwhelmingly hostile” must be substantially revised.60 Religious
intellectuals were not eager to be seen as zealous bigots, and so took the theory of
evolution seriously, arguing against it on scientific as well as religious grounds. The less
well‐educated may have been less concerned about seeming to keep an open mind, but
they were also less interested in the debate in general, content to understand evolution
as portrayed in popular culture and as preached from the pulpit.61
Critiques of Darwin in American religious reviews tended to be cautious, even
complimentary, but ultimately negative. This was especially true of periodicals that
sought an audience beyond those interested in doctrinal matters. For example, The
Methodist Quarterly Review’s editor, D. D. Whedon, had an interest in politics,
literature, and science, and the review provided positive notices of Darwin’s earlier
work.62 The reviewer of Origin showed respect for the basic idea of the mutability of
species, and recognized that Darwin marshaled “innumerable facts” to support it, but
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also raised a number of sticking points he felt Darwin did not adequately address.63 A
later, more detailed critique from the same publication noted the book’s great success
and its treatment, positive and negative, by various critics (many of whom he
categorized by religious inclinations.)64 In the end, the author complimented himself
that debating Darwin’s ideas on scientific rather than theological grounds was sufficient
to discredit them:
We have discussed this as a scientific question only, to be decided upon
its merits without reference to its theological bearings. It will be time
enough to consider it from this latter point of view when it appears likely
to become established as a true scientific theory, of which there seems
now to be but little need of apprehension.65
Similarly, the author of a review in the Presbyterian weekly New York Evangelist
disclaimed any need to discuss the religious ramifications of Darwin’s work, relying on
science alone to discredit it.66
Catholic treatment of Darwin followed a similar course. As a writer in The
Catholic World noted, “we believe it to be useless to mix up theology with scientific
debates, at least when it is not directly attacked.”67 The Catholic World, started in 1865
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by one of the founding members of the Paulist Fathers, Father Isaac T. Hecker, sought to
orient the church in the direction of American middle‐class culture.68 For Catholics
Darwinism was more than just a theory, it was one more rock to navigate on the river
leading to American acceptance—and Catholics were already perceived as enemies of
science.69 Like those in other denominations, Catholic thinkers softened the issue of
religious compatibility by denying that Darwin’s theory was a valid scientific hypothesis
in the first place. For example, Orestes Brownson, one of the most well‐known Catholic
thinkers of the time, professed his willingness to bow to the authority of science, but
considered Darwin’s theory an induction based on few facts and much speculation.
While Brownson declared in no uncertain terms that Darwinism was incompatible with
Christianity, he did not regard this as an attack on science itself, but only a rejection of
unverified opinions.70 As the century wore on, more and more Catholics came to
question whether evolution really was irreconcilable with their faith.71
Most Christian reviews at this time preferred to label Darwin’s book bad science
rather than bad for religion. The reviewer in the Unitarian Christian Examiner was as
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firm as Brownson about the negative theological implications of Darwin’s work, yet
chose to discuss the nature of hybrids and the geological evidence instead.72 D. R.
Goodwin, president of Trinity College in Connecticut, admired Darwin’s collection of so
many useful facts but felt that his conclusions did not logically follow, were dependent
on too much evidence that was missing or unobservable, and thus did not call for a re‐
evaluation of the theory of theistic creation.73 Even the extensive reaction in The
Theological and Literary Journal, which contained a six‐page explication of the Biblical
account of creation, ultimately spent more time on the current state of scientific
knowledge about prehistoric species than on Christian doctrine.74 Except for a more
religious orientation, these reviews were not much different from those that appeared
in popular secular publications like The Atlantic Monthly and The North American
Review.75
Of course, the early reviews of Origin of Species differed from discussions five,
ten, or more years in the future. In the first years after publication no one knew what
the long term impact of the book would be. Reviews by Christian intellectuals did not
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explore the religious implications of Darwin’s theory because they assumed that any
hypothesis that was incompatible with Christianity could not be true.76 Only later, when
it became clear that evolution was gaining rather than losing adherents among scientists
did theologians begin to take the implications for doctrine seriously.
Uncertain and inchoate opinions about the development hypothesis formed the
backcloth before which reactions to Herbert Spencer’s New System of Philosophy
played out. Important scientists like Agassiz and Gray took opposite sides on the issue,
while Christian writers, unwilling to seem reactionary, forswore the odium theologicum
for detailed scientific debate. Many felt that Darwinism, if accepted, would destroy
belief in a loving creator. The ambivalence created a challenging environment for
Spencer’s theories. He was skillful enough at aligning his philosophy with the latest in
scientific theories to avoid outright condemnation. On the other hand, he was clearly
not a Christian, and, like Darwin, provided very little room for God’s active presence in
the world. As with Darwin, those critics who had religious reasons to reject Spencer
were constrained to treat him with respect. They had to find flaws in his arguments
rather than simply dismissing him as anti‐Christian.
Laying the Foundation: Spencer’s First Principles
When Spencer began to write First Principles in 1860 he felt that he was finally
passing the “miscellaneous” period of his existence and beginning “something like unity
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of occupation.”77 Yet this did not engender a feeling of calm. Putting his ambitious plan
in motion had caused another relapse of his nervous condition. Midway through the
first installment of First Principles he broke down again. His solution, as usual, was to go
on vacation and let relaxation put his head right. These vacations generally involved a
tour of familiar haunts—vacation spots like Llandudno in Wales and Tréport in France,
the Potters at Standish House, Octavius Smith’s estate at Loch Aline.78 Fortunately this
sufficed, and Spencer managed to finish the first installment of his system by the middle
of September. A recent discovery helped; he found that if he dictated rather than wrote,
he could work for a longer period of the day without congestion in his head. Once he
discovered this, he never worked without a secretary again. Using an amanuensis gave
him the freedom to engage in some rather bizarre work habits in an effort to stave off
his symptoms. He took to working in a boat, alternating dictation with vigorous rowing.
Or, he would play “racquets” (squash) and dictate a page or two between games. Still,
his productivity was not as great as he wished, and he had to tell his subscribers that he
could not stick to the schedule.79 First Principles was not finished until 1862.
First Principles was divided into two major sections. The first was the most
controversial. At the end of “Progress, Its Law and Cause” Spencer had written “ultimate
knowledge is impossible” because the reason the universe’s laws are as they are is
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unknowable. In part I of First Principles this “unknowable” became “The Unknowable,”
the Absolute that lay outside of the scope of human understanding and was the
originator and Power behind force and matter.80 Here Spencer was reacting to the ideas
of Thomas Hamilton and Henry Mansel, who argued that human beings cannot have
knowledge of the infinite; Spencer’s “Unknowable” is essentially what Hamilton called
“the unconditioned.”81 Spencer claimed that although all knowledge is relative and
limited, and human beings cannot have definite consciousness of the Absolute, some
indefinite ideas about it are necessary to the processes of thought.82 No one can
conceive themselves as not existing, so the meaning of “existence” must be
comprehensible on a basic level. Spencer argued that this basic idea of existence is
common to all conceptions, thoughts, and impressions, and thought would be
impossible without it.83 Thus, he concluded, the Absolute which underlies and explains
all sense impressions must have real existence. Spencer used similar logic in his essay on
“The Universal Postulate”—something is true when the human mind cannot conceive of
it being false. Of course, such logic begs the question of what humans can and cannot
conceive, and leads to the subjective psychological realm explored in Principles of
Psychology. Indeed, much of Spencer’s argument hangs on epistemology as much as
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ontology. Such uncertainty about the status of knowledge is quite different from the
brash confidence Spencer displayed about science in Social Statics.84
By this method Spencer ruled out atheism, pantheism, and theism as thinkable
alternatives, since each in turn either required creation of something out of nothing or
eternal existence, neither of which was conceivable by the human mind. Since these are
the only three possible explanations for the origin of the universe, Spencer argued that
some sort of ultimate substance or energy must exist that we are incapable of
understanding. What made his analysis controversial was his refusal to assign a
personality to this “Power,” “Absolute,” “Ultimate Cause,” or “Unknowable.” He
suggested that it could transcend such things; to Spencer, belief in an intelligent
Absolute was a bit like an intelligent watch believing its creator has springs and
mechanisms.85 Spencer believed that true religion should teach that the phenomena we
perceive are the manifestations of an omnipresent power that acts on us but is
incomprehensible—this is the common basis of all past and present religions.86 All other
facets of religion are simply attempts to understand what cannot be understood.
Spencer went so far as to suggest that religion should be grateful to science for the
process of purification.87 This was unlikely, for as George Santayana pointed out,
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“genuine religion professes to have positive knowledge and to bring positive benefits: it
is an art; and to ask it to be satisfied with knowing that no knowledge can penetrate to
the heart of things is sheer mockery: the opposite is what religious instinctively
asserts.”88
Spencer highlighted the limits of scientific knowledge as well. He believed that
science was no more capable than religion of comprehending ultimate realities. For
example, space and time must be things—otherwise they are nothing—but no one can
represent them in thought, because things are conceived of through their attributes,
and what attributes do space and time have?89 Likewise matter, motion, and force are
at root outside human comprehension. Even Descartes’ Cogito ergo sum will not save
us, for how can we perceive our consciousness from outside, as object? What then does
the perceiving?90 For Spencer, all thought was relational, not absolute, connected to
previous ideas and sensations rather than simply existing in itself.91 Such relativism
weakened the bulwarks of Spencer’s unified system of knowledge in some ways, but it
also eliminated certain questions from the realm of science, thus clearing some
epistemological ground. Furthermore, Spencer believed these limitations on knowledge
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were something upon which religion and science could agree. “If Religion and Science
are to be reconciled,” he wrote, “the basis of reconciliation must be this deepest,
widest, and most certain of all facts—that the Power which the Universe manifests to us
is utterly inscrutable.”92
Spencer wrote his section on the Unknowable to forestall charges of materialism
and atheism, but it had other purposes as well. In a way, Spencer was laying out a
philosophy of science, noting what data was admissible and what was not.93 This
philosophy of science was somewhat different from today’s, for like nineteenth‐century
scientist and philosopher William Whewell, Spencer believed that logical deduction
from necessary first principles was a legitimate scientific procedure.94 As in his section
on the Unknowable, facts which are ratified by the universal postulate and thus form
the foundation of consciousness are treated as axioms, from which further deductions
are possible. Thus the remainder of First Principles followed a particular method:
Spencer deduced a broad generalization about the laws of the universe, then gave many
examples as inductive evidence that his generalization was, in fact, true.
Having said what could be said about the Unknowable, Spencer turned to the
“The Laws of the Knowable.” As in his first section, he argued that science cannot
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explain what is behind sense perceptions, but it can grasp the order in which they are
manifested, discovering what are known as laws.95 Spencer’s ideas about manifestation
are not always clear. At times it seems that what is perceived are simply emanations
from the one unknowable reality, fundamentally unreal, while elsewhere matter and
energy seem to be real things separate from but caused by the Unknowable.96 The
question is a theological one, and led to Spencer being called a pantheist on more than
one occasion. Spencer would no doubt have argued that either way, the order of
manifestations is the same, so human minds derive the same laws from them.
Chief among these laws is the law of evolution. Here Spencer reprinted most of
his essay “Progress: Its Law and Cause” with few changes.97 Spencer claimed these
changes were unimportant, but there was one crucial difference between the two texts.
In both, Spencer noted that the word “progress” implies changes that lead to increased
human happiness; in First Principles this led him to substitute “evolution” in its place.98
Spencer was essentially giving up the idea that evolution must always be beneficial to
humankind, in order to make it a broader, value‐neutral, and thus more scientifically
acceptable concept.99
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He also admitted that changes that increase heterogeneity can be steps towards
dissolution, as in the case of cancer or social rebellion. To differentiate between
evolution and dissolution, Spencer imported an idea from his essay “Transcendental
Physiology”: that growth is not just an increase in the complexity of matter, but also
implies the development of structural differences through the aggregation and
integration of matter into specialized organs.100 In broader terms, change that ends in
greater heterogeneity is only evolution when it is also a development from the
indefinite and chaotic to the definite and orderly—that is, when the transformation
results in an increasing number of distinct, separate structures.101 Spencer thus
eventually defined evolution as “a change from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity,
to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; through continuous differentiations and
integrations.”102 This is a universal process, he argued, which has, is, and ever will go on.
It can be seen in many phenomena, and Spencer provided pages of examples, from the
formation of the earth, to the development of the embryo, to the social differentiation
in modern society.103
Once Spencer had established that the law of evolution can be seen acting
everywhere, he sought to explain why these patterns recur. To do this he used
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deduction from the necessities of thought. Spencer argued that no one can truly
conceive of matter coming from nothing or turning into nothing. This jibed with current
scientific thought about matter’s indestructability.104 Another recent scientific postulate,
the conservation of energy, must also be fundamental based on the experience of the
Unknown Power—though Spencer preferred to call this the persistence of force.105
Force can change—motion can become heat through friction, for example—but modern
science shows that when force is “spent” equivalent amounts of force are always
generated.106 Force and motion follow various subsidiary patterns, such as following the
line of least resistance (and this can be seen in man as well as nature, and in the actions
of societies as well).107 These basic facts are what makes evolution necessary; they
explain the instability of homogenous bodies and the multiplication of forces, here
called the “multiplication of effects.”108 Thus increasing heterogeneity is inevitable.
Spencer believed that evolution is most likely to take place where the whole is
semi‐solid, capable of internal movement and development but not so flexible that it is
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incapable of taking more definite form.109 Thus living creatures are highly subject to
evolution, as are societies that are somewhat organized but not as structurally frozen as
Oriental societies—England of course being the best example.110 What makes this
transformation evolution and not dissolution is the fact that forces tend to separate
parts based on likeness, like a wave separates sand from pebbles, leading to
differentiation of different parts from each other and their integration with similar
parts. For example, since men always act on one another by physical or mental force,
there must always be a struggle for supremacy which some will win and some will lose—
that is, the formation of social classes.111 And these classes, tending to adhere together,
lead to a society with segments that are integrated but clearly differentiated from other
segments.
In the final chapters, Spencer returned to flesh out some of his concepts—”the
multiplication of force,” “differentiation and integration,” and most importantly,
“equilibration.” He wrote each chapter using the same pattern. He explained the effect.
He provided many examples, starting with the birth of planets as described by the
nebular hypothesis and running through chemical, geological, biological, psychological,
and social evolution. Finally, he deduced the necessity of the effect given the
persistence of force. This method gave the book a sweeping quality, as Spencer
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constantly returned to the birth of the solar system and worked his way up to the most
complex phenomena of society—the effects of the introduction of the locomotive, for
example.112 In his penultimate chapter, on “equilibration,” Spencer reasoned that
evolution always tends towards a system of moving equilibrium, such as is seen in our
solar system, but that since every moving equilibrium has some instability, all matter
ultimately reaches a state of motionlessness and “omnipresent death...a universe of
extinct suns round which circle planets devoid of life.”113
Spencer was not content to end with such a vision. Instead, he imagined that the
power of gravitational attraction might eventually cause these suns to collide,
generating great heat and causing most of the matter in the galaxy to be diffused into a
thin gas, which could then evolve again.114 For all we know, these alternate eras of
evolution and dissolution may go on forever. As for humanity, Spencer envisioned a
great destiny, just as he had been doing since Social Statics. Great perfection and
happiness that will inevitably come when man’s mental workings are perfectly adapted
to the conditions of his existence in society.115 One is irresistibly reminded of the ending
of Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation, where Chambers predicted a continual
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moral and intellectual advance, perhaps ending in a higher type of humanity.116 One
important point must be stressed, however: Spencer’s rejection of a personal,
intervening deity meant that the will of the creator could no longer serve as an
explanation for why things tend towards universal perfection as it had in Social
Statics.117 Instead of a divine master plan of creation, Spencer’s view implied that
progress is simply a necessary effect given the basic laws of the universe. To his way of
thinking, the persistence of force and the indestructability of matter meant that
universal evolution must take place, and since evolution in humans and their societies
meant better adjustment to conditions, ever‐increasing happiness was necessarily one
result.
From a modern point of view, a number of Spencer’s deductions are
problematic. Putting aside metaphysical and theological issues for the moment,
Spencer’s doctrine of evolution is foreign to the modern idea of science because it is not
clear how a hypothesis as general as Spencer’s could be tested by experiment or
observation. No data could falsify it, for several reasons. First, Spencer provided no
means to predict how long a particular case of evolution might take, or whether it
would end in equilibrium or dissolution. Anything that did not seem to be evolving could
simply be transforming at a very slow rate, or in equilibrium, or dissolving. Second,
Spencer used extremely vague terminology. For example, his idea that a homogenous
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whole is unstable begs the question: what is a whole? Sometimes the parts of the whole
closely interrelate and are distinct from other bodies, as with an organism, and other
times they are loosely connected and it is difficult to draw boundary lines, as with a
society.
Even if Spencer’s hypotheses were deducible directly from the basic laws of
matter, no warrant existed for applying them to larger and more complex systems.
When Spencer leapt from physics and chemistry to biology and sociology he retained all
the laws of matter and motion he had derived from simpler processes. For example, he
tried to demonstrate that force follows the line of least resistance, whether the subject
was water flowing, organisms moving, or nervous energy driving emotions. But clearly
the complexity of the human mind makes tracing the millions of forces buzzing through
the nervous system an impossible and pointless enterprise. Spencer simply ignored
these complexities, treating the line of least resistance as more than an analogy. For
example, in The Principles of Biology explained the genesis of nerves in terms of nerve
force following lines of least resistance, leading to channels that eventually became
distinct.118
Because he integrated recently discovered scientific principles such as the
conservation of energy, because he used evidence from the latest scientific studies, and
because his System of Philosophy included books on biology and psychology, Spencer’s
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readers gave him credit for broad scientific learning. This fact is central to an
understanding of the reception of First Principles and of Spencer’s work in general. For
many, criticizing Spencer meant criticizing the modern, scientific way of thinking.
Hindsight suggests that it should have been easy to debunk First Principles as a scientific
work. But because the field of science was not yet rigorously limited to specialists
working with quantitative data, few of those who critiqued Spencer seriously
questioned his scientific credentials.
Religion and Science: The American Response
After 1860, Spencer’s American reputation grew exponentially, despite the fact
that so many Americans’ attention was drawn by the drama of secession and civil war.
Life goes on even during wartime, and intellectual life is no exception. Spencer’s
growing fame came despite the difficulty experienced by the American press in these
years, especially the publishers of periodicals. The panic of 1857 had already thinned the
ranks; now war brought higher labor costs and the loss of all Southern subscribers to the
North, and vice versa.119 Newspapers sold their coverage of the vicissitudes of war, but
reviews and even most magazines at the time did not cover current events, and many
continued this practice—such as The Atlantic Monthly and Harper’s New Monthly
Magazine, which “neither poetized nor propagandized the conflict.”120 Harper’s
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Monthly, founded in 1850 to aid the Harper Brothers’ publishing firm, was the most
successful magazine in America by the time of the Civil War, printing 200,000 copies a
month. Any difficulties it had during the war were more than made up for by Harper’s
Weekly, which reached 90,000 subscribers when the war began, and kept growing
thanks to its stirring engravings of Civil War scenes.121
Most articles on Spencer written during the Civil War years concerned either
Education or First Principles. But name recognition tempted some critics to rediscover
his earlier work. A long critique of Social Statics that appeared in the Biblical Repertory
and Princeton Review in the fall of 1861 opened with a statement of the law of equal
freedom.122 The critic complained that Spencer intended this to be a logical proposition
with the certainty and exactness of a mathematical axiom. Such a system must
necessarily be a failure: men can be understood only through experience since they are
beings created by God, not machines constructed to obey a priori law.123 Applying this
scheme only to the perfect man means that almost all people must be left out—the
perfect code of laws is only possible when its subjects are ideal, not real.124 The writer
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also criticized Spencer for attacking obedience to social authority, since such obedience
is not only universal, but also intended by God for our own good.125
Overall, the reviewer put together a poorly organized rag‐bag of criticisms and
complaints, some with so little logical force that they were the written equivalent of
clucking one’s tongue. However, he had a few worthwhile insights. The writer criticized
Spencer for arguing that civilization must follow a particular path of development and
then loudly condemning past and present laws and institutions.126 This strikes at the
heart of Spencer’s dilemma, for in Social Statics he was caught between a desire to
prescribe and a pessimistic sense that only description is possible. But for the most part
the review is notable only for what is absent: Spencer’s attitude towards the poor, for
example, or his arguments against state charity. Spencer’s anti‐government stance was
hardly mentioned. If there was a general argument in the review, it was that a society of
imperfect human beings cannot be analyzed rationally, but only on the basis of
experience and natural sentiments. Spencer’s view of progress through pain was not
discussed.
Spencer’s new American popularity even led to some discussion of the first
edition of Principles of Psychology, at least among those with an interest in the subject.
A series of articles in the American Phrenological Journal brought up his work several
times, mostly in opposition. Spencer’s had criticized phrenology in his work, though he
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shared a number of assumptions with phrenologists: that different sections of the brain
rule different modes of thought and emotion, for example. The author of the articles
was one of Spencer’s subscribers, Levi Reuben; he criticized Spencer in turn, for his
account of the development of the concepts of space and time and the origin of the idea
of equivalence. Reuben argued that Spencer wanted to reduce knowledge to a
combination of sensations; but sensation is really only the cause of ideas, which have
the psychic actions of the mind itself as their source.127 Another article in the same
journal was more positive, calling Spencer “one of the most profound thinkers of our
day” and quoting Principles of Psychology at length in support of cerebral localization of
specialized brain functions.128 Spencer even appeared in an Encyclopedia, one issued by
his publisher D. Appleton and Co., which unaccountably summarized his psychology but
none of his other works.129
Most of the discussion of Spencer in the American press concerned First
Principles, however. “For the Victorians Herbert Spencer was pre‐eminently the
philosopher of First Principles,” historian Michael Taylor has written. “Notwithstanding
the popularity of some of his other works, like Education and the Study of Sociology…in
the 1870s and 1880s Spencer’s towering intellectual reputation rested on this one
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book.”130 William James, who used the book in the classroom, agreed with this
assessment of Spencer’s American reputation.131 And indeed, Spencer’s work generated
such interest that critiques were written before the book in its entirety was available.
Spencer’s American publisher, D. Appleton, did not issue the book in a single volume
until 1864. Yet reviews appeared discussing the sections issued by subscription, or, after
1862, based on the English edition. The earliest of these reviews obviously concerned
themselves with the first part of the book, where Spencer outlined his philosophy of the
Unknowable. This first principle of First Principles was the most interesting and
controversial aspect of Spencer’s work for many of his contemporaries, especially for
religious writers.
The earliest reactions in Christian reviews varied between tentative acceptance
and outright hostility.132 The Christian Examiner was guardedly optimistic. The Examiner
was the most important Unitarian periodical at the time, with frequent submissions
from faculty members at Harvard. One such contributor was theology professor Charles
Carroll Everett, who introduced Spencer as a promoter of the positive philosophy, and
cheered the attempt to reconcile science and religion from this “wisest and most
honorable of opponents”:
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Herbert Spencer comes, in good faith, from what has been so long a hostile
camp, bringing a flag of truce and proposing terms of agreement meant to be
honorable to both parties. Let us give him a candid hearing, and perhaps the
terms he offers, though we may not accept them in their first and full form, may
lead to a better understanding, and open the way to a final adjustment. 133
D. A. Wasson, writing in the same journal a year later, was less sanguine. Wasson was a
Unitarian minister and inexhaustible source of material for the periodicals of the day.134
Here he complained of the “spiritual timidity” of a certain class of writers, who believe
“the soul can furnish only fancies, that the senses alone afford a safe foothold.”135 In the
same issue, however, Editor Joseph Henry Allen praised Spencer’s scientific reasoning
and his definition of life. First Principles might ignore the soul and find no greater
meaning in existence, but Allen felt this was simply characteristic of the thought of the
present which prepared the way for the fuller philosophy of the future.136
Support for Spencer’s view of religion and science was not confined to Unitarian
periodicals. The New Englander was a Congregationalist publication with ties to Yale; its
aim was to be “simply a magazine expressing the views of free Christian men, on

133
[C. C. Everett], “Spencer’s Reconciliation of Science and Religion,” review of First Principles by
Herbert Spencer, Christian Examiner 72, no. 3 (May 1862), 337. This was a review of the first four sections
of the book.
134

Mott calls him “brilliant” and compares him to Emerson. Mott, American Magazines, 1:290, 3:18.

135

[David Atwood Wasson], “Courage in Belief,” Christian Examiner 74, no. 3 (May, 1863), 383‐84.
Wasson did not consider Spencer an atheist, however, calling his system “negative theism”. D[avid]
A[twood] W[asson], “Mr. Sears on Modern Naturalism,” Radical (Nov., 1865), 104.
136

447.

[Joseph Henry Allen], “Review of Current Literature,” Christian Examiner 74, no. 3 (May 1863), 445‐

202
whatever happens to come up for discussion.”137 Its reviewer, J. E. Barnes, praised
Spencer as a “Positivist who does not treat the subject of religion with supercilious
neglect,” though he felt that awe at the Unknowable, while it might satisfy some, was
too weak a religion for “earnest thinkers.”138 Spencer, sensitive as always about his
debts to Comte, responded with a letter pointing out that “positivist” had become a
general term for men of science who opposed religious explanations of phenomena,
that he had already published objections to Comte’s system, and that no British scientist
he knew considered himself a disciple of Comte.139
The most thorough of these early reviewers of First Principles, Everett and
Barnes, made two arguments that would become common methods of approaching
Spencer’s idea of the Unknowable. First, they pointed out that the Absolute could
choose to make Himself known by revelation.140 Everett went so far as to say that
“science will demonstrate the fundamental truths of revelation, and will settle the
meaning of it.”141 Second, both argued that even if direct knowledge of the Absolute is
impossible, man can know some of His attributes by studying those phenomena that
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point to His existence. To Barnes, this meant humanity’s religious and moral instincts,
which prove that the Absolute is a personal lawgiver.142 Everett made an even more
ingenious argument: if sense perceptions are only symbols of ultimate reality, what a
person thinks and feels must also be a projection of this ultimate reality, implying that it
contains mind and thought.143 Both points would be made in a variety of forms by later
critics who sought to prove that the Absolute was not as unknowable as Spencer
believed.
On the other hand, some early critics mistook Spencer for a simple materialist,
despite his venture into metaphysics. The reviews that were more in‐depth, like that of
Barnes, usually pointed out that Spencer was an improvement on Hamilton and Mansel
because he argued that absolute being must exist.144 Shorter and assumedly more
hurried reviews were less likely to consider such nuances. A critic in the Methodist
Quarterly Review complained that the Unknowable was “a nothingness to us,” and that
Spencer only thought objects that could be pictured were real.145 Spencer had already
strenuously denied these charges in several letters to the British weekly The
Athenaeum; he pointed out that he considered atheism just as impossible to truly
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conceive as theism, and affirmed the existence of an omnipresent power not just as a
backdrop, but as the cause for all physical phenomena.146 One American writer
summarized these letters, but ended by simply noting that Spencer denied Christian
revelation.147 That was apparently enough to convict him of materialism for this author.
Early reviews of First Principles were not common in the secular press. One
striking exception was the work of John Fiske, later the author of Outlines of Cosmic
Philosophy among other books. In an article reviewing H. T. Buckle’s History of
Civilization in England Fiske positively gushed over Spencer, putting his theory of
evolution on a par with Newton’s theory of gravity. For Fiske, the theory explained all of
nature and human history.148 In 1863 The North American Review published Fiske’s
review of First Principles and two books on language which applied Spencer’s theories to
the development of human speech.149 He credited Spencer with extending the concept
of evolution and praised his “stupendous induction, from all classes of phenomena,”
giving numerous examples from Spencer’s book.150 Tracing the development of
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language in terms of growing heterogeneity and integration, Fiske came to the
conclusion that English was the most highly evolved language, while the gesticulations
common to “lower races” like Negroes and Chinamen were remnants of a primitive,
homogenous proto‐language.151 Interestingly, Fiske ended the essay with a vision of a
future “absolute community of causation” where generalization would ally all
phenomena; then “science and religion will be in complete accord.”152 Reviewers this
familiar with Spencer’s evolutionary theory were few in the early 1860s, however.
Almost all of the critics, even those who had not read Spencer thoroughly,
agreed that he was an important thinker and a skilled and careful writer, and he merited
attention.153 The Saturday Evening Post declared him “a writer whom thinking men are
bound to read, if for no other reason than to keep up with their times,” and added
“Herbert Spencer’s ideas will soon by in everybody’s mouth, and everybody will be
called upon to say yea or nay to them.”154 The New York Times reported that Spencer
had gained a high position as an original thinker, and praised his analytical power and
clear style. Interestingly, the Times recommended Spencer’s political essays, just then
emerging in American form, above all others.155 Some periodicals recognized Spencer’s
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particular attractiveness to Americans. Amidst fulsome praises of Spencer’s contribution
to the advance of civilization, The Atlantic Monthly declared that “in America we may
even now confess our obligations to the writings of Mr. Spencer, for here sooner than
elsewhere the mass feel as utility what a few recognize as truth.”156 The Christian
Examiner noted the importance of his educational precepts in a country that relied on
the capacity of all men to take part in civic life.157 Spencer seemed peculiarly useful for
Americans, perhaps because his notions of progress spoke to American ideas about their
destiny.158
These early reviews are important because they were written before the
contents of First Principles were widely known in America. Thus they represent
reactions uninformed readers might have had when coming to the book with few pre‐
conceived notions. Some readers, like Fiske, succumbed completely to Spencer’s grand
vision. Others, who appraised the book purely through religious lenses, rejected it as
materialist and atheist. The more careful religious reviewers found First Principles
valuable as a first step but ultimately too limited to be accepted by Christians. Ironically,
as years passed and positions on the book hardened, none of these approaches came to
represent mainstream opinion. As Christian opinion‐makers became more and more
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concerned about a movement they called “modern thought,” neither outright
condemnation on religious grounds nor partial acceptance seemed to offer the right
antidote against this new type of secular and scientific thinking. It was not enough to say
that Spencer stopped too short; he had to be proven wrong. Meanwhile, more secular
reviewers, unable to swallow Spencer’s entire system, usually found it easier to criticize
than to compliment. Thanks in part to Spencer’s emphasis on the systematic nature of
his project, those who carefully scrutinized Spencer’s work found it difficult to single out
any of his theories for praise without ratifying his entire system. With some exceptions,
neither religious nor secular writers were willing to go that far. The irony is, the more
the critics criticized the more Spencer’s popularity seemed to rise.
Spencer’s Essays in American Guise
In 1864 Appleton published the first American collection of Spencer’s essays,
entitled Illustrations of Universal Progress. The title was a bit of revisionist history, for
Spencer thought that many of his early essays showed his theory of evolution in
rudimentary form.159 However, unless one takes Spencer’s conception of evolution to
include all development over time, essays like “Manners and Fashion,” “The Genesis of
Science,” and “Use and Beauty” cannot be considered evolutionary. Some of the essays
in Illustrations did address issues directly connected with the doctrine of evolution.
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“Progress: Its Law and Cause” and “The Development Hypothesis” were both included,
as was “Illogical Geology” and “The Nebular Hypothesis.” An “American Notice of a New
System of Philosophy” describing Spencer’s plans and goals came immediately after title
page and statement of copyright.160
Most of these essays were unfamiliar to Americans. They were originally
published in British magazines, and neither volume one nor volume two of Essays:
Scientific, Political, and Speculative were yet published in an American edition.161 As
such, Illustrations evoked a small flurry of critical attention. The Round Table
understood the essays as illustrative parts of a larger system that emphasized universal
progress or the law of evolution based on the correlation of physical forces, and focused
on Spencer’s scientific evidence for the nebular hypothesis and for evolution.162
However, by the end, the reviewer’s focus returned to religious matters. He directed the
reader to First Principles for Spencer’s full views, and suggested that the theological
issues raised might convince theologians to stop wrangling with each other and unite to
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defend their common faith.163 This was somewhat ironic, as the Round Table, a short‐
lived but influential New York journal which averaged around 4,000 subscribers, was
infamously contrarian.164 The Christian Examiner, still feeling positive about Spencer,
recommended the book for filling out a harmonious and complete system superior to
that of Comte, but noted that it did not include Spencer’s essays on more popular topics
like politics and ethics.165 J. P. Quincy, writing in The Atlantic Monthly, praised Spencer
highly for his abilities and his dedication to his vast undertaking. Satisfied that the
system provided a foundation for the religious feelings, Quincy recommended the book
not only to the educated but to “the mass of working men and women who make time
for a solid book or two in the course of the year,” who might not understand the whole
but would find things to interest them in the parts.166 The recommendation is worth
noting for its rarity—Spencer’s audience was generally assumed to be the educated
classes.
As in the early reviews of First Principles, reviewers of Illustrations were quick to
praise Spencer’s originality, clarity, and boldness. At times the acclamations were
fulsome indeed. One reviewer wrote “the thought which pervades this book is, beyond
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doubt, in a philosophic point of view, the most important that the human mind has yet
reached” and, like Fiske, compared Spencer to Isaac Newton.167 Even those who
rejected Spencer’s doctrine of evolution could find intriguing theories and striking facts
in the various essays.168 Recognition of Spencer’s growing popularity was also general.
The Round Table discussed Appleton’s promotional and publication strategy, and
credited E. L. Youmans as well.169 Even the United States Service Magazine felt the
necessity of introducing Northern soldiers to Spencer and his Illustrations, if only to
warn them against a philosophy which traded a personal God for an anonymous force
acting on a homogenous medium.170
D. Appleton published the remainder of Spencer’s review articles at the end of
1864, in a book titled Essays: Moral, Political, and Aesthetic.171 This collection reprinted
Spencer’s essays on political and social topics, like “Over‐legislation,” “Representative
Government” and “Parliamentary Reform: The Dangers and the Safeguards.” A few
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miscellaneous pieces were also included, such as “The Philosophy of Style” and
“Gracefulness,” as well as Spencer’s screeds against marketplace fraud, “Railway Morals
and Railway Policy” and “The Morals of Trade.” This collection received considerably
less attention than the last. A number of possible reasons present themselves.
Appleton’s issue of First Principles earlier in the year surely distracted the attention of
reviewers. Perhaps the political essays, with their constant, detailed citation of English
examples, did not appeal to Americans.
Whatever the reason, notices of the book tended to be short, when they
appeared at all. The Ladies’ Repository praised Appleton for making Spencer’s writings
available to Americans, since many of them were applicable to the American scene.172
The author was no more specific than this, however. The Cincinnati‐based Repository,
like other popular women’s magazines of the day, was aimed at middle‐ and upper‐class
educated women.173 Despite its religiosity (it was firmly Methodist) it was not shy about
recommending Spencer to its readership, and would continue to do so in years to
come.174 Not all of its contributors followed this policy, however: Francis Willard wrote a
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piece bashing Spencer among other “men whose reason has become their deity” for
considering religion the domain of the ignorant and misguided.175
The New‐York Tribune published a review that promoted Spencer as particularly
good for American readers. The reviewer quoted at length from “The Philosophy of
Style,” cleverly linked Spencer’s notions about economy of attention with his
suggestions about economy of movement (“Gracefulness”), and, after a long quote from
“Overlegislation,” summarized Spencer’s views on representative government.176
However, much of the column was quotation and summary with a minimum of
comment. The New‐York Tribune’s guiding force was the influential Horace Greeley, who
was controversial at the time for supporting a negotiated peace between North and
South. The Tribune reached 400,000 people in the 1860s by Youmans’ estimate, making
its endorsement quite valuable.177 Whether Greely himself was a disciple of Spencer is
doubtful. Greely did not mention Spencer in his autobiography and was cool to the idea
of serially publishing Spencer’s sociological work.178 Nevertheless, thanks in part to
Youmans’ evangelism, the Tribune was a firm supporter of Spencer for many years.
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The range in religious opinion about Spencer’s political essays was starkly
illustrated by the notices in the American Quarterly Church Review and the Christian
Examiner. The former, edited by Episcopalian priest Nathanial Smith Richardson, was
the foremost periodical of its denomination.179 Its critic declared Spencer a “schemer
pushing his dangerous sentiments to their natural result, in their application to the
Moral and Political interests of Society”—an application which could only lead to
vandalism, lust, and the enormities of the French Revolution.180 The Unitarian Examiner,
on the other hand, praised Spencer as a wise and vigorous writer whose essays were
recommended reading—though noting that the age of some of the essays meant the
abuses they exposed had been rectified.181 Clearly, some religious writers were willing
to bracket Spencer’s religious opinions when reviewing his essays and others were not.
The Dust Settles: Developing Critiques of First Principles
After Appleton finally issued the American edition of First Principles in 1864, a
flurry of new critiques appeared. Spencer’s popularity was duly noted. The New York
Evangelist, a Presbyterian weekly which began as an anti‐slavery journal, stated that
demand for First Principles was even higher in America than in England, “a somewhat
remarkable fact, especially when we consider that we are now involved in civil war, and
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England is at peace with all the world.”182 The American Presbyterian and Theological
Review, which conflicted with Hodge’s Princeton Review on desirability of union
between the branches of Presbyterianism, pointed to Spencer’s bold and
comprehensive plan as part of the reason for his success.183 One sign of Spencer’s
growing visibility was a notice of First Principles that appeared in Harper’s Monthly.184
Though circulation had declined thanks to the war, this still brought Spencer’s name
before tens of thousands of readers.185 There were, of course, some who disagreed with
the common assessment. “We sometimes see a man of middle size, who, by justness of
proportion, and erectness of carriage, conveys the impression of rather commanding
height,” wrote a critic in the radical Friend of Progress. “Such a man is Herbert
Spencer.”186
Interest in Spencer’s work continued to be highest among religious writers. Over
the next few years, reviews continued to range the gamut from friendly to hostile. Some
critics still did not make fine distinctions between Spencer’s denial of knowledge and
simple materialism. For example, a writer for the New Englander stated that Spencer’s
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doctrines were not theistic and thus were anti‐Christian. He acknowledged that Spencer
had devoted admirers but griped “it would seem that the editors of religious
newspapers ought to know whether the books which they recommend teach Theism or
Atheism, on principle.”187 Another called Spencer’s system “one of the most fascinating
and most mischievous systems of Materialistic Atheism.”188 The writer was still willing to
engage Spencer in lengthy debate, however.
Most critics recognized the complexity of the issues, and highly detailed and
critical discussions predominated. Though the assessment was generally negative,
religious reviewers willingly engaged Spencer on his own terms to see if his philosophy
stood up to scrutiny. Sometimes, theologically inclined reviewers found something of
value in Spencer, for all their disagreements. In the revised edition of his Intuitions of
the Mind, James McCosh, a transplanted Scottish divine who later became president of
Princeton University in 1871, described Spencer’s system as the attempt of a powerful
mind to reach an impossible height. Though doomed to failure, McCosh wrote, “his bold
generalizations are always instructive, and some of them may in the end be established
as the profoundest laws of the knowable universe,” a statement later used by D.
Appleton to advertise Spencer’s work.189 Lyman H. Atwater, another Princeton
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Presbyterian, accepted development from homogeneity to heterogeneity as true of
organisms, physical and cosmic phenomena, and in some ways of society as well.190 On
theological grounds, however, he considered Spencer a hair’s breadth away from
materialism. To believe force can neither be created nor destroyed is to deny the
Creator, he pointed out, as is identifying mind with matter as Spencer did in his
Psychology.191 As Atwater put it, even if Spencer was not technically an atheist, his
vision of God was “an exceedingly thin, dead abstraction—a ghost of a shadow.”192 That
Spencer’s Unknowable God was scarcely worth worshipping was a sentiment shared by
many religious writers.
The Methodist Quarterly Review expressed what would become a common
critique of Spencer’s thought from a Christian standpoint: that the realm of the
“Unknowable” was simply an epistemological ghetto where theological issues could be
set aside and forgotten.193 The Methodist Quarterly was the most important Methodist
review magazine, and during the lengthy term of editor D. D. Whedon one of the most
important religious magazines in the country.194 The reviewer found Spencer’s claims to
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reconcile science and religion empty; pruning away Christian doctrine to reach a
purified, abstract religion was simply destructive to religion itself.195 He argued that
Spencer’s theory of the physical world was completely independent of his theological
arguments, and wrote “his Universe is an awful tenement to inhabit. It is not until it is
warmed and cheered by a living, ruling God that we can feel safe, or make it an
endurable home.”196 Another article in the same periodical noted with some sarcasm
that Spencer generously allowed God to reign over whatever part of the universe
science could not understand.197 Unitarian minister and philosopher Francis Ellingwood
Abbot made a similar critique. Though many Unitarians found value in Spencer, Abbot
was a foe from the beginning, despite taking a radical position on many aspects of the
Christian faith. Writing in the Christian Examiner, Abbot complained that Spencer’s
attempted reconciliation quietly snuffed out religion, dismissing its positive results while
allowing those of science to stand.198 Unsurprisingly, a sense of awe at the unknowable
nature of the universe was too weak a religious sentiment to appeal to many of
Spencer’s Christian readers.
Another common method of dealing with Spencer’s arguments was to attack his
conceptions of what was conceivable and what was not. The critic in the Quarterly
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Church Review criticized Spencer for confusing physical sensation with perception, one
an act of the body, the other an act of the mind. Further, the reviewer felt that Spencer
confounded imagination, which has to do with specific objects, with the conception of
general things such as the properties of a triangle.199 Other critics made similar attempts
to exalt understanding and comprehension above the realm of the physical senses.
Theology professor Laurens P. Hickok proposed a distinction between sense‐objects and
reason‐objects; Spencer could not comprehend the infinite only because he confined
himself to the former.200 Congregationalist minister Jesse H. Jones, employing the
“rational psychology” of Hickok, argued that a faculty called “the pure reason” could see
the truth directly, bypassing the senses and the understanding.201 “WE KNOW that we
stand on the eternal Rock. Our eye is illuminated with the unwavering Light which
radiates from the throne of God,” Jones wrote.202 McCosh came to similar conclusions,
labelling Spencer’s theory of the Unknowable “The Nescience Theory,” the belief that
nothing can come from nothing (as opposed to belief in creation).203 McCosh argued
that Spencer’s universal postulate (a belief is true if its negation is impossible to
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conceive) was secondary to the ability of the mind to know directly, to see some beliefs
as self‐evident, impossible not to know.204
Most critiques of Spencer’s work, even those from the pens of Protestant
divines, were civil in tone and treated Spencer’s arguments with respect. Spencer might
be called a rationalist atheist and his works condemned as insidious and anti‐Christian,
but only after demonstrating that his metaphysical structures were unsound and did not
keep him clear of materialism as he claimed. Occasionally, however, arguments of a
different sort were tried. Attacking Spencer’s ignorance of philosophy and theology
outside his own narrow confines was one tactic. Given Spencer’s dislike of reading and
his disregard for authorities it is surprising that this weakness was not exploited more
often than it was. Another avenue of assault was Spencer’s use of words, which some
felt was tricky and deceiving. Examples of both strategies can be found in a review of
First Principles in the Round Table. The reviewer wrote that Spencer was simply
retreading ground that had already been covered by Kant, Spinoza, and Hegel, and that
his ignorance of the great Christian theologians was “pitiable.”205 He attacked Spencer’s
psychological conceptions as vague, ill‐defined, and inconsistent. “The author who rests
a grand discovery on what is a mere thimble‐rigging in the use of terms in which he
cannot always clear himself from linguistic blunders is not to be trusted,” he wrote.206
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The idea that Spencer’s logic was mere verbal trickery was attractive to other
critics; unfortunately, many of them could not clearly define what Spencer’s
inconsistencies were. Congregationalist minister Edward Beecher, one of Lyman
Beecher’s sons, wrote an article for The Independent entitled “Verbal Jugglery” which
claimed “perhaps no more striking example of such jugglery can be found than is
furnished by the verbal processes used by Herbert Spencer to cheat men out of the
knowledge of God as a personal God, with whom they can commune.”207 The
Independent, a Congregationalist weekly paper founded on antislavery sentiment, was
one of the most important religious periodicals in the country, both for its circulation
(perhaps 75,000) and for its contributors, the most famous of whom was Edward’s
brother Henry Ward Beecher (a supporter of Spencer).208 Edward Beecher’s objection
hung on Spencer’s use of “juggling words” such as absolute, unconditioned, and infinite,
terms perfectly acceptable to most philosophers and theologians.209
Some critics tried arguments against Spencer that were unique to themselves.
Lyman Atwater disputed the universality of development from homogeneity to
heterogeneity. In the higher spiritual and moral realms, he wrote, progress is from
heterogeneity to homogeneity, as education and political rights spread and moral
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harmony is achieved. In Christ, after all, we are all brothers.210 Perhaps for this reason
the article ended with a call to arms of the faithful, to fight the spread of skeptical ideas
from Great Britain.211 Another dismissed biological evolution (though not before
treating it at length) and considered Spencer’s more general theory too vague to be
useful.212 But he seemed to accept the nebular hypothesis, proposing only that God to
set the diffused atoms in motion.213 Like some previous writers, he pointed to the
results as positive evidence of God’s wisdom and goodness.214 Many other reviews put
forward their own arguments—criticism of First Principles was rarely purely negative in
the 1860s.
Critiques of Spencer in secular publications were no less critical. For example, a
number of negative reviews appeared in the North American Review, America’s most
prestigious quarterly. These were penned by members of “The Metaphysical Club,” a
group of young men more or less connected to Harvard College that included Francis
Ellingwood Abbot, William James, Charles Peirce, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., and John
Fiske.215 Abbot wrote a piece giving his ideas about the human conception of space and
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time and critiquing those of Spencer along the way. Abbot’s central argument was that
extension—that is, continuity of matter in space—is essentially different than space
itself.216 Like Spencer, he divided ideas of space into two classes. One originated with
Kant and understood space as a basic function of mind, the other argued that the
concept of space was developed through empirical experience.217 Spencer’s
reconciliation of the two hypothesis failed, Abbot argued, because for Spencer
experience was still the source of the concept, even if it was experience of ancestral
organisms in the distant past.218 In the same issue, Abbot’s good friend Chauncey Wright
discussed the nebular hypothesis, with much reference to Spencer’s theories. Wright
was a convert to Darwin’s theory of natural selection but not to the theory of evolution,
which he understood in Spencerian terms as implying growth and development.219
Though he felt Spencer made some contributions in psychology Wright did not think he
had mastered the technical knowledge of science, and pointed out various errors
Spencer made in his essay on the nebular hypothesis.220
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Spencer was something of a “bête noire” for Wright, and less than a year later he
wrote another article on the philosopher for the North American.221 Here Wright’s main
criticism was that Spencer tried to follow scientific and metaphysical methods at the
same time. Wright argued that positive science deals with facts, and with theories that
can be converted into facts by verification of the senses, not by reason alone.222
Spencer’s idea of proof depended on two unproven hypotheses: that there are absolute
uniformities in nature and that their effects produce invariable beliefs.223 As in his essay
on the nebular hypothesis, Wright rejected the idea of universal evolution. Besides
embryology, he did not consider any of Spencer’s sources of examples strictly scientific:
To us Mr. Spencer’s speculation seems but the abstract statement of the
cosmological conceptions, and that kind of orderliness which the human mind
spontaneously supplies in the absence of facts sufficiently numerous and precise
to justify sound scientific conclusions. Progress and development, when they
mean more than a continuous proceeding, have a meaning suspiciously like what
the moral and mythic instincts are inclined to...224
Wright also complained that Spencer used scientific terms in non‐scientific ways, such as
his adoption of “the persistence of force” as a universal law, or his concept of force in
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general.225 In the end, Wright found Spencer’s abstractions lacking, and did not think
him competent to succeed in his encyclopedic undertaking.226
Wright’s criticisms were remarkable. Few others were so particular about
Spencer’s scientific merit, though the untestable nature of his hypothesis seems obvious
from a modern standpoint. Unfortunately, Wright’s writing lacked the clarity of
Spencer’s, and it is often hard to divine his precise intentions. Furthermore, his essay
was wide ranging, summarizing Spencer’s work from Social Statics to the latest issue of
The Principles of Biology, critiquing everything from Spencer’s derivation of moral values
to his classification of the sciences.227 Contemporary readers were exposed to Spencer’s
considerable eclecticism and intellectual breadth, but probably did not understood
many of Wright’s criticisms.
Spencer had his supporters as well, as Christian reviewers never tired of pointing
out. The New‐York Tribune declared that Spencer had discovered the universal law of all
growth and development by generalizing from the evolution of organisms.228 The
Tribune saw Spencer as the epitome of scientific inquiry and at the center of a
reorganization of thought which nobly revealed a bright future for humanity. The paper
also reported that 17,000 copies of Spencer’s works had already sold in America, and
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opined that he was more in tune with forward looking Americans than the tradition‐
loving English.229 Other supporters popped up in a variety of places. In the pages of the
newly resuscitated De Bow’s Review G. H. Holmes praised Spencer for serving the cause
of philosophy, science, morals, and religion by demonstrating the necessity of a First
Cause.230 Godey’s Ladies Book, edited by the redoubtable Sarah Josepha Hale, told its
readers that Spencer’s system of philosophy “certainly deserves the candid investigation
and respectful consideration of all thinkers,” whatever its defects might be, and noted
“Mr. Spencer now occupies a high and commanding position in the domain of
metaphysical speculation.”231 In the Atlantic Monthly, Charles Sprague praised those
who were working out the natural laws which act in the universe and quoted Spencer at
length about seeking after and declaring the truth.232
Spencer’s reputation was high during the 1860s. His most devoted followers
considered him the greatest thinker of the age, and if most readers were not so
enthusiastic, they still credited him with a powerful mind and vast scientific learning.
Even many religious writers praised his honesty, acumen, and powers of generalization.
One went so far as to say “we greatly regret that this rare genius is not baptized by the
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same spirit of reverence for the supernatural, as was that of Sir Isaac Newton, who was
none the less a philosopher for being a Christian.”233 Although references were still
made to Education, most of this reputation rested soundly on the first volume of his
new system, First Principles. And the argument that the power responsible for the
physical universe is unknowable would continue to occupy the minds of theologians for
decades, even after Spencer himself turned to other subjects.
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CHAPTER FOUR
BIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY
Finishing First Principles does not seem to have caused Spencer any mental or
physical distress, though he did begin to take opium, “commonly under the form of
morphia,” to treat his insomnia.1 After a short interval of rest he provided his
subscribers with sections of the next division of his System of Philosophy, The Principles
of Biology, at regular intervals. He finished the first volume in 1864, but a relapse of his
nervous condition that year delayed volume two until 1867. Spencer was no expert in
biology, though he had shown an interest in the subject, and especially in entomology,
since he was young. But once again, he felt that as an outsider he had some advantages;
he had not needed to become a specialist in any one branch of the subject and thus
could see broad truths applying to all groups of organisms.2 And he had the help of two
of the foremost men in their fields: botanist J. D. Hooker and zoologist T. H. Huxley.
By the time the Biology was written Spencer counted a number of the eminent
scientific men of the day as friends. One reason was the formation of the “X Club” in the
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fall of 1864.3 This group of young scientists, all converts to the theory of evolution,
included not only Huxley and Hooker, but John Tyndall, John Lubbock, Edward
Frankland, George Busk, Thomas Archer Hirst, and William Spotiswoode.4 The club dined
together once a month. According to Spencer, they met for purely social reasons, a
statement confirmed by Huxley.5 However, the group shared a particular perspective—
evolutionary naturalism—and various members had previously worked together
towards common professional goals.6 At the dinners, talk of the doings of the British
Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS), the Royal Society, or other scientific
societies was inevitable.7 Spencer felt the club was given more credit for influence than
was really due—a misconception that was not surprising, given that three of its
members became presidents of the Royal Society and five presidents of the BAAS.8
Membership in the club increased Spencer’s scientific credibility and added to the
resources he could call upon when dealing with scientific questions. It probably
encouraged him to present his own work to the Linnaean society in 1866 (the paper was
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read by X Club member George Busk.) This paper, on the vascular structures in plants, is
one of the few pieces of Spencer’s published work that looks like science to modern
eyes. The essay contained a literature review, accounts of his experiments with plant
sections and dyes (detailed enough to be easily replicated), and even a further
experiment to counter possible objections.9
Spencer encountered serious financial difficulties during this period, and almost
gave up on his System of Philosophy. After First Principles was finished, the number of
his subscribers declined to 350; some terminated their subscriptions, others were
removed from the rolls for non‐payment.10 Youmans raised money among some of
Spencer’s American admirers for the purpose of paying D. Appleton & Co. to publish
Social Statics and the two volumes of Spencer’s Essays, but Spencer refused to accept
royalties until all costs of publishing were repaid, so this arrangement hardly improved
his financial position.11 Obviously, at this early date the Appletons did not consider these
volumes a good risk. Appleton was fairly generous with its British authors—which
included Darwin and Tyndall—especially considering the lack of an international
copyright agreement between England and America.12 Many publishers paid the British
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authors they pirated no royalties at all, but Appleton typically gave Spencer a 15 percent
royalty on his books. However, Spencer paid for the plates and thus bore some of the
initial cost.13 With less money coming in from subscribers, these costs became too great
to bear. In 1865, he decided to cease publication of his System of Philosophy, and wrote
a note to that effect for insertion into the latest installment of Principles of Biology.
When John Stuart Mill offered to indemnify the publisher against losses, Spencer replied
that it was his living expenses, and not simply the costs of publication, which were
eating up his capital.14 Though Spencer lived simply, he felt responsible for his aging
parents, a considerable burden for a man who still roomed in a boarding house.
In 1866, Spencer’s father died, and his mother passed away the following year.
His father’s death came as a shock; his mother’s was the occasion for melancholy, for
she had suffered from dementia for years. To his friend Youmans he wrote “I am now
alone in the world.” Later, when writing his autobiography, he remembered his regret:
“In human life as we at present know it, one of the saddest traits is the dull sense of filial
obligations which exists at the time when it is possible to discharge them with
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something like fulness, in contrast with the keen sense of them which arises when such
discharge is no longer possible.”15 The formality of style cannot hide a depth of feeling
Spencer rarely displayed, either in his autobiography or in his life.16 His wonted
objectivity was swept away by his parents’ deaths; an emotional reaction was the only
response possible.
During this trying time in Spencer’s life, his American admirers intervened yet
again to keep him afloat, this time more successfully. They raised a $7,000 “testimonial”
which Youmans presented to him in person along with a gold watch. The donation took
the form of bonds in Spencer’s name; despite his reluctance, he was compelled to
accept what was already legally his or risk offending his friends.17 The American press
duly reported the generous gift, though they sometimes mistook the details.18 Youmans
wrote several letters explaining the circumstances; nevertheless, a narrative developed
in which Spencer was kept afloat by his American supporters while Britain ignored
him.19 Many Americans took pride in the fact that they were the first to recognize
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Spencer’s greatness, however unfair this was to his British friends. Whatever the merits
of the case, with the American testimonial and a small bequest from his father Spencer
was once again financially prepared to continue with his System of Philosophy.
Incorporating Darwin: The Principles of Biology
The American edition of the first volume of The Principles of Biology was finally
published in the spring of 1866, and both British and American versions of volume two
came out the following year.20 The Biology was Spencer’s first truly scientific book by
today’s standards, presenting the minute observations of many natural historians at
great length. Latin names, technical details, and detailed descriptions abounded in both
volumes. Spencer made arguments, generally in the form of causal explanations for the
data he presented, but he also admitted it when his evidence was thin or inconclusive.21
Spencer also spent considerable space generalizing from specific results to broadly
explanatory theories, often based on the dictates of his theory of evolution. Reading the
Biology provides crucial insight into Spencer’s beliefs about biological evolution, beliefs
which affected both his psychological and his sociological ideas.
Spencer began The Principles of Biology at the lowest level of organization, with
the organic molecules (which he called “atoms”) that make up cells. Little was known
about these molecules at that time, but Spencer surmised that they must be very
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mobile to provide “the conditions necessary to that re‐distribution of Matter and
Motion which constitutes Evolution.”22 Somehow these conditions also created “nerve‐
force,” a somewhat mysterious power which nineteenth‐century natural philosophers
believed was what made living tissue different from dead matter.23 In organic matter, he
wrote, small disturbances of nerve‐force can cause large redistributions of matter,
which are continually adjusted to balance outer changes. This is life, by Spencer’s
definition: the continuous adjustment of inner to outer conditions, also referred to as a
“moving equilibrium.”24 This definition had not changed since The Principles of
Psychology, and in fact Spencer simply reused three chapters from that work to
elucidate this theory.25
Spencer argued that life which is more completely adjusted to conditions is
“higher” or “more complete” than other “lower” types of life, and this is only possible
when complexity is greater.26 Since evolution always increases complexity
(differentiated heterogeneity) evolution has generally led from lower to higher
organisms, ending in man. Use of such value laden terms suggests that Spencer
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conceived of biological evolution as goal‐directed, in contrast to Darwin, whose
mechanism of natural selection was essentially random.27 However, though Spencer
believed in Lamarckian use‐inheritance he summarily rejected Lamarck’s ascription of
variation to the innate tendency of an organism to follow nature’s plan, calling it “a
shaping of ignorance in to the semblance of knowledge.”28 And Darwin both accepted
use‐inheritance as a supplement to natural selection and retained a somewhat
progressive view of evolution himself.29 Neither Darwin’s nor Spencer’s version of
biological evolution was teleological in the sense of implying goals or a master plan, but
Spencer emphasized evolution’s positive outcomes more than Darwin.30 His prediction
of future perfection and his quest for a scientific morality were always in tension with
this rejection of teleology.31
Biology as defined by Spencer was a description of all the phenomena involved in
the way matter changes to perform life functions like growth and development, waste
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and repair, reproduction, heredity, variation, and more.32 The bulk of volume one gave
details about these functions. Spencer wrote that biological evolution implies both
growth and development, since increased structure is necessary to support larger size
and vice versa.33 Evolution occurs when changes in the environment require a particular
function to be emphasized, leading to the growth of the organs or structures involved.34
Spencer’s idea of a singular, abstract environment with which each organism interacts
was a fairly new one; in the future he would extend the idea to the psychological and
sociological realms as well.35 For Spencer, the external environment necessitated certain
internal adjustments from organisms, i.e. the exercise of certain functions, which could
in turn lead to changes in the structures responsible for these functions. Like Lamarck,
Spencer believed that these structural changes made during the life of an organism
could be passed to its offspring. Spencer called this process “direct equilibration.”36 He
also praised Darwin’s theory of natural selection, but felt that the term suggested that
someone or something was doing the selecting. He thus substituted “indirect
equilibration,” as well as the more felicitous phrase “the survival of the fittest.”37
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Spencer argued that though indirect equilibration explains most of the facts of
evolution, direct equilibration is more prominent when a particular environmental
pressure is frequent or continual, and when organisms are comparatively complex.38
Thus with man, whose social arrangements shield his incapables, little indirect
equilibration takes place.39 To put it simply, Spencer observed that the survival of the
fittest no longer functioned in modern society.
Spencer admitted that “to prove the transmission of those structural
peculiarities that have resulted from functional peculiarities, is, for several reasons,
comparatively difficult.”40 Lacking such proof, Spencer sought to explain heredity, a task
which Darwin had not yet attempted (though he would soon do so.)41 Spencer’s
argument involved “small sets of physiological units in a fit state for obeying their
proclivity towards the structural arrangement of the species they belong to,” whose
“special polarities” could be modified by changes in the parent organism’s structure.42
These physiological units come from both parents, and they may combine in different
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ways, thus explaining variation.43 Spencer was at his most theoretical here, having
almost no facts to go on. Such flights of fancy were not common in the work as a whole,
however. Spencer’s usual method was to gather as many facts as possible before
generalizing.44 For example, in support of biological evolution he gathered evidence
given by embryology, morphology, and the classification and distribution of species.
Spencer argued that a Darwinian, branching version of classification is implied by the
similarities in overall structure between related species, and reinforced by Von Baer’s
theory that embryos diverge from each other only as they develop.45 Evolution also
explains the distributions of organisms on the earth: groups spread to new
environments when population pressure overcomes the counteracting resistance of
new conditions, then change to better fit these environments.46
The second volume of Spencer’s Biology concentrated less on theory and more
on description. For example, in his section on the forms of plants Spencer gave an
account of the various types of branches, leaves, and flowers.47 Spencer’s theorizing
originated from his attempts to explain the attributes of individual species or genera in
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terms of indirect or direct equilibration. So, he argued that ruminants have organs to
hold unchewed food because it allows them to consume more when there is
competition over a limited supply, and he explained vertebrae in terms of the long‐term
results of a body flexing from side to side.48 At the back of it all was the persistence of
force and its corollaries: differently acting forces explain why an animal has a diversity of
parts while the presence of equivalent forces explain why so much symmetry exists in
nature.49
At the end of the second volume Spencer discussed the implications of his
biological theories for human beings. He thought that increased complexity in an
organism mandates diminished reproductive capacity, a theory held over from his early
essay on population in the Westminster Review.50 He provided a great deal more detail
here, touching on both sexual and asexual reproduction, nutrition, self‐maintenance,
and so on. The essential idea was that the organs and cells of the body compete with
each other for nutrition and other resources, so that growth and complexity of parts
come at the expense of reproduction.51 In humans, the outcome for Spencer was that
the larger the brain, the more restricted the ability to reproduce, which explained why
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“flat‐chested girls who survive their high‐pressure education” have poorly developed
babies they cannot nurse and why men who do much brain‐work often leave no
children.52 Spencer envisioned a sort of reverse‐feedback loop: human fertility leads to
population density, which advances technology and civilization, increasing demand for
mechanical skill, intelligence, energy, and self‐control, all requiring larger brain size,
which causes reduced fertility.53 Thus advanced civilizations eventually approach
equilibrium, with births almost balancing deaths—a state of harmony, as Spencer called
it.54
Ultimately, Spencer believed that biological evolution moved in a positive
direction. He admitted that devolution is possible, but spent very little time discussing
scenarios in which it might occur.55 Throughout The Principles of Biology there is a tacit
link between evolution and progress that a modern biologist would not make. However,
it would be a mistake to think that Spencer’s biology was simply an extension of his
general theory of evolution as seen in First Principles. Though he used concepts like

52

PB, 2:486.

53

PB, 2:496‐97, 502‐503. The equation of high evolution with infertility does not seem very Darwinian,
as Laurie Godfrey points out. Still, it is true that the class of animals we consider most evolved (mammals)
includes the largest and most complex creatures, which generally have comparatively few children. Laurie
Godfrey, “Darwinian, Spencerian, and Modern Perspectives on Progress in Biological Evolution,” in What
Darwin Began: Modern Darwinian and Non‐Darwinian Perspectives on Evolution, ed. Laurie Godfrey
(Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1985), 47‐48. As the previous few pages show, I fundamentally disagree with
Godfrey’s opinion that “conceptually, Spencer’s selection was different from that of Darwin. It would be
impossible to derive Darwinian selection from it” (46).
54

PB, 2:504‐505. Unlike in his essay on population, however, Spencer argues that gradual changes in
conditions such as climate make perfect equilibrium impossible.
55

See PB, 1:189‐90 for one example.

240
force, equilibration, and the rhythm of motion, these were usually used to explain things
like morphological development.56 The mechanisms behind evolution itself were
adopted almost completely from Lamarck and Darwin, though given a Spencerian twist.
One way to envision this is to say that for Spencer, the laws of physical forces
determined what possible forms could arise, while direct and indirect equilibration
determined which ones would arise and which would survive. But this is an
oversimplification of a theory that is in reality quite complex.
Spencer’s Lamarckism has led some critics to declare that he could not have
been a social Darwinist.57 His own words say otherwise—at times he seemed to forget
his own argument that human complexity entailed evolution by direct equilibration.
Though Spencer saw struggle and competition as morally beneficial in ways that could
be passed on to offspring, he rarely made this connection explicit. In his political and
sociological work, Spencer tended to focus more on the “undeserving poor” than on the
unfortunate and underpaid. In other words, his assessment of poverty was negative
rather than positive, focused on what to do about idlers and wastrels rather than on
how to help victims of misfortune and the working poor. Thus although Spencer’s
biological theory might have encouraged him to focus on promoting good habits that
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could be passed to offspring, his social preoccupations meant he was more interested in
seeing that the biologically degraded did not reproduce.
A Felicitous Phrase: “The Survival of the Fittest” and Social Darwinism
The phrase “the survival of the fittest” when applied to human society is a key
marker for social Darwinism.58 Since Spencer coined the phrase, it seems obvious that
Americans would tend to connect him to the doctrine. This assumption is problematic
for a number of reasons. First, American readers were not necessarily aware of the
phrase’s origins. As we have seen, Spencer initially coined “survival of the fittest” strictly
as a replacement for Darwin’s concept of “natural selection.”59 Use of the word
“selection” created problems because it implied a selector, whereas the most original,
radical, and controversial element of Darwin’s theory was that life and death in nature is
a matter of chance—with the odds stacked slightly in favor of those animals and plants
better adjusted to their environment.60 “Survival of the fittest” better reflects the cruel
irrationality of this mechanism, and Darwin adopted the phrase as an alternate (most
prominently, as the subtitle to Chapter IV, “Natural Selection”) in the fifth edition of
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Origin of Species, published in 1869.61 Since Darwin’s book was more widely read than
Spencer’s, the origin of the phrase was not clear to many.
Reviews of The Principles of Biology usually mentioned the phrase. For example,
the reviewer in The North American Review wrote “for the phrase natural selection
employed by Mr. Darwin, Mr. Spencer occasionally substitutes the phrase survival of the
fittest, which is in some respects a clearer and more scientific name for the great
principle indicated.”62 In other contexts, writers were liable to leave Spencer’s name
out. In 1868, an essayist in Lippincott’s Magazine wrote that neither “Darwin’s principle
of survival of the fittest” nor Lamarck’s theory was sufficient to explain development
without the guiding hand of a Creator.63 Philadelphia based Lippincott’s was a general
interest magazine with much literary content and the usual articles on art, travel,
politics, which shows how widespread the idea of “the survival of the fittest” became in
just a few years.64 The metaphorical use of the phrase was another sign of its
popularization. The Methodist Quarterly Review judged a theory about salvation “the
counterpart in theology to Mr. Darwin’s ‘natural selection’ in science,” in that “the
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attainment of eternal life by the blessed is simply ‘the survival of the fittest’.”65 Similarly,
Every Saturday, an eclectic magazine owned by the publisher of The Atlantic Monthly
and The North American Review, used the term as a metaphor for recruiting in collegiate
athletics.66 In neither case did Spencer’s name appear.
The expression “the survival of the fittest” only gained currency in the 1870s.
Usually the phrase was used in scientific contexts, but it did not take long for writers to
extend the concept to the human realm. Sometimes the context was racial. Appletons’
Journal, a monthly miscellany from Spencer’s publisher covering “literature, science,
and art,” suggested that blacks and whites seeking to adjust to postwar conditions in the
South would both be subject to the law of the survival of the fittest.67 In his novel
Overland, serialized in the highly successful New‐York magazine The Galaxy (best known
at the time for Mark Twain’s “Memoranda” section) J. W. De Forest wrote “the
contempt and hatred of white men for yellow, red, brown, and black men has worked
all over earth, is working yet, and will work for ages. It is a motive of that tremendous
tragedy which Spencer has entitled ‘the survival of the fittest,’ and Darwin, ‘natural
selection.’”68 At other times simple competition in the business of life was
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contemplated, as when Titus Munson Coan (son of a famous missionary to Hawaii)
wrote “disguise it as you will, most success is the result of cruel internecine warfare.
Success is natural selection, the survival of the fittest and the destruction of the unfit.
The purest successes are won by competition, and at somebody’s expense; alike in plant
and animal they involve victory and death.”69 Such pure examples of social Darwinism
were few and far between in the media, however. Protests against such attitudes were
more common. The Rev. Thomas K. Beecher, one of Lyman Beecher’s brood,
complained that the theory of evolution took the struggle for life as the central source
of all improvement, a doctrine of selfishness worthy of Satan himself.70 Neither Coan
nor Beecher mentioned Spencer, however.
Far from being an indicator of social Darwinist thinking, in the 1870s and 1880s
the phrase “the survival of the fittest” was most commonly found in discussions of
biological evolution or in casual, metaphorical contexts. In both cases, Darwin was more
often mentioned than Spencer. For example, In the space of a few years, from 1879‐
1881, writers in Harper’s Monthly used the phrase to explain Charles Sumner’s political
career, changes in clothing styles, and relationships among life insurance companies.71
In the article on Sumner, the phrase was connected to Darwin; in the latter two, it was
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simply used without comment. While it is true that Spencer originated a term that came
to characterize social Darwinism, he intended it simply as a reference to Darwin’s
theory; to the extent American readers connected the phrase to any thinker at all, it was
to Darwin, not Spencer.
The fact is that the central concept of social Darwinism—that natural selection
does and should apply to human beings—was not yet a part of the American mental
vocabulary. This made it difficult for Americans to recognize the idea when they saw it.
Reviews of the American edition of Social Statics, published in 1865, bear this out.
Magazines ranging from Godey’s Ladies Book to the Methodist weekly Zion’s Herald
printed notices.72 However, most American periodicals passed up this opportunity to
analyze Spencer’s defense of liberalism and laissez‐faire. Those that did review the book
often noted that Social Statics was fifteen years old and thus not up to date either with
events or with Spencer’s current views—something Spencer himself was careful to point
out in the preface to the American version.73
American reviews of Social Statics generally did not comment on Spencer’s
callousness towards the inferior and unfortunate. The Atlantic Monthly, in fact, praised
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Spencer as a defender of higher values against cynics who believed that only money and
power are important in life.74 S. N. Tufts, writing in the Freewill Baptist Quarterly
(published by the northern branch of the Freewill Baptists) agreed that God wills man’s
happiness, and thought that although Spencer did not give enough scope to divine
revelation in the development of the moral sense, many passages from Social Statics
“have drawn their force, consciously or unconsciously to the author, from that fountain
of truth.”75 Another writer argued that happiness is just a side effect of humanity’s real
goals, such as obedience and holiness, and professed to see in this early book the seeds
of rationalism that bore fruit in Spencer’s later writing.76 However, the review in the
Ladies Repository was more typical in considering Spencer’s social ideals apart from his
metaphysics. As in other reviews, the Repository critic praised the book for its
arguments against utilitarianism and in favor of a moral faculty, and emphasized the law
of equal freedom as a “first principle of social morality.”77
Not all reviewers mentioned the anti‐government stance of Social Statics. Those
that did rarely understood it as a doctrine aimed at fostering the brutal struggle
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necessary for progress. Edward Everett Hale’s review in the Christian Examiner is a case
in point. Hale was a Unitarian minister in Boston, best known at the time for his pro‐
Union short story “The Man without a Country,” published in The Atlantic Monthly in
1863.78 His review recognized the law of equal freedom as the “first principle” of the
book, and emphasized Spencer’s argument that human progress makes the state less
and less necessary.79 Hale pointed out that American government had fewer flaws than
English. He also felt that even perfectly moral men would desire some government,
since relying on multiple privately constituted organizations just results in conflict and
confusion.80 In short, Hale found that the state would be necessary even for a fully
evolved humanity. Like most other critics, he did not make any connection between
reduced governance and ruthless competition.
Spencer’s social Darwinism was sometimes recognized—just not very often. One
example was published in the American Quarterly Church Review, which under long‐
time editor Nathanial Smith Richardson was the chief Episcopalian review in the nation.
In an article on church policy towards southern blacks, the anonymous author argued
that interference in Southern affairs would only trigger a “War of the Races” in which
the weaker race would be exterminated, citing several passages in Social Statics in this
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regard.81 Another writer quoted Spencer’s passage about nature’s stern discipline being
cruel to be kind, though with little comment.82 But most critics of Social Statics were not
concerned about natural selection being applied to man. They were more drawn to the
positive Spencer who preached that God wills man’s happiness, though the religious
might mutter that happiness depends on obedience to the laws of God.83
A Technical Treatise: The American Response
The two volumes of The Principles of Biology were probably the least read
division of Spencer’s System of Philosophy, and are not often cited by scholars today.
Spencer anticipated this. He recognized that even among educated people, few were
interested in the subject or even knew what “biology” was.84 Nevertheless, scattered
discussions did appear. Some were short notices; this was especially true of the popular
magazines that discussed the book, such as The Ladies Repository and Hours at Home,
Scribner’s literary monthly. Both complimented Spencer but ruled that his theories did
not explain life any better than special creation.85 Some longer reviews appeared as
well. Critics, even the religious ones, almost always treated Spencer’s evolutionary
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doctrines with respect. Exceptions were rare, but did occur. The American Quarterly
Church Review, whose dislike of Spencer almost seemed to be an editorial policy, opined
“Herbert Spencer is one of the most openly pronounced infidels of the age; and in his
writings he represents very distinctly the present mode and plan of attack upon
Christianity,” and called biological evolution “sheer humbuggery.”86 On the other hand,
there was some uncritical admiration, usually from secular sources. Leading sanitary
reformer John Griscom, writing in one of the country’s premier medical journals, praised
Spencer as a profound thinker and master of the knowledge of biological organization
and function. Griscom also reassured readers that the Biology was not atheistic for
those who could see God working through nature.87
Despite the Biology’s scientific nature, many reviewers could not help bringing
up metaphysical issues. The most egregious offenders barely discussed biology at all.
Such a review appeared in The Round Table, newly restarted after suspending
operations for the last year of the war. The critic praised Spencer for his boldness in
taking on such a great enterprise, and acceded to his law of evolution from
homogeneous to heterogeneous, but complained that without an explanation of the
relationship between absolute and finite being, Spencer’s whole explanation of the
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known was simply materialistic pantheism.88 The reviewer critiqued Spencer’s definition
of life but then fell back into epistemological issues in an argument for special
creation.89 That same month, The Nation published a rather unfocused review that
similarly slighted biological evolution. An intellectual weekly journal of opinion, The
Nation was at that time not quite a year old, but under redoubtable editor E. L. Godkin it
attracted 5,000 subscribers by its third issue.90 Its critic barely paused to list the parts of
the Biology before rushing into an account of Spencer’s entire system, concluding that
his cosmological principle of evolution was unnecessary to science and did not confirm
any facts or suggest any inductive investigations. While praising Spencer’s clear
statement of the arguments in favor of species change, the reviewer found Spencer’s
broader idea of evolution teleological—not in the sense that the goal of human
happiness determined the laws of nature, but in a more vague sense “as a cosmological
theory…charged with a mission.”91 Significantly, both magazines were secular, though
the positions of their reviewers on science and religion could not have been farther
apart. The Nation’s review was in fact rather singular in its criticism of Spencerian
evolution’s usefulness as a scientific theory.
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Though Spencer’s promotion of “direct equilibration” is one of the most salient
aspects of the Biology from a modern perspective, most commentators at the time did
not discuss it, nor did they make any clear distinction between Spencer and Darwin.92
Sometimes this was because Darwinism was interpreted more broadly than Darwin
himself would have liked, as the theory of natural law acting in the universe, or as
merely a continuation of the work of earlier evolutionists.93 At least one critic, writing in
the new quarterly The Southern Review, made a distinction between the two based on
their theories of the origin of life rather than their views on natural selection. This critic
saw Darwin as the more reticent of the two, leaving room for a miraculous creation of
the first living forms.94 Spencer, on the other hand, tried to explain too much about the
causes of life and of variation, thus virtually denying the possibility of a creative plan.95
“What is true in his theory of Organic Evolution is not new, and what is new is not true,”
the writer concluded.96 The Southern Review was the brainchild of unreconstructed
sectionalist Albert Taylor Bledsoe and represented a firmly Southern opinion.97 At least
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in the article considered here, this did not differ overly much from Northern opinion:
Darwin’s theory was considered a viable but unproven hypothesis that did not
necessarily conflict with revealed religion.98 While there was some resistance to
evolution in the post‐bellum, pre‐fundamentalist South, there were many that kept
open minds, especially in academic communities.99 It was possible for James Woodrow,
a Presbyterian, to serve as president of the University of South Carolina despite having
lost a hard fought battle against heresy charges for his belief in human evolution, for
example.100
Francis Ellingwood Abbot made a similar conflation of Darwin and Spencer in his
discussion of the Biology in the North American Review for October, 1868. Despite the
fact that James Russell Lowell and Charles Eliot Norton took over in 1864, the North
American still had only three to four hundred subscribers. But they were the type of
subscriber that could appreciate a long essay on Spencer, and Abbot obliged. Abbot,
who helped found the Free Religious Association the previous year, was forced to resign
from his pulpit that spring for being insufficiently Christian.101 However, he was still a
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strong believer in immortality and a personal God.102 In his review he accepted
Spencer’s arguments against special creation and even his grand ideas for a scientific
philosophy, writing “in no way does Philosophy, as co‐ordinating intelligence, more
irresistibly prove her right of eminent domain over the mind of man than by compelling
science itself to become philosophical in spirit and form.”103 Yet Abbot felt Spencer’s
work was only a preliminary step and not without its problems. For Abbot, the central
lesson of First Principles was that all phenomena are composed of matter and motion
continuously redistributed according to the law of evolution—a disappointingly
mechanistic conclusion that did not follow the unity in nature to its logical conclusion.104
Similarly, The Principles of Biology promoted a view of living organisms as mechanisms.
Abbot argued that the development of an organism from a germ is not explicable in the
same terms as the development of a solar system from a nebula. “It is life in the
organism, not incident forces outside of it, which must be regarded as the primary and
unknown cause of biological development and adaptation,” he wrote, a phrase which
earned him praise from the Methodist Quarterly Review despite his dismissal of
creationism.105 Ultimately, Abbot felt that Spencer’s answers to the primary problems of
biology—the origin of life, the origin of species, and the causes of evolution—were

102

Francis Ellingwood Abbot, “A Radical’s Theology,” Radical (June, 1867), 596‐597.

103

Abbot, review of The Principles of Biology, 379‐380.

104

Ibid., 381, 398.

105

Ibid., 408. “Synopsis of the Quarterlies, and Others of the Higher Periodicals: American Reviews,”
Methodist Quarterly Review 21 (Jan. 1869), 128‐130.

254
insufficient. By denying modern evidence for the spontaneous creation of organisms,
both Spencer and Darwin sidestepped issue one; they had the same answer to issue
two; and neither had a good explanation for issue three (Abbot was highly critical of
both Spencer’s “polarities” and Darwin’s “pangenesis”).106
Clearly, even among those who accepted the merits of evolutionary arguments,
discussion of The Principles of Biology often turned on issues extra‐scientific by today’s
standards. In part this was because those of scientific standing mostly ignored the book.
No doubt many never read it—after all, it made no pretense of being a work of original
research. Those that did may have felt like Darwin, who declared himself “astonished at
its prodigality of original thought,” but added “the reflection constantly recurred to me
that each suggestion, to be of real value to science, would require years of work.”107
Few were willing to do Spencer’s work for him. Mentions of Spencer’s ideas in technical
journals like American Naturalist were few, and brief.108 Occasionally someone
borrowed Spencer’s neologisms, such as his distinction between “recipio‐motor” and
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“dirigio‐motor” nerves, but none of these caught on like “the survival of the fittest”
did.109
The Principles of Biology was the least influential part of Spencer’s system of
philosophy. Few readers understood the difference between Spencer’s position and
Darwin’s, so the Origin of Species remained the leading text in support of biological
evolution. Spencer’s theory about the mechanism of heredity was no more successful
than Darwin’s; this piece of the Darwinian puzzle remained missing until the twentieth
century. As Spencer moved into the realms of psychology, anthropology, social science,
and ethics, few continued the discussion of his Biology.110 Ernst Mayr writes “it would be
quite justifiable to ignore Spencer totally in a history of biological ideas because his
positive contributions were nil.”111 He is not far wrong, though Spencer did have some
slight influence on Darwin’s mature thought.112 But as Robert J. Richards points out,
those whose theories are ultimately accepted were products of an intellectual
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environment that includes the ideas that fell by the wayside.113 Though little of
Spencer’s work remains part of the modern biological consensus, he did contribute to
the scientific atmosphere of his day.
Completing the Formula: First Principles Again
With the biology finished Spencer’s next goal was a new version of his 1855 work
The Principles of Psychology. But first, he wanted to revise First Principles, and make its
publication the occasion for rechristening his system The Synthetic Philosophy, a title he
found more precise.114 In the five years since its original publication in England, Spencer
recognized some flaws, and as stocks of the first edition fell low he saw the opportunity
to correct them. One part he did not change was the section on the Unknowable,
indicating either that he was satisfied with it, or he was not concerned about it—
probably a little of both. Meanwhile, he rearranged the section on the Knowable and
added nine new chapters. The biggest effect of the new ordering was that the chapters
explaining the law of evolution were pushed back, after the sections on space and time,
matter and motion, and the persistence of force. Since Spencer derived his law by
deduction from these primal realities, this arrangement made logical sense. However,
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for the reader it meant going through half the book without an adequate explication of
evolution.115
To the beginning of the section on the Knowable Spencer added two chapters on
philosophical knowledge. He defined it as knowledge of the highest generality, that
which fuses the contributions of the several sciences into a whole. Spencer wrote,
“knowledge of the lowest kind is un‐unified knowledge; Science is partially‐unified
knowledge; Philosophy is completely‐unified knowledge.”116 He remained a relativist:
the truth philosophy concerns itself with was for him simply perfect agreement between
our mental representations and our sense impressions.117 But he noted that philosophy
must assume that the foundational beliefs of consciousness are true, for example, that
the manifestations we sense correspond in some way to Unknowable reality.118 These
fundamental beliefs, now considered philosophical truths, included the persistence of
force, the indestructability of matter, the continuity of motion, and all other things from
which Spencer derived the law of evolution.119
Spencer had a new definition of evolution which took into account the
movement involved: “Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation
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of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity
to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes
a parallel transformation.”120 He wrote that he had erred in seeing evolution as the
transformation of the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, since this was simply a
secondary effect of the primary process, integration, where incoherent (unorganized)
matter becomes coherent.121 This process could be simple or compound, depending on
whether integration was rapid or slow—it usually included differentiation of parts from
each other, but could be more straightforward.122 Evolution was highly compounded in
organic material. Spencer also put greater emphasis on the process of dissolution, which
always accompanied its opposite and must someday predominate. So all organisms die,
and so one day the earth will disintegrate as well. However, Spencer did not alter his
suggestion that a new universe might arise after the death of the old.123
To the casual reader these seem like minor alterations. Certainly the majority of
American readers saw them this way. The second edition of First Principles was not
published in America until 1869, and when it finally emerged, the media made no
distinction between the new volume and the old. However, Spencer took the changes
very seriously. In his autobiography he described the genesis of the law of evolution as a
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seventeen‐year process that began with his discovery of Milne‐Edwards and von Baer
and ended with the second edition of First Principles—noting that although his ideas
seemed to have reached equilibrium at that point, he had been wrong about this
before.124 Nevertheless, Spencer’s future work was not much affected by his more
precise definitions. He might start the new edition of The Principles of Psychology by
putting the nervous system into the context of movement, but this inquiry into matter
and motion soon gave way to discussion of the different types of nerve tissue and the
parts of the brain.125 Secondary redistribution of retained motion, conservation of the
relations between forces, compound evolution—Spencer rarely used these concepts in
the rest of the Synthetic Philosophy.
Discussion of First Principles in the press continued to follow the paths blazed by
previous critics. By the end of the 1860s the book was almost entirely the province of
philosophers and theologians, who were most interested in Spencer’s doctrine of the
Unknowable. In 1867 Hegelian philosopher William Torey Harris inaugurated his new
Journal of Speculative Philosophy with a discussion of Spencer. This journal, improbably
enough, was founded in St. Louis, “a city which is generally supposed to be more
interested in the price of wheat than in Metaphysics, and more alive to the merits of Mr.

124
125

AB, 2:165‐170. This was probably written in 1887 or 1888 (see pp. 142, 145).

Spencer, The Principles of Psychology, 2nd ed., vol. 1 (New York: D. Appleton, 1871), chapters 1‐3
(hereafter cited as PP2).

260
McCoole, the pugilist, than to those of Hegel” as one commentator put it.126
Nevertheless, it grew to be the most important American philosophical journal,
publishing the work of writers like Charles S. Peirce, William James, and Josiah Royce
alongside translations of German thinkers.127 In his discussion of Spencer, Harris gave
him credit for sincerity and courage but made a number of criticisms. On the subject of
epistemology, Harris rejected conceivability as a criterion for knowledge, arguing that
we can know things logically (such as that matter is infinitely divisible) without being
able to conceive them.128 Furthermore, Harris believed the mind capable of
contemplating pure being without relying on faith.129 Both were common enough
arguments; Harris blazed little new ground, but his language was clear and he
summarized Spencer well. Despite his negative assessment, Harris found it encouraging
that Americans were reading Spencer.130
Harris avoided Spencer’s definition of evolution until the very end of his article,
and then made no attempt to analyze it.131 Religious writers, too, continued to display
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little interest in cosmic evolution, typically confining themselves to the observation that
it excluded anything but matter and motion from consideration. Few asked whether or
not Spencer’s formula was valid; the issue was whether or not it was materialistic.
Despite his protestations to the contrary, some determined that Spencer was an atheist.
Even writers who wrote about his work at length sometimes came to this conclusion.
Francis Ellingwood Abbot, for example, accepted that Spencer moved scientific
naturalism very close to religion, writing “thus is accounted for the otherwise
inexplicable phenomenon of religionists appearing among Mr. Spencer’s warmest
admirers.”132 Abbot even quoted Spencer’s formula for evolution. But rather than
discussing its validity as a description of the universe, he attacked Spencer for describing
mental phenomena in mechanical terms and for denying that absolute force had a
personality.133 Abbot was in favor of blending science and religion, just not in the way
Spencer proposed.134 Spencer, he wrote, did not understand the atheistic implications
of his own theory.135
Prolific Catholic writer Orestes Brownson took a similar position against Spencer.
In a review of The Principles of Biology which Catholic World founder Isaac Hecker asked
him to prepare, he criticized The Principles of Biology for ruling out a “vital principle”
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and relying solely on chemical, mechanical, and electrical forces to explanation the
phenomena of life.136 In a review of First Principles, Brownson claimed that non‐religious
supporters of science liked Spencer because he disguised his atheism successfully.137
According to Brownson, Spencer’s Unknowable was not something, it was a negation,
just as atheism is the negation of religion. Brownson pointed out that religion seeks to
explain in supernatural terms what Spencer claimed could not be known by unassisted
human thought about physical laws.138 Brownson considered relative knowledge no
knowledge at all, but argued that it is possible to understand real, concrete being, and
to “apprehend” things one could not “comprehend.”139 He did use part of his review to
examine the Knowable, but even there he kept things on a metaphysical level. For
example, though he did quote the law of evolution, he attacked it by denying that the
persistence of force and the indestructability of matter are facts of consciousness that
must be true.140 Like Abbot, Brownson did not discuss Spencer’s many examples of
evolution, not even his arguments for species change.
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Those religious writers who felt inspired by Spencer did not necessarily delve
into the Knowable. Unitarians were the ones most likely to see the positive side of
Spencer, Abbot notwithstanding. One writer in the Unitarian Monthly Religious
Magazine called Spencer a worker for truth and endorsed him as a careful and
reverential student “who, having gained at least a glimpse of the law which prevails in
all life and in all work, is now trying, humbly and faithfully, to open our minds, that we
also may see this uniting, harmonizing, governing law.”141 This writer believed that faith
could know what science could not; he was interested in Spencer’s scientific claims only
so far as they showed the limits of scientific knowledge.142 Likewise, Unitarian minister
William Rounseville Alger understood Spencer as a “philosophical scientist” and a
“generalizing observer,” yet used most of his article to discuss the Unknowable.143
Where Abbot and Brownson emphasized Spencer’s negations, Alger focused on his
theistic elements. Alger believed that the Unknowable could be a basis for religion,
because those emotions classified as religious are reactions to mystery and the thought
of the infinite.144 He even agreed that religion needed purification, God having become
too anthropomorphic. After all, he pointed out, God is not man on an infinite scale;
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unlike man, God has no environment to which to respond.145 Liberal clergyman O. B.
Frothingham agreed, noting that a less definite concept of God had the advantage of
avoiding the irreverence brought by familiarity and giving men more scope for free
action.146 Such concessions were rare indeed among religious men, confined to the most
radical of Unitarians and free religionists. The fact that both Abbot and Rounseville
wrote in the Christian Examiner demonstrates that it was willing to host a diversity of
opinions on Spencer.
Most Christian writers passed over Spencer’s views on evolution, but not all. A
writer in the Baptist Quarterly, Heman Lincoln, described Spencer’s use of organic
development as a universal law covering human life and society, but noted that
Spencer’s ideas were more philosophical than scientific.147 The Philadelphia‐based
Baptist Quarterly was one of its denomination’s most important reviews, though it only
lasted from 1867‐1877.148 Lincoln’s rejection of evolution was thorough and well
informed, and generally even‐handed. Similarly, an article in the same journal five years
later discussed Spencer’s arguments against special creation along with Darwin’s. The
writer argued that Darwinism did not conflict with scripture because an intelligent force
behind development was still possible, and chided Spencer for ruling out such an
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explanation.149 J. S. Jewell, writing in The Methodist Quarterly Review, even tackled the
conservation and correlation of forces, and quoted Spencer’s law of evolution. Jewell
concluded that basic forces could not produce organic phenomena but did not dismiss
the law entirely.150 Congregationalist minister and prolific author Horace Bushnell,
writing in Hours at Home, showed particular fascination with Spencer’s ideas of progress
as a natural law and his vision of alternating periods of universal evolution and
dissolution, though he found these conceptions cold without a loving God.151
Opinions varied among mainline Protestants as well. While none agreed with
him fully, some accepted the value of certain of his ideas. Three books published in 1871
by three of the most important religious leaders in the country provide an illustration.
Charles Hodge, a conservative Presbyterian and Principal of Princeton Theological
Seminary, brought out the first volume of his Systematic Theology. James McCosh,
President of Princeton College, published a series of lectures he had delivered for the
“Elias P. Ely Lectures on the Evidences of Christianity” about the relationship of science
and religion as Christianity and Positivism. Finally, Congregationalist Noah Porter, who
became President of Yale College in 1871, published The Sciences of Nature Versus the
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Science of Man, portions of which reprinted an addresses given before the Theta Beta
Kappa society at Harvard.
None of the three writers accepted Spencer’s delimitation of the Knowable.
Hodge agreed that the object of Christian worship must be infinite and thus
incomprehensible, but made a distinction between what could be understood and what
could be known (much as Brownson did) with faith based on the latter.152 As fellow
Presbyterian and Auburn Theological Seminary professor R. B. Welch put it, faith is not
counter to reason because belief is based on the type of spiritual evidence affirmed by
Spencer’s universal postulate, like awareness of the self.153 McCosh also found an
element of truth in Spencer, acknowledging that God is mostly unknown to us.154 But he
was much more sanguine about what is knowable than Spencer, contending that human
minds can conceive of an uncaused, self‐existent God and comprehend Him through His
works.155 The contradictions, McCosh wrote, were in the minds of the metaphysicians
and not in the laws of human thought. Porter was the most original of the three on this
subject. Rejecting Spencer’s “incomprehensible somewhat” as an object of worship, he
suggested that Spencer’s own methods of knowing might be relative rather than
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absolute, the products of a physiology and psychology which might evolve new modes
of thought in the future. To Porter, Spencer’s axioms could only be accepted as
foundational to science if they were more than the product of an ephemeral set of
interior relations.156 Porter’s use of Spencer’s theories of knowledge was somewhat
ironic, given his earlier dismissal of The Principles of Psychology as a book of “great
pretension and small results.”157
While none of the writers called Spencer an atheist or materialist, Hodge and
McCosh found materialistic elements in his doctrines. Much of this was centered on
Spencer’s ideas about life and human intelligence. In a chapter on materialism, Hodge
quoted a number of passages from First Principles where Spencer stated the close
relations between mental and physical processes.158 The mistake of materialists, Hodge
declared, is that they start with dead matter and try to explain how it has so many
amazing properties, instead of beginning with the infinite, intelligent God that is
responsible for matter and for mind as well.159 However, Hodge admitted that Spencer
claimed not to be an atheist, remarking only that Spencer called miscalled something
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“God” which did not have attributes like thought.160 Unlike Hodge, McCosh had read
Spencer’s biological and psychological work. However, he too found Spencer’s ideas
about life unsatisfactory. He felt Spencer’s biological work was valuable for describing
the elements that make up organisms, but did not explain how these elements produce
life as such. Nor did he believe that Spencer successfully showed how the persistence of
force and instability of the homogenous could produce sensations of pleasure and
pain.161 Porter, on the other hand, did not discuss the physiological side of Spencer’s
psychology. Instead he praised Spencer for seeing that psychology is fundamental to
philosophy’s ability to develop necessary principles. But he felt that Spencer’s promise
was unfulfilled because he suborned his thought to a metaphysical hypothesis, the law
of evolution, which was neither self‐evident nor proven.162
In some ways the writers were very different from each other, and they arrived
at different conclusions about Spencer. Hodge treated him the least, and when he did it
was to disagree with him. He made no comprehensive statement on Spencer. McCosh
was the most knowledgeable about Spencer’s work and the most positive. He accepted
Darwin’s ideas about evolution, noted that the world is filled with conflict and suffering,
and even agreed that natural selection works in human society—though he contended

160

Ibid., 241.

161

McCosh, Christianity and Positivism, 364‐365.

162

Porter, Sciences of Nature, 65‐67.

269
that it is the morally strong and Godly who are the fittest.163 McCosh highlighted
Spencer’s ideas about progress, something few religious writers did. However, he
pointed out that the thought of a world free from pain fifty million years in the future is
small comfort to someone who is grieving now.164 Furthermore, Spencer could not
prove that progress was inevitable; his physical forces could just as easily lead to
destruction without regulation by his unknown reality, and such regulation implies
goodness and wisdom.165 As Thomas Hill, former president of Harvard, put it, “the order
of the universe is intelligible and beneficent; and we are hence led to the induction that
its Cause is intelligent and benevolent.”166 Despite all his criticism, McCosh agreed that
Spencer was a “powerful speculative thinker,” and suggested “it may be safely said of
some of his high speculations, that they will not be either proven or disproven for
ages.”167
Porter’s assessment, on the other hand, was ultimately dismissive. He
recognized that Spencer’s familiarity with physics and natural history was unique among
philosophers, and wrote that Spencer was not “a sophist or a charlatan, for the reason
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that he instructs in too many single and important truths.”168 Nevertheless Porter
complained about the vagueness of terms like evolution, differentiation, and the like,
called Spencer “a dexterous juggler,” and implied that Spencer overawed credulous
readers with his knowledge and confidence.169 Ultimately, Porter wrote, any student of
philosophy could see that Spencer’s knowledge was shallow, and that “notwithstanding
the zeal of his admirers, he will cease to be the wonder of the hour; that so soon as the
secret of his plausibility is exposed he will suffer a more complete neglect than he will
fairly deserve.”170 Porter may have been correct in the long term, but in the short term
he could not have been more wrong.
Hodge, McCosh, and Porter were fairly representative of mainstream theological
opinion about Spencer. All three took Spencer seriously, though ultimately rejecting
many of his ideas. Henry Ward Beecher, a Congregationalist minister and one of the
most famous preachers in America, shared this sentiment. In The Christian Union, a
magazine founded as a forum for Beecher in 1870, he wrote:
I am sorry to see men read Herbert Spencer, and Huxley, and Tyndall, as though
they were the end of the law. I read them, too; and I believe much that they say.
A great many things in their works will be found to be a part of the truth. But in
order to get the truth which they contain I do not propose to forgo the Bible.171
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Beecher ultimately found Spencer’s work valuable, but as he said vis‐a‐vis Spencer on
another occasion, “there never was a field of wheat that ripened which did not have a
good deal of straw and husk with it.”172 None of those who wrote about Spencer from
the mainline Christian perspective could accept Spencer completely, though the amount
of chaff one found varied from person to person.
Some writers found little in Spencer besides a danger to faith. The Presbyterian
weekly New York Evangelist, a frequent critic, warned “no one need read Herbert
Spencer with any doubt of the fact that in so doing he steps into a poisonous
atmosphere, against whose careless inhalation he should be on his guard.”173 A writer in
the Southern Review evoked a great conflict between light and darkness, Christians and
Atheists, with Spencer on the side of the latter.174 Such attacks were not the norm,
however. Writers were more likely to try to expose Spencer’s mistakes than to condemn
him. And by the 1870s, most recognized that Spencer posited a power or absolute that
underlay and explained all perceptions—a valuable admission by one perceived to be in
the camp of science. To reject Spencer completely was to lose the use such admissions
for polemical purposes.

172

Henry Ward Beecher, “Lectures on Preaching. IV. The Study of Human Nature,” Christian Union 5,
no. 15 (Apr. 3, 1872), 300.
173

“Miscellany,” New York Evangelist 40, no. 38 (Sept. 23, 1869), 6.

174

“Modern Atheism,” Southern Review 11, no. 21 (Jan. 1872), 121, 131‐32.

272
The Problem of Mind: Extending The Principles of Psychology
After the biology, the next step in Spencer’s journal was a reframing of The
Principles of Psychology. Spencer planned to greatly expand this into a two volume
work, more than doubling the size of the first edition. He began this work in 1867, and
even hired a young Scotsman, David Duncan, as a research assistant and secretary. But
before Spencer accomplished much, he had another breakdown; severe insomnia seems
to have been the worst symptom. Hydropathic cures, skating, and racquets were not
very helpful, so in the spring of 1868 he decided to take a tour of Italy.175 As usual,
Spencer’s physical health was fine: he was able to chase down a twenty‐year‐old
pickpocket (his sense of justice overcoming any thoughts of the dangers involved) and
climb an erupting Mt. Vesuvius.176 In his autobiography he critiqued everything from the
Sistine chapel to the Italian scenery, though he did admire Pompeii.177 In a letter to
Youmans he cited his independent‐mindedness: “not looking at things through the
spectacles of authority, I often find but little to admire where the world admires, or
professes to admire, a great deal.”178
Spencer returned after six weeks with his health unimproved, but did feel that a
break from work helped him in the long run. For the next five years Spencer worked on
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the Psychology, dictating on the racquet courts, in rowboats, and during walks.179 Even
with all these precautions, his capacity for work was not high, and worked only in the
early part of the day. Spencer was elected to London’s prestigious Athenaeum Club in
1868, and spent much of his afternoon there, playing billiards, skimming the latest
periodicals and books, and chatting with friends.180 The first volume of the Psychology
was not published until 1871; the second came out in 1873.
The Principles of Psychology was a foundational piece of the Synthetic
Philosophy. Spencer never abandoned the idea that traditional introspective methods of
psychological analysis are empirically valid.181 The Universal Postulate, which based
truth on the human ability to conceive, undergirded First Principles, and the idea that
innate ideas are inherited from ancestors was fundamental to his sociology and ethics.
In the second edition, Spencer did not abandon these ideas, but built on them, and
connected them more thoroughly to other parts of his grand philosophy. In particular,
he added much more biological detail and discussed the ramifications of psychology for
morality. Additionally, Spencer carried over his denial of free will from the first volume.
Though he never emphasized this finding, it underlay his fatalism and sociological
determinism. His objections to the historical emphasis on “great men,” for example, was
based in part on his preference for environmental explanations over human agency.
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Spencer’s additions to the first volume of The Principles of Psychology mostly
took the form of a biological examination of the nervous system. In part I, “The Data of
Psychology” he examined its structures and functions, and the connection to subjective
experience. In an overview, he invoked evolution to explain psychological facts as
“incidents in the continuous re‐distribution of Matter and Motion,” an approach that led
many critics to label his philosophy of mind materialistic.182 However, in the concluding
chapter of the section he noted that
Though accumulated observations and experiments have led us by a very indirect series
of inferences...to the belief that mind and nervous action are the subjective and
objective faces of the same thing, we remain utterly incapable of seeing, and even of
imagining, how the two are related. Mind still continues to us a something without any
kinship to other things…183

Spencer and his supporters could point to this and similar passages as evidence that he
did not equate mind with matter.
However, in Spencer’s Psychology the separation between physiology and
thought was razor thin. For him, the development of intelligence mirrored the growing
complexity and centralization of nervous tissue. Spencer went into great detail about
the composition and arrangement of the nerves, much of which was highly theoretical.
For example, he explained the transmission of nervous signals by a “wave of isomeric
transformation” (that is, a reversible chemical reaction) and proposed that the
cerebellum coordinates objects in space while the cerebrum coordinates objects in
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time.184 Basic principles of evolution explained the genesis of nerves: “nerve force”
following lines of least resistance eventually carved out channels of molecules whose
symmetric “orientation” and “polarities” better carried nervous waves.185 Over long
periods “compound” and “doubly‐compound” nervous systems evolved, and reflex
action evolved into more complex instinct and thus into consciousness.186 None of these
positions was justified by the available evidence, but Spencer was not the type to forgo
explanations that were plausible because solid facts were lacking.187 A priori deductions
from basic physical principles helped fill in these gaps. For Spencer, the development of
complex nervous systems was a prime example of the law of evolution in action. The
progression from small, simple coordination of nerves in minor ganglia to increasingly
large and more compound coordination in vertebrate centers implied a progressive
integration of motions that grew in heterogeneity and definiteness.188 The first
principles of evolution were never far from Spencer’s mind, though much of his
physiological information was too specific to illustrate such general laws.
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Bringing brain and mind even closer together was Spencer’s chapter on “Aestho‐
Physiology,” a word he coined for the study of the connection between nervous action
and thought. Though he stated clearly that mental experiences do not have any
conceivable similarity to biological processes, Spencer narrowed the gap
considerably.189 He pointed out that things which inhibit nervous action, like pressure or
poor circulation, also reduce feelings.190 Spencer wrote,
We have good reason to conclude that at the particular place in a superior
nervous centre where, in some mysterious way, an objective change or nervous
action causes a subjective change or feeling, there exists a quantitative
equivalence between the two; the amount of sensation is proportionate to the
amount of molecular transformation that takes place in the vesicular substance
affected.191
Emotions, Spencer felt, obey the same general laws. For example, he described desires
as imagined feelings aroused when the corresponding real feelings have not recently
been experienced. These imagined feelings correspond to nerves which have not been
discharged, becoming unstable and sensitive to the general reverberations of the
nervous system until they are either exercised or until gradually the sensitivity ends and
the corresponding desires fade.192
In the second part of his Psychology Spencer explored the basic elements of
mind, much as he had explored the basic composition of the brain before. He suggested
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a new theory: that all feelings can be deconstructed into tiny elemental “shocks,” like
the feeling of exposure to electricity or a loud noise but on a much smaller scale. As
nerves act in pulses, so these tiny feelings of shock combine in various ways to create
the mind. Again, Spencer carefully pointed out that what these elemental particles of
feelings are is unknown, so they cannot simply be translated into the physical firing of
nerves.193 The difference between mind and matter was preserved, though Spencer
narrowed the gap tremendously. However, he did not pursue this line of thought
further, instead turning to the kind of subjective analysis of the psyche familiar from the
first edition of The Principles of Psychology.
Each feeling, Spencer wrote, occupies a portion of consciousness large enough to
make it distinct from others.194 Thus individual feelings could be minutely analyzed. In
their individual states they could be primary—either centrally initiated (emotions) or
peripherally initiated (external and internal sensations)—or secondary, recollected
versions of these.195 Together they formed clusters, such as with an “idea” which
Spencer interpreted as a combination of vivid and faint feelings.196 Spencer thought that
feelings and the relations between them tended to cluster together with similar
predecessors, according the law of association. This arrangement worked beneficially in
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nature in the form of pleasure and pain. Survival of the fittest favored organisms in
which pain accompanies actions harmful to the individual or group, and pleasure
accompanies helpful actions likewise.197 This conception was foundational to Spencer’s
later social and ethical theory; as he pointed out here, human beings have not yet fully
adjusted to their social environment (thanks in part to the elimination of natural
selection) and so still find some harmful things pleasurable and some helpful things
painful.198
Spencer included the sections “General Synthesis” and “Special Synthesis” from
the first edition with few changes. This included his view that intelligence is simply
highly developed instinct, that basic modes of thought are inherited from a long line of
ancestors, that the self is simply a composite of all current states of consciousness, and
that free will is illusory. In his second volume he expanded on some of these ideas. He
began with his “Special Analysis” from the first edition, with a few minor changes having
to do with reasoning and spatial perception.199 The “General Analysis,” which discussed
the Universal Postulate, was greatly expanded and its core reworded. At root it was
defense of realism against idealism, ending in a doctrine Spencer called “Transfigured
Realism.” Against “metaphysicians” Spencer argued that reason is just a re‐coordination
of already coordinated states of consciousness, not categorically different than
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observation as a way of knowing.200 Thus reason was not competent to overrule the
reports of the senses. Furthermore, Spencer noted that the division between “self”
(subject, ego) and “not‐self” (object, non‐ego) is primordial to consciousness and
directly and vividly felt, while Idealism, the outcome of a chain of reasoned arguments,
could only be vague.201 Spencer’s ultimate argument against Idealism was the Universal
Postulate, which he altered slightly to deal with some of John Stuart Mill’s criticisms.
The real change from the first edition was that Spencer now connected his postulate to
his other psychological theories. To Spencer, cohesions among thoughts could be
stronger or weaker; the Universal Postulate simply singled out cohesions that could not
be broken apart as necessarily true beliefs.202 After examining the conceptions of
subject and object innate to the human mind, Spencer explained Transfigured Realism:
the reality of objective existence is a necessity of thought, but this does not mean that
things are exactly as they seem to the observer.203 This brought Spencer back to the
conclusion he had reached in First Principles: the universe is a manifestation of an
Unknowable Reality.204
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Spencer ended the new Principles of Psychology with a section of miscellaneous
corollaries from what had gone before. Most of this section concerned “the special
psychology of Man, considered as the unit of which societies are composed.”205 Here
Spencer explored a number of conceptions that would be crucial for his sociology and
especially for his ethical system. First, he categorized thoughts and feelings into
overlapping categories: presentative (sensation), presentative‐representative
(identification), representative (recollection), and re‐representative (abstract
thought).206 To Spencer, these categories corresponded to degrees of mental
evolution.207 He argued that primitive man could not think abstractly, in terms of law,
because his way of life gave him little chance to observe precise equality or the exact
repetition of events.208 Spencer also considered primitive man deficient in imagination
and originality, both requiring recollection.209 He based these ideas on his categorical
scheme rather than on anthropological evidence, a very different procedure from his
later sociological work.
Society, Spencer argued, requires sympathy or fellow‐feeling, which can only be
strong where the higher thoughts and feelings make it possible for the individual to
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represent to himself the pleasures and pains of others.210 Spencer divided these re‐
representations into egoistic, ego‐altruistic, and altruistic sentiments, giving Auguste
Comte due credit for the word “Altruism.”211 The egoistic type included the enjoyment
of possessions, love of freedom, feelings of pride, and the like—all requiring abstract
thought.212 Ego‐altruistic sentiments were those tied to social approbation; right and
wrong being socially determined and backed by love of admiration and fear of
punishment both in this life and the next.213 Finally, the most evolved type of sentiment,
present only in civilized men living in highly civilized societies, was the purely altruistic
one. These sentiments transcended the merely relatively right and wrong for absolute
ethics.214 For Spencer, complete altruism was only possible in societies that had evolved
beyond military and industrial conflict, for such conflict inevitably meant the hardening
of the sympathies.215 The most complex of the altruistic sentiments, Spencer wrote, was
the sense of justice.216 In this way Spencer came full circle: his psychological doctrines
justified the political doctrines he set down in his earliest work.
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The enlarged version of Spencer’s psychology ranged widely, and sometimes the
pieces fit together uneasily. He came very close to identifying mind with brain. But using
subjective analysis to explore one and physiological data to describe the other made
them seem very different indeed. Spencer argued that both the mind and the brain of
man had evolved from lower forms by steady steps: as nervous centers became more
complex, “involved forms of consciousness which are the correlatives of these complex
structures and functions must have arisen by degrees.”217 Yet his interest in physiology
apparently stopped after volume one, and his sections on primitive man in volume two
were almost devoid of physical data. This makes it difficult to assess how influential his
biology was on his sociology and ethics. Finally, Spencer ended the book with some of
his weakest material, on the mentality of primitive man. His hypotheses in earlier
sections at least had the benefit of being plausible.
The Mental and the Material: Critiques of the New Psychology
Before the first volume of the second edition of the Psychology was published
the New‐York Tribune discussed its first section, The Data of Psychology, based on the
periodical segments still being sent to subscribers.218 The short article was
complimentary to Spencer, but its main concern was to show, with quotations, that
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Spencer did not equate consciousness and nervous activity.219 This was an important
issue for many critics, especially religious writers. For example, The Independent also
discussed the first section briefly, concluding that it was valuable in part for the “strictly
scientific demolition of the doctrine of materialism which the concluding chapters
contain.”220 The Ladies’ Repository, still taking an approving interest in Spencer, pointed
out the difference between Comte, who rejected psychology as metaphysical, and
Spencer, who recognized it as something different than pure physiology.221
However, reviews of the complete volumes were few. In part this was because
Spencer, concerned about misrepresentation of his views, stopped sending copies of his
books to the press. The extremely technical nature of the material also contributed.
Spencer’s highly speculative physiological theories were panned by a writer in The
Methodist Quarterly Review, who quoted a long section about the evolution of nerves
and observed “can any one say they have ever met with a more fanciful, or artificial, or
minute account of a process, the details of which are mostly beyond the power of the
microscope, and of which, for this reason as well as for others, we know almost
nothing?”222 Perhaps for this reason, few reviews appeared in medical journals, and
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those that did were brief.223 A critic in Harper’s Monthly worried that Spencer’s abstruse
style could lead to misunderstandings, and maintained that Spencer was not an atheist
or skeptic, but a pantheist and realist who founded knowledge on intuition.224
The most important discussion of Spencer’s psychology appeared five years after
the fact: an article by William James in The Journal of Speculative Philosophy. James was
worried about the impact of Spencer’s theory of mind: “Probably a large proportion of
those hard‐headed readers who subscribe to the Popular Science Monthly and Nature,
and whose sole philosopher Herbert Spencer is, are fascinated by it without being in the
least aware of what its consequences are,” he wrote.225 James’ was primarily concerned
with Spencer’s determinism. An idea of mind as nervous adjustments of internal to
external conditions for the sole purpose of survival left out important human interests
like aesthetic feelings and religious emotions.226 Furthermore, group survival required
many of these human interests to contradict individual well‐being. Bravery and self‐
sacrifice, for example, were elements of the personality that were good for the group
but not for the individual.227 James argued that these diverse elements of the human
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mind were often in conflict, so no normative theory of correct behavior was possible.228
He concluded that the mind is not a passive reflector but an actor, with a “vote” in the
conflict.229 Clearly, James did not agree with Spencer’s position on free will.
Americans mostly ignored the second edition of The Principles of Psychology, but
this did not mean that Spencer’s popularity was waning. In the 1870s, interest in First
Principles was just as great as ever. And by the middle of the decade, Spencer had begun
publishing his work on human societies, first in the enormously popular The Study of
Sociology and then in the volumes of The Principles of Sociology. Spencer had gained
popular fame as well, as evidenced by the many references to him in articles, books, and
even in stories and poems. Herbert Spencer’s stock continued to rise.
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CHAPTER FIVE
HERBERT SPENCER AND AMERICAN FAME
She was a girl of education and sense, and she no more believed in ghosts than does
Professor Huxley or Herbert Spencer.
‐‐Justin McCarthy, “The Tread of Invisible Feet”1
Herbert Spencer had a reputation which extended beyond the ranks of
academics and clergymen. The first book he published in America, Education, ensured it.
As Spencer’s System of Philosophy gained him repute as a philosopher, popular
recognition also grew. From 1864, when the first American edition of First Principles was
published, to 1874, when the highly popular The Study of Sociology appeared, Spencer
became a household name for millions of Americans. Some casual readers came to
know him as the epitome of the intellectual, a philosopher and man of science on a
fearless quest for the truth who had dedicated his life to a great work. Others saw him
as the greatest menace to religion in the modern world. Many understood him as both.
One thing was clear: Herbert Spencer had a message for Americans. But was it one they
could comprehend?

1

Justin McCarthy, “The Tread of Invisible Feet,” Harper’s New Monthly Magazine 42, no. 249 (Feb.
1871), 410.

286

287
The Popular Philosopher: The Breadth of Spencer’s Audience
Information about Spencer spread in a variety of ways. The print media was one;
word of mouth was another. Personal conversations are impossible to reconstruct, but
sermons and speeches were sometimes preserved in newspapers, journals, and books.
These reveal the wide range of venues in which Spencer was discussed. In a Fourth of
July speech given in Boston in 1863, Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr. cited Spencer as a recent
thinker who expounded a “law of simultaneous intellectual movement” which could
explain the changes in thinking and feeling that led to the Civil War.2 In a discussion of
“negro suffrage” at New York’s 1867‐68 Constitutional Convention, one speaker,
claiming blacks were a “younger race,” proclaimed “Herbert Spencer recognizes the
education of races by the reiteration of impressions made hereditary by their action
upon successive generations.”3 W. C. Flagg, President of the Illinois State Farmers’
Association, argued against Spencer on government ownership of railroads in an
address to the National Agricultural Congress’ fourth annual session in Cincinnati.4 In the
cities and on the prairies, farmers, politicians, and ordinary citizens became familiar with
Spencer’s name and with his ideas.
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Spencer’s theories continued to be debated by religious thinkers throughout this
period. Sometimes such debates took place at gatherings of clergymen. In an address to
a conference of Unitarian ministers, Orville Dewey discussed Spencer at some length,
observing that “to be all the while writing, thinking of infinitude and yet to deny that it is
thinkable seems a strange thing.”5 A year earlier Dewey wrote to a friend, “I have
fought, in these later years, through Mansel and Herbert Spencer, as hard a battle as I
have ever had. But I have come, through all, to the most rooted conviction of the
Infinite Rectitude and Goodness.”6 Papers on Spencer were presented at a variety of
such conferences, from Methodist conclaves to institutes for Congregationalist
seminarians.7 Interest in Spencer was not confined to the leading theologians of these
denominations, but extended to the clergy in general and from them to the laymen in
their flocks.
Seminary students sometimes heard lectures discussing Spencer as part of their
curriculum. For example, James McCosh delivered a lecture on Spencer to the students
of Union Theological Seminary in 1871, which was reprinted in the New York Times.8
Secular institutions, too, hosted discussions of Spencer. In 1868, former Ohio Governor
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James Dolson Cox gave a critical review of Education to the learned societies of Miami
University of Ohio.9 At the 1872 Vassar College commencement, one of the students
read an essay on “The Conservation of Thought” based on Spencer’s ideas about the
persistence of force.10 Spencer’s books were not adopted by many schools, in great part
because he was perceived as an enemy of Christian religion. However, American papers
did report that Oxford had adopted some of Spencer’s works as required reading, and
that questions about him appeared on qualifying exams.11
Religious radicals took an interest in Spencer as well. In 1867, at Boston’s Free
Religious Club (later the Free Religious Association), Lizzie Doten, a spiritualist who had
published poems purportedly dictated by the spirits of William Shakespeare, Robert
Burns, and Edgar Allen Poe, discussed the Unknowable before an audience that included
Bronson Alcott and his daughter Louisa May, Julia Ward Howe, D. A. Wasson, Lucretia
Mott, and Robert Dale Owen.12 Owen, a spiritualist himself, used Spencer’s suggestion
that long‐held beliefs must contain an element of truth as an argument for belief in the
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afterlife in the pages of Atlantic Monthly.13 Owen later compared his youthful
theological ideas to Spencer’s—”a confession of incompetence to grasp in thought the
cause of all things.”14 Philosophical societies also sometimes “tackled” Spencer.15
Physicians frequently discussed Spencer. At a conference of the American Dental
Association, a section on dental chemistry turned into an impromptu debate about
modern science in which one doctor quoted Spencer at length on evolution and the
advance of knowledge, and defended him against accusations of materialism.16 A
speech read before the Ohio State Medical Society in 1872 discussed the persistence of
force as fundamental to human thought. “It would be out of place in this paper to
elucidate the great doctrine referred to,” the speaker announced, “but we may safely
say that upon this field is to be fought the final battle of Truth against Error.”17 Medical
men often took opposite sides in this battle, as when an article disparaging Spencer
prompted a doctor to write a letter declaring him the greatest philosopher of the age
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for his unification of all phenomena under one law.18 Such discussions concerned
Spencer’s general philosophy rather than any specific biological or psychological
theories. Medical men rarely cited Spencer in their professional papers, except in vague
terms. Sometimes the terms could be very vague indeed. One writer referred to
Spencer’s great law as “the continuous redistribution of matter and motion.”19 Another
wrote that Spencer would attribute the arrangement and movement of the heart to
“external forces;” the writer preferred Hegel’s idea of “opposing forces.”20
Indefiniteness about Spencer’s arguments and beliefs was common in the
popular print media as well. Often Spencer was simply used as an example of scholarly
intellect. George William Curtis, writing from his perch on the “Editor’s Easy Chair” at
Harper’s Monthly, thought Spencer would be puzzled at how railroad conductors
become invisible at any sign of trouble. Sarah Josepha Hale, doing similar duty at
Godey’s, imagined that even Spencer would be unable to explain the development of
her pet rabbit, and would classify such questions as unknowable.21 Spencer was often
seen as the prototypical impractical, abstruse philosopher. The Chicago Tribune, for
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example, pictured him in his library, sitting in an easy chair, “elevated above the plain of
ordinary mortals.”22 Another writer imagined him returning from his metaphysical
roaming to “old paths” of Christianity thanks to his childhood faith.23 Sometimes writers
highlighted the technical nature of Spencer’s writing, as when D. A. Wasson used him as
an example of “the Dryasdust of science” and wrote
It is true that Mr. Herbert Spencer, having, by diligent, heroic self‐desiccation,
got his mind into the purely adult, dried‐beef condition, well freed from all boy‐
juices of imagination, has discovered that all Fact in this universe, which cannot
be verbally formulated and made a scientific dogma, is without significance to
man’s spirit, however it may be negatively implied as a vacant somewhat by his
logic. For which discovery the incomparable man will please accept my
profoundest ingratitude.24
On the other hand, a commentator in the Chicago Tribune wrote “he has frosted over
the naked, wintry landscape of philosophy with glistening rainbow flakes of poetry and
beauty, and enlivened its desolation with music.”25 Clearly there was room for
disagreement about Spencer’s attractions as a writer.
In fiction, Spencer’s works were often used as examples of the complex and
abstruse. In a poem about her daughter being “commonplace,” popular writer
Constance Fenimore Woolson asked if she should “take her stories—simple tales which
her few leisure hours beguile— / And give her Browning’s Sordello, a Herbert Spencer, a
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Carlyle?”26 In a later story Woolson demonstrated the intellect of a character by having
him study Spencer with careful attention to each word. She observed that both the
scientific and the illiterate read this way, unlike those of the middle‐class, who look only
for the general meaning.27 Similarly, Spencer sometimes served as an example of the
dangers of modern thought. In one of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s stories, the narrator
explained “my mother and aunt had read together Lecky, and Buckle, and Herbert
Spencer, with the keen critical interest of fresh minds. Had it troubled their faith? Not in
the least. . . .There is a certain moral altitude where faith becomes knowledge, and the
bat‐wings of doubt cannot fly so high.”28 Whatever nuances intellectuals and
theologians might find in Spencer, to many Americans he was known as a danger to
faith, and little else.
Nevertheless, Americans were eager to learn what Spencer was really like. In
1870, British writer Justin McCarthy, a frequent contributor to American magazines,
wrote “during the first few weeks of my sojourn in the United States I heard more
inquiries and more talk about Spencer than about almost any other Englishman living.”29
Under McCarthy’s pen Spencer emerged as an outwardly prosaic, respectable
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gentleman who had a “pure, rigorous, anchorite‐like devotion to knowledge” and an
uncompromising love of justice—a moral and intellectual superman in the guise of a
Victorian Clark Kent.30 A year earlier, another writer made a similar report after meeting
Spencer: New‐York Tribune editor George Ripley. Of Spencer’s manner, Ripley wrote,
Without any formal and pedantic precision, he evidently weighs his expressions
with the conscientiousness of one who wishes to make his language the exact
representation of his ideas. He speaks fluently, but not volubly, and with a
certain grave earnestness that is more impressive than any attempt at
conversational eloquence.
Spencer’s careful choice of words was noticed by many of those who admired him.
Ripley also made it clear that Spencer was no materialist. He cited Spencer’s oft‐
repeated comment that if he had to choose between pure materialism and pure
spiritualism he would choose the latter.31
An early biographical sketch appeared in the Independent in 1864, attributed to
“Mrs. Tracy Cutler.” Cutler got her information from a visit she paid to Spencer’s parents
a dozen years before. During their conversation, William George Spencer reportedly said
that he would have been proud to give his son a “profound classical education” but felt
it would ruin the boy’s health. So he educated his son by referring to physical objects
and their laws instead. No doubt Herbert Spencer would have been surprised to learn
that the teaching methods and subjects he cherished were actually his father’s second
choice. Also, according to Cutler, Spencer senior regretted not giving his son a deeper

30

Ibid., 38‐40.

31

[George Ripley], “Ten Days in London,” New‐York Tribune, Aug. 25, 1869.

295
education in moral philosophy. But when he loaned his son a copy of Johnathan
Dymond’s Essays on the Principles of Morality the young man said he could do a better
job himself, and several months later sent his father a copy of Social Statics.32
Mistaken information about Spencer circulated all too commonly. Usually such
errors were innocuous, as when he was referred to as a “statistician” or as “Sir Herbert
Spencer.”33 Other times they were more serious. In the 1870s, a rumor spread that
Spencer had educated George Eliot, a piece of misinformation that took years to
dispel.34 Even the Appletons’ own magazine claimed that the two met in her teens and
that “under Spencer the future novelist probably learned to think.”35 Other reports had
Spencer engaged to marry an American heiress, or to become president of a college in
Cincinnati.36 Sloppy reporting is not a modern invention. Spencer himself learned to
accept such misstatements as inevitable. He only took them seriously if they reflected
badly on himself or on people he cared about. Mistaken interpretations of his work, on
the other hand, drew his immediate attention.
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Some periodicals and newspapers took an interest in Spencer’s publishing
history. It became a point of pride to many that Americans supported Spencer when the
British did not. “The first money that Herbert Spencer ever received in his life from his
books was sent to him in 1861 by the Appletons as his share of the proceeds of his
‘Essays upon Education’” James Parton bragged in Atlantic Monthly. Nor was this all:
according to Parton, Spencer’s works were particularly well adopted to the American
mind, and Social Statics was “Jeffersonian Democracy, illustrated and applied.”37 The
exaggerations became so great that Youmans felt compelled to set the record straight in
the New‐York Tribune. If American support of Spencer was to be “boasted of as a
national honor,” Youmans wrote, then at least the facts should be known, and Spencer’s
English supporters not slighted.38
Spencer was quoted regularly, often to give an article a little panache or
scholarly heft. Since Spencer wrote on a range of subjects, his name appeared in a wide
variety of contexts. Some writers cited his essays on business ethics and bemoaned the
scarcity of moral values in American commercial dealings.39 One quoted Spencer on the
moral nature of children.40 Every Saturday repeated his views on the cost and trouble of
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following convention, while Scientific American used him as an authority on intellectual
property and patent rights.41 Sometimes Spencer’s miscellaneous scientific work was
discussed, like his theories about electricity or sunspots.42 Even a general‐interest
magazine like Scribner’s Monthly might reprint one of Spencer’s scientific arguments.43
Such attention put Spencer before a multitude—Scribner’s, another of the great
publisher‐owned periodicals, printed 40,000 copies of its first issue in 1870 and had
print runs of more than 100,000 by the end of the decade.44 Newspapers, too, discussed
Spencer’s scientific theories. The Chicago Tribune reported on an amateur scientist in
Britain who tried to verify Spencer’s ideas about inherited instinct by putting wax in the
ears of newborn chicks, and hoods on their heads. The experimenter reported that as
soon as the impediments were removed the chicks used their senses properly to locate
food, although they had never used them before.45 This kind of experimental
verification of Spencer’s ideas was rare, however.
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Spencer’s Education remained a landmark text in the decades after its
publication. It continued to be recommended, at least by those not put off by Spencer’s
religious views. The Southern Review, belatedly reviewing Education in 1867, announced
that all parents should read the sections on the management of children.46 Another
Southern periodical, De Bow’s Review, used the book as part of an argument in favor of
practical and science‐based education in the South.47 Teachers discussed the book in
journals of education and at teachers’ associations and conferences.48 One writer even
called Spencer “the greatest living writer on education,”49 but such hyperbole was not
typical. However, general appreciation for Spencer’s work was common, even among
those who disagreed on one or two points. For example, a writer in Massachusetts
Teacher agreed with Spencer that knowing the meanings of words does not teach cause
and effect, but argued that learning Latin was useful for exercising the mind.50 The most
common issues discussed, besides the worth of classical languages, were education’s
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bearing on ethics and religious instruction. Spencer argued that education did not in
itself make a person moral, an issue that was taken up, pro and con, by numerous
writers.51 Of course, Spencer’s neglect of spiritual training was an issue for those who
felt that religious values should be considered the knowledge of most worth, since they
determined the soul’s destination.52
The Practical Philosopher: Spencer’s General Readership
Education was Spencer’s most popular book among women.53 At ladies’ clubs
and churches, women discussed the book and urged others to read it.54 Often the
context of consumption was quite domestic. One woman described herself darning
socks while her husband read Education aloud: “that homely embroidery fitted well with
Herbert Spencer’s genial philosophy, and while I gained new ideas about my boy’s
education, I had a certain satisfaction in feeling that I was making comfortable provision
for his toes also.”55 The scene was mirrored in fiction in the sentimental tale “Dr.
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Thorne’s Confession.” The titular character, having married a sweet and beautiful young
wife, tried to “discipline her mind” by reading Spencer’s “Social Status” aloud to her by
the fire in the evenings.56 Women’s reaction to Education was not always positive,
however, for it sent mixed messages about the education of girls. Sarah Josepha Hale
chided Spencer in Godey’s Lady’s Book for writing that men prefer rosy cheeks to
intellectual achievements. She replied that while physical and moral health is important,
intelligent companionship is just as attractive. Hale, a dedicated supporter of female
education, also argued for women’s place in intellectual history, and contended that
women could make contributions in the sciences if they were properly trained.57
Women read Spencer’s other books as well. Sometimes writers used knowledge
of Spencer as shorthand for general intellectual ability, as when Justin McCarthy
observed that he had heard “American girls” talking about Spencer in a way that
showed that they had not only read him, but understood him.58 Scribner’s ran a poem
which described romancing an educated women who “knows by heart John Stuart Mill /
And likewise Herbert Spencer!”59 Such knowledge could be couched in negative terms
as well: one writer, presumably male, conjured up a vision of a women’s rights advocate
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with pale, doughy skin, thoughtful eyes, and a flat chest, discussing Bismarck and
Herbert Spencer with the men—a description that echoed Spencer’s own account of the
effects of high‐pressure education on women.60 Some women did write articles about
Spencer. “Mrs. A. E. Barr” contributed an excellent summary of the first part of First
Principles to the Christian Union, a magazine founded as a vehicle for Henry Ward
Beecher in 1870. Barr concluded that religion and science agree that ultimate reality is
inscrutable, a more charitable view than that taken by most of her male colleagues.61
Marie Howland, while acknowledging Spencer as “one of the first intelligences that the
world has known,” contended that his arguments against government did not apply to a
republic like the United States, where the welfare and liberty of citizens was a
fundamental principle.62 Additionally, despite the fact that Spencer partially retracted
his defense of women’s rights in the American edition of Social Statics, some continued
to cite him as an advocate for women.63 At least one writer mistakenly claimed that
Spencer signed the petition on the right to vote that John Stuart Mill created and
presented to Parliament in 1867.64

60

“Men’s Rights,” Putnam’s Magazine 3, no. 14 (Feb. 1869), 213.

61

Mrs. A. E. Barr, “Ultimate Scientific Ideas from Herbert Spencer,” Christian Union 5, no. 4 (Jan. 17,
1872), 92.
62

Marie Howland, “What are the Functions of Government?” Appletons’ Journal of Literature, Science
and Art 14, no. 346 (Nov. 6, 1875), 590‐591.
63
64

M E S, “The Appeal of a Western Woman,” Independent 19, no. 947 (Jan. 24, 1867), 6.

Lander, Meta [Margaret Woods Lawrence], “Talks about the Woman Question,” Ladies’ Repository
31, no. 3 (Mar. 1871), 215. A letter from Spencer to Mill makes it clear that he had not. Herbert Spencer

302
Evidence exists that some African‐Americans read Spencer as well. Fanny
Jackson Coppin, a former slave, Oberlin College graduate, and Principal of the
Philadelphia Institute for Colored Youth, boasted that in the evening many patrons of
the school’s reading room asked for Mill, Hamilton, or Spencer, and read and re‐read
them.65 That African‐Americans would read the books of a decided racist may be
surprising, but most of Spencer’s comments on race were made in his sociological work.
Spencer’s arguments in favor of individual freedom would have appealed to black
Americans. Nor were Spencer’s ideas about race discussed in the print media, in part
because they were not remarkable for the time. Interestingly, Spencer was on the
committee that elected Edward Wilmot Blyden, the Liberian minister to England, an
honorary member of the Athenaeum Club, as reported by The African Repository, long‐
running journal of the American Colonization Society.66 Spencer did not mention the
incident in his autobiography or surviving letters, so his attitude about the election is
unclear.
Spencer had a large and diverse audience, despite the fact this his books were
universally considered heavy reading. As Every Saturday put it, “who reads Herbert
Spencer in June, or speculates very deeply upon ‘fate and foreknowledge’ in the dog‐
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days?”67 Some suspected that many who read Spencer did not fully understand him.
One writer in the Galaxy wrote “they praise Herbert Spencer, because he is direct and
interesting, and makes each of his readers think that they have solved the riddle of the
universe, and that they know more than they did before they were introduced to ‘first
principles.’”68 A writer in the Round Table believed that thanks to the diffusion of
education combined with democratic principles, Americans liked to buy books they
knew they would not be able to understand, like those of Spencer, Mill, and Comte:
The American has an idea, fixed though vague, that such and such writers are in
the van of contemporaneous thought, and that therefore he should possess their
works. He may not have time to understand them just yet, but he hopes to do so
by‐and‐by. Meanwhile he is gratified at being able to get at the sense of a
passage here and there, and has a profound reverence for not being able to
understand the whole of it.69
The passage is snobbish, but has an element of truth. Not everyone who read Spencer
finished his books, or understood what they had read. Unfortunately, this was also true
of those who wrote about him.
Pastors and other religious authorities worried that their youth were reading
Spencer and other unhealthy books. “A young man of consecrated purpose and
powerful intelligence, who wants to learn how to live most largely in accordance with
truth, will frequent the lecture‐room of science rather than the conventicle of tradition.
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He will not hear C. H. Spurgeon; he will study Herbert Spencer,” worried one concerned
writer.70 The New York YMCA refused to accept a magazine because it had articles by
Spencer in it.71 On the other hand, in an 1867 article the Independent recommended
“awakeners” for its young male readers, whether it be Sartor Resartus, Mill’s Logic, or
Spencer’s First Principles.72 Possibly the influence of Henry Ward Beecher was
responsible, for he remained attached to the weekly until 1870.
The True Believers: Spencer’s American Disciples
Spencer’s supporters were quick to defend him from hostile criticism. In 1869 a
critic in The Nation, reviewing a book by Henri Taine, wrote “it is Herbert Spencer’s
reputation over again, all very well for the ‘general public’ but the chemists and the
physicians, the painters and the architects are disposed to scoff at the new light.”73 Over
the next few months, the magazine printed several responses. Publisher Henry Holt
pointed out that Spencer never claimed to be an expert in any one field, and that men
like Hooker, Huxley, Lewes, and Mill found his work valuable.74 John Fiske added that
the real “scoffers” were literary men without the scientific training to understand
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Spencer—revealing that he did not think the general public competent to form an
opinion of Spencer’s books.75 Youmans wrote a long piece in Appletons’ Journal, which
he edited at that time, in agreement but with more detail. He cited positive reactions in
a number of reviews, and even quoted James McCosh’s praise from Intuitions of Mind.
To Youmans any critics of Spencer were “nameless newspaper scribblers,” “philosophic
fledglings,” and “prejudiced adherents of old traditions.”76 A similar debate occurred
when an editor at The Chicago Tribune suggested that “involution” from heterogeneous
to homogenous was just as common as evolution.77
Youmans continued to be Spencer’s main champion. He had the advantage of
various editorial positions, but he also had contacts in the publishing world that gave
him influence in newspapers like The New‐York Tribune and periodicals like the Christian
Examiner. In the latter he wrote a long article defending Spencer in 1867. He began by
simply observing that preconceived notions and deference to the common wisdom
could create bias. “Carelessness of statement, gratuitous imputation of evil motives,
misrepresentations of meaning, and all the petty tricks by which a writer seeks to bring
an author into reproach, should be sternly reprobated,” Youmans lectured.78 It was
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common for Spencer to claim that he had been “misrepresented”; here and elsewhere
Youmans was following the master’s lead.79 Youmans critiqued a number of reviews,
including one from the Examiner itself. His main contentions were two. First, he noted
that Spencer’s system did not depend on the first section of First Principles; those who
thought creating doubt about the doctrine of the Unknowable was sufficient to
demolish the entire philosophy were wrong.80 Second, he criticized those who called
Spencer a materialist, marshalling a variety of evidence to show this charge was
untrue.81 It was an impressive performance: now meeting his adversaries point‐by‐point
and arguing terminology to a hair’s breadth, now making sweeping utterances about
science and truth, Youmans dispatched Spencer’s critics one by one—at least, to his
own satisfaction. He ended with an undated letter in which Spencer essentially said that
he did not mind opposition from the truly religious, as long as they understood what
they were opposing.82
Youmans was the editor of Appletons’ Journal in its first year, before
disappointment with its lack of science coverage caused him to resign.83 He edited the
“Scientific Miscellany” section in The Galaxy, New York’s answer to The Atlantic
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Monthly, from 1871‐1874.84 Both posts gave him ample scope to promote Spencer. The
“Table‐Talk” section at Appletons’ quoted “Judge Arrington, of Chicago” as saying
“Herbert Spencer’s ‘First Principles’ is one of the greatest pieces of thinking that the
ages have produced. Spencer is the Aristotle of modern thought.”85 Later that year,
Youmans inserted a short piece on Spencer’s character.86 And of course there was the
defense of Spencer mentioned above. Even after he left Appletons’ Journal Youmans
had enough influence there to get a “puff piece” on Spencer published there. He made
sure that American readers knew that men like Darwin and Mill considered Spencer an
important thinker, and described the core of the Synthetic Philosophy as “the law of
Universal Evolution.”87 And he emphasized, again, that Spencer was not an atheist.
Youmans described Spencer’s reconciliation as an admission of the truth at the core of
religion. But he never grappled with the question of Christianity and its teachings.88
At The Galaxy, a number of scientific articles mentioned Spencer’s ideas, such as
his conception of isomeric changes in nerves, his theories about instinct, and his phrase
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“survival of the fittest.”89 Youmans also “puffed” Spencer directly, as when he lauded
Spencer’s one major scientific paper, on circulation in plants.90 Youmans was a
relentless promoter and could worm Spencer into any conversation. For example, he
began an article on “International Education” for the Christian Union with a discussion
of the multiplication of forces.91 However, for various reasons The Galaxy balked at
serially publishing Spencer’s The Study of Sociology in 1872. Youmans responded by
starting his own journal with the backing of the Appletons. Popular Science Monthly
debuted in May 1872, and printed more than 10,000 copies by the year’s end.92 It was a
dream come true for Youmans—a periodical under his control that printed nothing but
articles on science. And it was a forum for Spencer’s sociological work, much of which
was serialized in its pages prior to its publication in complete volumes.93
“The Spirit of Individuality”: Americans Debate Spencer’s Political Vision
“The Spirit of Individuality, this desire to throw off all trammels, and to live in the
atmosphere of one’s own personality” inspired Spencer’s most remarkable essays,
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according to one magazine.94 Not all Americans were this excited about Spencer’s
individualism. Spencer was sometimes compared to John C. Calhoun for his desire to
restrict government, and this was not intended as a compliment.95 Americans
considered their government different than Britain’s: more representative, more
reflective of the spirit of the people.96 Furthermore, some of Spencer’s ideas were
extreme. At various times writers pointed out that Spencer objected to the postal
service, public education, public sanitation, compulsory vaccination, capital punishment,
and labor laws.97 Given the long list of government services Spencer found
objectionable, it was easy for writers to find something to criticize.
Some agreed with Spencer’s basic premises, if not all of his specific conclusions.
For example, a writer in Appletons’ Journal supported Spencer’s definition of
government’s proper function and paraphrased the law of equal freedom.98 The
Christian Union felt that Spencer’s basic arguments were sound, but followed to absurd
conclusions; the writer thought legislation must be reduced on a case by case basis, not
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according to a sweeping generalization.99 Disagreement was more common, however. A
letter to the editor in the Chicago Tribune mocked Spencer for his “fine‐spun theories”
and noted that on his principle the Erie Canal would not have been built. The writer
argued that education’s true purpose is to teach people their rights and how to maintain
them.100 Another letter, this time to The Round Table, suggested that readers would be
surprised that “one of the most advanced and radical thinkers of the age, one consulted
and accepted as of almost apostolic authority by many of our reformers, strenuously
opposes the practice of free or government school education altogether.” This writer
felt public education was a fait accompli.101
Sometimes the source of the disagreement was the power of big corporations,
which populist thinkers felt the government needed to regulate. In 1875, President of
the Illinois State Farmers’ Association W. C. Flagg gave an address at the National
Agricultural Congress in Cincinnati in which he addressed the role of government. Flagg
agreed with Spencer’s law of equal freedom, equating it with Americans’ rights as
individuals. However, he disagreed with the advocates of laissez‐faire who preached
“‘every one for himself and the devil take the hindmost.’” Such a doctrine might have
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worked in the past, but with capital concentrated and given special privileges, the
state—which after all was just the people united—should intervene. One of Flagg’s
suggestions was for the government to take over the railroads and other means of
transport. It was a typical producer’s argument: too much of the wealth went unfairly to
traders, bankers, and shippers thanks to legal advantages and combinations.102
Old and New provided a rare look at the way Spencer’s ideas about the state
were debated by printing an account of a discussion in their offices about the role of
government. Old and New was the brainchild of Boston Unitarian minister Edward
Everett Hale, and absorbed the Christian Examiner before itself being merged with
Scribner’s Monthly in 1875.103 In the conversation, a pro‐government man mocked
Spencer for thinking that fishermen should pay for lighthouses and that mailmen should
negotiate the price to send a letter. Another participant opined that the first job of
government was not to protect citizens, but to enable communication between them by
building roads and public buildings.104 Hale himself joined the conversation a few years
later with a long essay on Spencer’s ideas, originally read before the public at
Horticulture Hall in Boston. This included many of the critiques noted above: that in
American the people governed the governors, and that private enterprise would not
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ensure that roads were built and elderly people supported.105 Ultimately, Hale felt that
Spencer overstated the power and rights of the individual: “to define terms with
precision, so soon as society exists, there cease to be ‘individuals.’ From the necessity of
the case, the ‘individual’ surrenders his ‘individuality.’ Government is the willing
organization of the methods of that surrender,” Hale wrote.106 In a footnote he argued
that the state can take peoples’ labor if necessary, echoing a phrase he used ten years
before in a critique of Social Statics: “Society has a right to the utmost efforts of all of its
members.”107 Few had such an exaggerated faith in government, however.
At times Spencer’s anti‐government stance was seen as callous, as with one
writer who declared that a true republic cares for its citizens, though Spencer might
disagree.108 However, Spencer’s political arguments were seldom put in the framework
of social Darwinism. Dislike of government does not automatically imply approval of a
social struggle which weeds out the weak. Spencer could be quoted in favor of altruism,
even by those who had read Social Statics.109 Spencer’s social Darwinism was little
remarked upon in the 1860s and 1870s. There were a few exceptions—enough to prove

105

Edward E. Hale, “The American Governments,” Old and New 11, no. 5 (May 1875), 518‐520.

106

Ibid., 524.

107

Ibid.; [Edward E. Hale], “Spencer’s Social Statics,” Christian Examiner 79, no. 2 (Sept. 1865), 280.

108

“The Massachusetts Board of State Charities, and the Westborough Reform School,” Christian
Examiner 83, no. 1 (July 1867), 112. For a similar opinion see “The State and its Charities,” 4.
109

J. P. Quincy, “The Better Samaritan,” Old and New 9, no. 2 (Feb. 1874), 189‐190; [J. P. Quincy],
review of Social Statics, by Herbert Spencer, Atlantic Monthly 16, no. 95 (Sept., 1865), 381‐383.

313
that some people noticed Spencer’s conviction that the survival of the fittest was a boon
for humanity. An article in the New York Times reported Spencer’s belief that the
ancient Greek practice of killing unwanted infants had improved the human race. As
part of a plea for better sanitation at schools, the author argued that whatever
humanity’s distance from Spencer’s imagined state of perfection, the practice was
currently unnecessary since unsanitary conditions were killing so many children.110 The
Christian Union summarized one of Spencer’s comments about “good‐for‐nothings,”
“storing up miseries,” and “maudlin philanthropy” but made no comment.111 A very
strong statement against Darwinian social thinking appeared in The Independent in
1873. “I know what says that benign philosopher, Herbert Spencer—that charity ought
not to save the weak from the doom to which they are appointed by the law of natural
selection,” wrote this critic. “Doubtless there is a natural law by which the stronger and
shrewder live while the feebler die. But it is the office of Christianity to mitigate the
action of natural law.”112
Perhaps most revealing is an article by Presbyterian minister William A. Holliday
on labor reform in the Presbyterian Quarterly and Princeton Review for July, 1876.113
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Holliday understood evolution as a positive force, and found that both Darwin and
Spencer agreed. But, he noted, the improvement of society as a whole is not the same
things as individual welfare:
And the doctrine of evolution has no tenderness for individuals….Natural
selection, survival of the fittest—these may be watch‐words to cheer an
aristocracy of physical strength and mental power, but they are a vae victis to
the struggling, to those overborne in the rude and fierce contest for existence.
Holliday denigrated such conclusions, arguing against a method for improving the poor’s
condition based on the idea “that improvement consists in starving them out and killing
them off.” In a footnote, Holliday cited a lecture by social reformer Moncure Conway
where Conway told a story about Spencer. The two men were observing boys running
alongside a canal chasing a boat for pennies. When some of the boys tired and lagged
behind, Spencer told Conway that he would soon see the exercise of pity, and showed
satisfaction when pennies were thrown to the lagging boys. In his speech, Conway
declared that an evolutionist philosopher should not feel such satisfaction, and noted
that Spencer certainly did not feel the same when pity was exercised on a larger scale.
The note is intriguing for several reasons. It gives evidence that Spencer’s harsh social
attitudes were sometimes addressed in speeches. It also implies that a connection was
made between evolutionary thinking and such attitudes. Both the speech and the article
as a whole suggest that at least a vague understanding of the ideas behind social
Darwinism was widespread.
Articles about Spencer’s social policies were rare in the 1860s and 1870s. Most
Americans perceived Spencer as a philosopher, an intellectual, and an evolutionist, not
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as a political reactionary. This despite the fact that he continued to argue that practices
in the world’s most civilized societies supported the unfit, to the detriment of the
human race. The next subject in Spencer’s Synthetic Philosophy gave him scope to
explore this issue. Spencer’s sociological work included much discussion of political
topics, and used the evolution of society over time to explained governing institutions.
And his book The Study of Sociology, as a work of popular science, brought his political
ideas before a wider audience.
“Is There a Social Science?”: Popularizing Sociology
Spencer began his sociological work while he was writing The Principles of
Psychology. One of the reasons he hired David Duncan as his assistant was to gather
material for The Principles of Sociology. He trained Duncan in what to look for in “books
of travel”: information on climate, geographical features, flora and fauna, and local
knowledge and beliefs in places all around the globe.114 Unfortunately for Spencer,
Duncan was offered a position in India as a professor of logic and Spencer lost his
services in 1870.115 He found not one replacement but two: James Collier, who took
charge of Spencer’s dictation, and Richard Scheppig, a German.116 By this time Spencer’s
books had become remunerative, especially those sold in Britain, where he paid the
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publishing costs himself and reaped the majority of the rewards. He could afford to keep
researchers “on staff,” which made his sociology very different from the earlier divisions
of the Synthetic Philosophy. To put it baldly, it was much more inductive, based on
mountains of evidence rather than a priori arguments and the conclusions of a few
specialists.
Spencer had the information gathered by Duncan, Collier, and Scheppig
compiled into large tables, arranging and classifying the data according to his
specifications. He felt this provided an objective view of the facts, which anyone could
use to verify his conclusions, or to make investigations of their own.117 Convinced of the
value of this material, Spencer arranged to have it published under the title Descriptive
Sociology. The first volume, on the English, was published in Britain and America in
1873, and from then on a volume appeared every year until the eighth volume, in
1881.118 These were large books, twenty inches by thirteen, and expensive to produce.
Spencer quickly found that they lost money. He estimated that the first volume cost him
£648, £296 in pay to Collier and £351 for stereotyping and printing 1,000 copies.119 Eight
months after it was printed Spencer wrote to Youmans that less than 200 copies had
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been sold.120 Still, he felt it was his duty to continue, in part because of promises he had
made to Collier and Scheppig, in part because he considered the work a public benefit.
By this period Spencer’s profits from his other works were enough to offset these costs,
and he turned down several offers by Americans to help fund the project.121 However,
by the time the eighth volume was published in October of 1881, Spencer estimated he
had lost approximately £3,250 in total on the books (around $370,000 today).122
Spencer thought the cost too heavy and called a halt to the project.
Americans showed only slight interest in Descriptive Sociology. A few positive
notices appeared around the time the first volume was released. A Chicago Tribune
reviewer believed the work would answer critics who accused Spencer of not having
enough facts to support his inductions. He considered the book free from bias, filled
with “facts, pure and simple.” Interestingly enough, this critic also reprinted a long
extract from Education pleading for what we would today call social and cultural
history.123 R. W. Raymond, mining engineer, legal scholar, author, and member of Henry
Ward Beecher’s Plymouth Church, wrote in the Christian Union that this was Spencer’s
great work, published purely for public benefit. “He has injected no theories into his
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tables,” Raymond wrote.124 The Nation was not so sure; though approving of Spencer’s
need for such facts it worried that many of his ancient sources were unreliable. The
writer thought Spencer should make this clear so that “ardent” and “impetuous”
disciples would not exceed their cautious master.125 The fact that Spencer himself
decided which facts were useful and arranged them into categories of his choosing did
not seem to bother this writer or any other. Soon enough the book dropped from the
public consciousness, although it saw occasional use. For example, an address by
education advocate Jabez Lamar Monroe Curry cited Spencer’s tables as proof that
agriculture had improved over the ages thanks to better observation and reasoning.126
Before Spencer continued with the Synthetic Philosophy another project arose.
Youmans was travelling England, Scotland, France and Germany, trying to arrange a new
series of books called the International Scientific Series which would publish work from
leading British, American, and European scientists for popular consumption at home and
abroad.127 Acknowledging his debt to his American promoter, Spencer reluctantly
agreed to suspend his work to write a popular treatise on sociology.128 The result was
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The Study of Sociology, which Youmans founded Popular Science Monthly to serialize. It
became one of Spencer’s most popular books, and one of the most financially
rewarding.129
The Study of Sociology assumed nothing, starting with the fundamental question
of whether a science of society was necessary or even possible. Spencer argued the
need by demonstrating that few people understood political and economic systems—
proven by how few agreed with his political and social shibboleths, such as the
impotence of government and the destructiveness of indiscriminate charity.130 As for
the possibility, Spencer criticized both those who felt God was responsible for what
happens in human affairs and those who followed the “great‐man‐theory of History.”131
The great man is the product of his society, he argued, and needs the “material and
mental accumulations” of his society to function.132 There must be forces which dictate
how society grows and functions, otherwise political and economic prediction would be
impossible, Spencer reasoned.133
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Spencer described the nature of these forces by reference to the social
organism, making sure that his readers understood that it was only an analogy.134 Like
organisms, he wrote, societies have their own taxonomy—in a way, Spencer was trying
to create a “genealogy of types of social structure,” not a history.135 He argued that,
although societies came in various recognizable varieties, they nevertheless share
certain structures, which develop and become distinct as society grows and social roles
become fixed.136 Ultimately, Spencer felt that growth and its attendant structural
development was a good thing, writing “if there does exist an order among those
structural and functional changes which societies pass through, knowledge of that order
can scarcely fail to affect our judgments as to what is progressive and what retrograde‐‐
what is desirable, what is practicable, what is Utopian.” Thus, the typologies of society
Spencer developed in his sociological work should be considered as a hierarchy—with
Britain at its apex, of course.
Having established the possibility of a science of society and its nature, Spencer
devoted the remainder of his book to describing the problems in the way of its proper
study. In his chapter headings he classified these into three types: difficulties (objective,
subjective/intellectual and subjective/emotional), biases (educational, political,
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theological, and the like) and necessary preparation (in biology and psychology). The
main challenge, objectively, was the difficulty of predicting human behavior. Spencer
made an apt analogy to a baby: precise predictions about its future life are impossible,
but predictions about the general pattern of events can be made based on
physiology.137 Other problems highlighted were the lack of trustworthy sources, the
potential to confuse facts with inferences, and the length of time over which social
changes occurred.138 On the latter subject, Spencer wrote “true conceptions of
sociological changes are to be reached only by contemplating their slow genesis through
centuries . . . basing inferences on results shown in short periods, is as illusory as would
be judging of the Earth’s curvature by observing whether we are walking up or down
hill.”139 But he reaffirmed that despite these issues, general results are obtainable.
Under the heading “subjective” Spencer discussed the difficulty of understanding
thoughts and feelings foreign to our own.140 Here he took a clear stand in favor of the
rationality of primitive peoples. Beliefs that seem irrational must make sense for a
certain time and place, given the information available.141 The investigator must try to
be objective about these beliefs and the actions they prompt, though it impossible to
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eliminate sympathy for certain institutions and customs and dislike for others.142 But
since the sentiments of citizens must harmonize with their current social organization to
prevent social dissolution, some bias in sociological conclusions is inevitable.143
This bias came in many forms, which Spencer discussed in detail. Patriotism, for
example, is necessary for social cohesion but makes it difficult to understand one’s own
society as one among many.144 Class, too, could make a writer value one form of
government over another, or favor a particular form of labor organization.145 Here
Spencer attacked all classes of society for short‐sightedness. Workers fail to understand
economic realities and waste what wages they already get.146 The upper classes, whose
only purpose is to regulate society so that the lives of all are better than they would be
otherwise, have too many “worthless descendants” who are rich and idle.147 Thanks to
political bias, many think that legislation can solve such problems, but Spencer repeated
his contention that political arrangements, however cunningly devised, can do nothing if
they are not compatible with national character.148 He pointed to the United States and
its problem with bribery and corruption as an example. As with the economic system,
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the failures of the political system were due to imperfect human nature. Better results
would come from forms of organization based on individual cooperation, but these
were not currently possible.149 Spencer argued that some middle path was needed
between the radical reformer and the conservative. One must acknowledge that the
established order serves a purpose given current human nature, the other must realize
that what is good for a moment is not good forever. The radical was necessary for
progress, even though his political dreams were not possible to fulfill.150
Spencer saved theological bias for last. Throughout his book, he was very critical
of religion. He suggested that Christian civilizations had two religions, one of “amity”
based on the New Testament and one of “enmity” inherited from the Greeks and
Romans.151 This was possible only because Christians did not attempt to make their
conflicting beliefs agree with each other; in other words, Christians were inherently
hypocrites, preaching peace and self‐sacrifice while supporting war. Spencer believed
that as civilization advanced, the morality of institutions and actions came to be judged
more and more on whether they improved human happiness, rather than “their
apparent congruity or incongruity with the established cult.”152 He felt that members of
religious communities were unable to perceive that these institutions were a natural
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part of society, and the value of their teachings relative, and thus not capable of judging
men of other religious communities.153 But he also noted that an “anti‐theological bias”
was possible, which encouraged throwing out the truth at the core of religion along with
everything else.154 Religion, he declared, cannot be destroyed, only refined into a
“higher and fitter form.”155
Spencer believed that though it was impossible to overcome these difficulties
completely, they could be mitigated with the proper preparation. First, a general
understanding of the sciences would provide the necessary discipline and habits of
thought.156 Second, knowledge of biology was needed, since social actions are
determined by individuals, whose actions conform to “the laws of life”.157 Furthermore
the analogy between society and organism made study of physiology useful, though
Spencer pointed out that the connection was not immediate since society was made up
of individual organisms. Finally, knowledge of psychology was vital, because feeling
causes action (and Spencer maintained that it was not knowledge, but the emotion that
went with it, that caused men to act).158 Spencer argued here as elsewhere that
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education in and of itself does make an individual moral—even education in ethics.159
Moral habits could only be formed by connecting actions with feelings—for example, by
allowing people to suffer the natural consequences of bad behavior.160
While The Study of Sociology was supposed to concern sociological methodology,
it also retailed a number of Spencer’s political and social beliefs. Often these had
developed little since they were first set down in Social Statics. At several points,
Spencer made arguments that clearly qualified as social Darwinism. However, unlike in
his earlier work, here the context was both intra and extra‐social: when weak societies
were killed off or conquered it benefitted mankind, just as when weak individuals did
not reproduce. He imagined what aboriginal tribes felt about being dispossessed by
“that tide of civilization which sweeps them away”—from their perspective this was an
evil, but from a wider point of view these events were “steps towards a higher life.”161
Nevertheless, Spencer remained a passionate critic of colonialism, both because of the
cruelty of British policies towards other races and because he thought that, once a
certain level of civilization was reached, militarism kept a society from progressing. As
he wrote,
Severe and bloody as the process is, the killing‐off of inferior races and inferior
individuals, leaves a balance of benefit to mankind during phases of progress in
which the moral development is low. . . . But as there arise higher societies,
implying individual characters fitted for closer co‐operation, the destructive
159

Study, 363‐365.

160

Study, 367, 372‐373.

161

Study, 204.

326
activities exercised by such higher societies have injurious re‐active effects which
outweigh the benefits resulting from extirpation of inferior races. After this stage
has been reached, the purifying process, continuing still an important one,
remains to be carried on by industrial war—by a competition of societies during
which the best, physically, emotionally, and intellectually, spread most, and
leave the least capable to disappear gradually, from failing to leave a sufficiently‐
numerous posterity.162
Spencer developed this reasoning at much greater length in The Principles of Sociology,
devoting several chapters to a typological distinction between militant and industrial
societies.
Spencer believed that only small modifications to human nature were possible in
the short term, but in the longer term changes could be immense. His social Darwinism
grew in part from a natural anger at those who did not do their share, but also from his
concern with future human evolution. Thus, Spencer displayed intemperate hostility
towards those he considered a drain on society. “Fostering the good‐for‐nothing at the
expense of the good, is an extreme cruelty,” he wrote. “There is no greater curse to
posterity than that of bequeathing them an increasing population of imbeciles and idlers
and criminals. To aid the bad in multiplying, is, in effect, the same as maliciously
providing for our descendants a multitude of enemies.”163 He felt agencies which
indiscriminately handed out charity interfered with “that natural process of elimination
by which society continually purifies itself.”164 Here Spencer forgot his Lamarckism
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completely. There was no recognition that encouraging good habits could lead to
improvements passed to offspring, only the keen edge of natural selection.
The Study of Sociology was aimed at a popular audience, and its style was much
simpler and more emotional than in his other works. It was a polemical book, filled with
shots against political and cultural sacred cows. Spencer engaged in heavy sarcasm from
time to time, as when he imagined merchants and aristocrats declining to serve in
Parliament, pleading lack of the decades’ worth of study needed to understand
government policies.165 The book had an overabundance of examples, often superfluous
to the argument but entertaining nonetheless. For instance, at one point Spencer
imagined what a person from tens of thousands of years in the future, when society was
completely harmonious, might think of present‐day England (which, incidentally,
revealed the time‐frame of his utopian visions). This led to an elaborate expose of the
foibles of the present.166 He gave a complex account of all the social and technical
processes that were needed to develop the press used at the London Times, and spent a
half‐dozen pages denigrating Napoleon.167 Despite all of this the book was barely over
four hundred pages, excluding notes, which was short by Spencer’s standards.
Spencer was not sanguine about the lasting influence of The Study of Sociology,
however. He agreed that personal beliefs and actions are important because they direct
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society’s changes, but felt it was not possible to speed up development (though it could
be hindered by ignorance.) Would his doctrines convince people not to bother working
for social change? “Doubtless it is true that on visionary hopes, rational criticisms have a
depressing influence. It is better to recognize the truth, however,” Spencer wrote.168
“The man of the higher type…has to see how comparatively little can be done, and yet
find it worth while to do that little: so uniting philanthropic energy with philosophic
calm.” Spencer clearly placed himself in the role of the higher man. His laissez‐faire
political liberalism now flew against the political winds. Spencer tried to bear this with
patience and do what little he could.
American Critical Reaction to The Study of Sociology
According to The Nation, Spencer’s articles in Popular Science Monthly attracted
attention because he addressed the topic of man “in the cold‐blooded fashion with
which science now approaches everything.”169 Whatever the reason, the articles
prompted a response from the press, in publications as varied as the Chicago Tribune
and Forest and Stream.170 Spencer’s comments on America raised some hackles,
especially his depiction of the West as a wild place where vigilante justice was law.171
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However, most of the discussion of The Study of Sociology came after the publication of
the book. Unlike with the volumes of the Psychology, the Appletons did send copies to
reviewers, and this remained their policy towards all of Spencer’s later works as well.
Most reviews were complimentary. The Chicago Tribune considered The Study of
Sociology the most important book in the International Science Series so far.172 The
Galaxy declared that whatever one might think of Spencer’s other works, the
information in this one needed to be spread rapidly.173 Even The Prairie Farmer advised
its readers that, sociology being the science of the future, they should buy Spencer’s
latest, noting that thanks to Spencer’s easier style “the work is as interesting as a
romance.”174 Few religious periodicals reviewed the book, but those that did agreed
that it was thought‐provoking.175 However, there were exceptions. One critic called the
book “commonplace” and marked by “crudity and juvenility” compared to Spencer’s
other works (though without giving specific examples). He blamed Youmans for
diverting Spencer into the project, which was a complete waste of time.176 Youmans
replied with an article that was reprinted in Appletons’ Journal. He noted the success of
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the published chapters and the high demand for the book in both Britain and America.
For Youmans, The Study of Sociology was simply a way to get Spencer’s ideas to a wider
audience.177
Appreciation for Spencer’s honesty about the limitations of sociology was
general. The Chicago Tribune’s critic thought the student of sociology must be almost an
“impossible individual” and not very amiable.178 The Tribune’s critic agreed with Spencer
that politicians tended to act without understanding all of the facts; the Universalist
Quarterly and General Review, leading quarterly of the Universalist denomination,
believed educated men sometimes made hasty deductions, and that legislators and
those dealing with poverty and crime should be aware of what Spencer had to say.179
Some reviewers noticed that Spencer himself suffered from some of the biases he
described. The Prairie Farmer perhaps said it best when it noted “he has crotchets as
well as other folks.”180 The Nation agreed, observing that Spencer convicted so many
people of bias that one expected him to finish by accusing himself.181
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Most reviews ignored Spencer’s Darwinian social ideals and his hard‐heartedness
towards those he conceived to be on the wrong side of evolution. In part this was
because critiques of Spencer’s book were generally confined to one or two pages in the
general interest magazines. The day of the serious review was over. Even the North
American Review shifted to a more popular format after James Russell Lowell left in
1872. Under Henry Adams and Henry Cabot Lodge it featured shorter and less scholarly
discussions of politics, economics, and history, ascending to an audience of 1,200
subscribers by 1876. The trend only continued when it moved to New York and changed
to a bimonthly format. The National Quarterly Review remained until 1880, but had
never shown much interest in Spencer. The days of fifty page review‐articles in secular
quarterlies was over. The field of serious, in depth study of intellectual issues was left to
the religious quarterlies, and they were still more interested in metaphysical issues than
in Spencer’s positions on social policy.
A New Interest in Evolution: The Continuing Religious Reaction
In the 1870s the attention of religious periodicals shifted away from the
Unknowable and the limits of knowledge. Though metaphysical and epistemological
battles were still waged, religious writers gradually shifted their interest to Spencer’s
evolutionary thought and its import. In 1872, a long article by John Bascom on this
subject appeared in the Presbyterian Quarterly and Princeton Review, a merger of one‐
time foes The American Presbyterian Review and The Biblical Repertory and Princeton
Review. Charles Hodge had left the helm of the Princeton in 1871, and Lyman Atwater
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was slowly steering the magazine in a more popular direction.182 Bascom’s twenty‐page
article was anything but light, however. Bascom was a professor of rhetoric who was
later appointed President of the University of Wisconsin (in 1874). He made both his
rhetorical abilities and his position on Spencer plain at the outset:
The fairly penetrative mind of average indolence is thus floated down what
seems to it a magnificent stream of thought, finds no place to pause, and, soon
out of sight of familiar land‐marks, glides away into the great ocean of
speculation, under the guidance of one who has quietly and with unmistakable
confidence taken the helm.183
To Bascom, Spencer’s Unknown Reality was just another word for physical force.184
Giving Spencer’s definition of evolution (from the 1st edition of First Principles) he
observed that Spencer tried to make the same laws cover physical and mental
phenomena, though without adequate proof.185 Bascom argued against Spencer’s
specific examples of evolution, such as the development of language and societies.186
Some of Bascom’s findings were strange, for example his insistence that the correlation
of forces did not include gravity, making evolution a law pertaining to gravity and matter
but nothing else.187 Towards the end of his essay he lapsed back into an attack on
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Spencer’s epistemology. Though not the best argument against Spencer’s work,
Bascom’s article shows that some writers still considered Spencer’s evolutionary ideas
materialistic.
A stronger argument came in the form of a trio of essays by Borden Parker
Bowne, a philosopher and Methodist pastor studying advanced philosophy and theology
in Germany (he became chair of the department of philosophy at Boston University in
1876.) Bowne’s articles appeared in the New Englander, a Congregationalist quarterly
with ties to Yale, in 1872 and 1873. In “Laws of the Unknowable,” Bowne called
Spencer’s arguments for God’s existence a “Trojan horse” and thus a worse danger to
faith than atheism.188 He attacked along the usual channels, claiming that both self‐
existence and the absolute are conceivable, and that objects can be known in
themselves.189 He also briefly raised the argument from revelation, contending that the
infinite must have a mind and have the power to reveal itself to man, or else it is
limited—”able to sow space with suns and systems, to scatter beauty broadcast like the
light, and maintain the whole in everlasting rhythm, but utterly unable to reach the
human soul.”190 Along the way he accused Spencer of confusion, contradiction, and
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“jugglery,” also a typical tactic in religious reviews, though not universally practiced by
any means.191
Bowne continued his series of articles with a long look at Spencer’s conception
of the Knowable. Bowne noted the difference between Positivism, which sought to
know how the universe works, and Spencer’s doctrines, which tried to explain why as
well.192 However, Bowne stuck mostly to the “how” in his article, and since his
knowledge of science was much more limited than Spencer’s he did not fare very well.
For example, he accused Spencer and scientists in general with confusing force and
motion, showing ignorance of Newton’s second law, and complained that Spencer
thought heat and vitality were the same thing, though modern biology did not recognize
“vitality,” “life force” or any such terms as useful descriptions of reality.193 Bowne was
more successful in his arguments against Spencer’s use of forces to explain life and
mind. Bowne argued against the idea that the inorganic could produce the organic, or
that physical forces could produce mental ones, both things Spencer could not
adequately explain.194 Furthermore, Bowne felt that Spencer’s formula for evolution did
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not cover all phenomena, and did not explain why the heterogeneity emerging from
homogeneity was organized and not chaotic.195
Bowne covered quite a few of Spencer’s psychological ideas in the middle
portion of his essay on the Knowable; he focused his attention on the same issues in his
review of The Principles of Psychology. Here he claimed that evolution in some forms
was compatible with theism, just not in the form Spencer proposed.196 Theistic
evolution must be guided by intelligence, while at heart Bowne considered Spencer’s
theory to be that “a cloud of atoms, if shaken together long enough, will hit upon living
forms; will provide eyes and ears, and adapt them to light and sound; will furnish all the
internal organs, and balance their several functions; will become self‐conscious, and
capable of thought and emotion.”197 As for Spencer’s doctrine of mind, Bowne objected
that though a qualitative agreement between nervous and mental processes might
exist, Spencer could not show that a quantitative relationship existed—that is, he could
show a relationship but not an identity.198 Bowne also felt that Spencer’s depiction of
the actions of the nervous system and the formation of the nerves was unproven and
did not form a secure basis for solving the problems of the theory of mental association
(which argued that all knowledge comes from perceiving relations between
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sensations).199 Experiences cannot give us our intuitions of the reality of the world, the
truth of logic, and the omnipresence of causation, and Spencer’s attempt to explain
these things via the development of the race was useless because these intuitions are
simply not the result of sensations.200 Bowne ended his essay by directly attacking
Spencer, asking whether his work might be an “elaborate satire upon the loose
reasoning and baseless assumptions of much that calls itself science,” and accusing him
of “intellectual buffoonery” among other things.201 Such attacks only created the
suspicion that Bowne, sensing that he had not bested Spencer intellectually, was forced
to resort to contradiction and name‐calling.
Whatever the weaknesses of Bowne’s arguments, he was lauded by some in the
religious press. The Presbyterian paper The New‐York Evangelist noted that many
considered Spencer the principle exponent of “modern thought” and gleefully praised
Bowne for demolishing him.202 Bowne published his essays as a book in 1874, with an
introduction that clearly stated his view that whatever beliefs Spencer might personally
have, his system was materialistic and atheistic.203 The Evangelist again showed its
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support, calling Spencer’s followers idolaters and intimating that Bowne was America’s
champion facing off against the Englishman Spencer.204 Other reviewers were similarly
positive, although several suggested that Spencer’s theory of evolution was true enough
to have the strength to withstand being purged of error.205 The book was praised even
in some secular contexts, as when G. Stanley Hall, a foundational figure in American
psychology, recommended Bowne’s criticisms as “subtle” and “forcible.”206
Bowne’s book, however, hardly put Spencer’s philosophy to rest. Arguments
about the Unknowable, universal evolution, and the nature of the mind continued to
appear in articles and books. In fact, the year after Bowne’s book was published three
more long discussions of Spencer’s philosophy appeared in the New Englander.207 These
and most of those that followed retreaded the same themes: the nature of the
conceivable, the assignment of personality to the absolute, the cause of development,
and the connection between brain and thought. Curiously, accusations of atheism,
which seemed to have died away for a time, made a resurgence. Everyone
acknowledged that Spencer denied being an atheist, but many argued that his system
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was materialistic, whatever his intentions. For example, in his book What is Darwinism?
Charles Hodge called Spencer “the speculating mind of the new school of science” and
argued that Spencer’s philosophy boiled down to an identification of God with Force.208
“What is Darwinism? It is Atheism,” Hodge wrote on his final page.209
Sometimes religious thinkers simply threw up their hands at all this philosophy
and simply declared belief in the spiritual and in a personal God a necessity for
Christianity. A writer in the Christian Union denied that “God holds his seat by the favor
of Herbert Spencer.” Rather, faith was not based on argument but on personal
experience, and the best solution for modern skepticism would be a new Pentecost.210
Another writer simply pointed to belief in the supernatural as the ultimate test of
Christian theism.211 James Thompson Bixby defined science as systematized knowledge
of the physical universe and religion as belief that the human soul and a “Sovereign
Over‐soul” relate to each other.212 For Bixby science and religion were two ways of
understanding reality that could not rightly invade each other’s realms; Spencer’s
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Unknowable was not scientific.213 Having established that, however, Bixby made no
attempt to prove the Over‐soul knowable.
First Principles thus lived on, continuing as a topic of discussion for years to
come. More and more attention was focused on evolution as a growing number of
scientists came to accept it. But concern about the Unknowable lingered on, because
despite the arguments against it, religious leaders continued to feel they were losing
church members, especially young people, to something that was a pale substitute for
Christian belief. This anxiety came more into focus when the word “agnosticism”
became popular. Spencer was seen by many as the central philosopher of this new
system of unbelief, though he had not argued about metaphysical issues for some time.
In fact, as he continued his Sociological work, Spencer gave Christian leaders something
else to worry about: the anthropological and historical contextualization of religion.
From Method to Practice: The Principles of Sociology, Volume One
After The Study of Sociology Spencer began issuing individual numbers of his
Synthetic Philosophy, with the first one published in June of 1874.214 Appletons’ decided
to print these simultaneously with the British versions, but did not start until the spring
of 1875. Each number cost sixty cents, or two dollars for a year of four issues (around
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$40 today).215 The chapters were also printed individually in Popular Science Monthly.
The first volume of The Principles of Sociology did not appear until December of 1876,
with the American version published in 1877; a supplementary section was sent out in
June of 1877 and added to subsequent printings.216 This, number 44, was the last of the
subscription parts, for Spencer stopped this method of distribution thereafter.217 During
the two and a half years he worked on the book Spencer had only one short relapse, but
otherwise his health was good.218
Spencer wrote The Principles of Sociology with a great mass of data on hand. His
method of organization was to have each piece of information on a separate piece of
paper, which he then divided up according to the parts of his book, and further divided
by chapter, occasionally adding chapters if his evidence suggested a topic he had not
envisioned.219 One of his secretaries, James Howard Bridge, recalls Spencer sitting in the
middle of a semi‐circle of folders, distributing his notes, occasionally launching into
discourses on subjects as diverse as medieval cavalry and the flowering of Aloe in his
usual careful speech.220 Bridge served as Spencer’s research assistant as well as taking
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dictation. Often enough, it was his job to find examples of social phenomena that fit his
employer’s theories.221 Because he had so much evidence from so many different
sources available, the sociological volumes of the Synthetic Philosophy were unlike any
others. They were filled with a wealth of examples, and sometimes even counter‐
examples which Spencer would explain away. They also contained many debates with
other scholars of folklore, anthropology, and history. In a way, the changes in Spencer’s
methods mirrored a shift in social thinking in general. Thanks to a greater awareness of
non‐rational behavior, deduction based on a few essential propositions about human
nature was no longer acceptable—rejection of the conception of society as a system of
rational relationships calculated to bring advantage was widespread.222 Spencer’s early
political work was essentially deductive; his sociology depended on a great deal of data
about actual human thought and behavior.
From the beginning, Spencer grounded his work in evolution. He explained
historical and modern social structures by studying the way they developed from their
origins with primitive man. Every society has characteristics that can be ascribed to the
environment and the character of the individuals that live in it, Spencer wrote.223 Social
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evolution is the adaption of the one to the other.224 While noting the difficulties in
reconstructing these factors for ancient man, Spencer outlined a number of external
factors, like temperature, aridity, and terrain, and internal factors, like physical
hardiness, emotional simplicity, and intellectual childishness.225 Though Spencer
believed that modern native peoples probably represented retrogression from higher
types, he often used them as examples of primitive thinking.226 As in The Study of
Sociology, he stressed the necessity of repressing modern civilized ideas to see things as
early man might have. “We must set out with the postulate that primitive ideas are
natural, and under the conditions in which they occur, rational,” he wrote.227
Spencer had a number of theories about early mental evolution, but the most
important was his “ghost theory” of religion. Spencer argued that because primitive
thinkers often erred in their classification of objects, they believed that their shadows,
reflections, and echoes were like them, suggesting that each person has a double.228
This double must go away and return during dreams, trances, and faints, leading to the
idea that death is the same.229 After discussing ideas about resurrection, ghosts, and the
afterlife, Spencer came to the heart of his theory: that the double of a dead man, his
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spirit, is believed to be able to interact with the living, causing fits, insanity, disease,
possession, and death.230 As a result, primitive people felt the need to propitiate their
dead ancestors with altars, sacrifices, and prayers—ancestor worship.231 As Spencer put
it, “it is unquestionably true that the first traceable conception of a supernatural being is
the conception of a ghost.”232 From this core belief, the worship of idols, animals,
nature, and eventually of deities arose. The latter came about because important men
were treated with great respect after death, just as they had been in life.233 Fear of the
living became the basis of political control, while fear of the dead became the basis of
religious control, Spencer argued.234
The next section of the first volume was an extended discussion of society as an
organism. Much of this was a more complex version of arguments Spencer had made
before. While he titled one chapter “Society is an Organism,” he made sure that the
limitations of the comparison were clear. Because all units of the social organism were
conscious, “it results that the welfare of the aggregate, considered apart from that of
the units, is not an end to be sought,” Spencer wrote. “The society exists for the benefit
of its members; not its members for the benefit of society.”235 Spencer called his
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analogy a “scaffolding to help in building up a coherent body of sociological
inductions.”236 Previously, in his 1871 essay “Specialized Administration,” he had argued
that such analogies existed because both organisms and societies relied on systems
organized into a mutual dependence of parts.237 In other words, both had evolved
through differentiation and integration. David Wiltshire argues that Spencer by this
point had abandoned the literal interpretation of the social organism.238 Whether he
had understood the comparison literally in the first place is subject to debate.239
Whatever the case, it was in this manner that Spencer tried to retain his organic
metaphor without jeopardizing his individualism; nevertheless, the perceived
contradictions were the basis of much of the criticism of Spencer’s system.240
Spencer essentially equated size with level of evolution. He argued that large
societies only grow from combinations of smaller ones, through conquest or absorption,
resulting in compound, doubly‐compound, and trebly‐compound societies where social
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and economic roles were further and further differentiated.241 For Spencer, warfare was
an essential motive force behind these changes. The initial differentiation in most
societies was between warriors and subordinates like women and slaves.242 Governing
structures arose because war between societies required further organization,
eventually developing into a military and productive system (which acted like the limbs
of an animal) and a leadership system, usually military in origin (similar to the nervous
system).243 Thus warfare played a vital part in the early development of society.
However, Spencer believed that more complex societies actually lost more than they
gained by engaging in war. He made a typological distinction between the “militant
type” and the “industrial type” of society, though observing that real societies were
always some mix of the two.244 While Spencer recognized that the balance between the
two could shift in a society, he clearly believed that industrial societies were an advance
over those of the militant type, and that a shift towards militancy was retrograde.245
Nevertheless, Spencer would develop this system of classification at much greater
length in the second volume of his Sociology.
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The remainder of The Principles of Sociology was to cover various social
institutions—domestic, ceremonial, political, ecclesiastical, professional, and industrial.
Spencer started with the family. He defined various types of relations between the
sexes: endogamy and exogamy (marriage within and outside of the social group),
promiscuity, polyandry, polygyny, and monogamy.246 Spencer judged these institutions
according to specific criteria: their benefit to the society, to the young, and to the
parents, with the first being most important. To Spencer the family was a dynamic unit
where the needs of different members did not always agree—especially the needs of
parents and children—but he felt that the best family types diminished this conflict.247
Using these criteria, Spencer ranked marriage relations. He found endogamous
monogamy superior, entailing the most clarity and strength in the links between family
members and the most clear male line of succession, important to both political and
religious stability.248 Spencer linked polygyny with the militant type and monogamy with
the industrial type of society.249
Spencer’s discussion of the family was quite Darwinian, with the emphasis put
on biological drives and competition between social groups rather than on culture or
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individual preference (Spencer’s psychology denied free will, after all, although this
point was left unspoken in his sociology.)250 For Spencer, unsettled promiscuity gave
way to more defined relationships between men and women because children from
such relationships were generally superior—in other words, because of the survival of
the fittest.251 Polyandry favored smaller families, which might be best in harsh
environments where each child needed more care and protection.252 Polygyny might be
superior when males often died in battle, and in any event it allowed stronger males to
have more children than weaker ones.253 Spencer emphasized power in much of his
sociology—men seemed always to do whatever they had the power to do.254 This
included the subjection of women. As Spencer wrote:
Perhaps in no way is the moral progress of mankind more clearly shown, than by
contrasting the position of women among savages with their position among the
most advanced of the civilized. At one extreme a treatment of them cruel to the
utmost degree bearable; and at the other extreme a treatment which, in certain
directions, gives them precedence over men.255
In his final chapter on the family, “Domestic Retrospect and Prospect,” Spencer
predicted that in societies that continued to advance, greater equality between the
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sexes could be expected, including educational, professional, and political equality.
However, he believed most women would continue their domestic roles, and men
would continue to have a preponderance of power in marriage.256 A close knit family
which took charge of all its children’s needs, strengthening bonds and ensuring care for
the parents in old age, was Spencer’s ideal of the future, and he ended his first volume
on this note.257
Quite a few reviews of the first volume of The Principles of Sociology appeared,
varying vastly in quality. The simplest stuck to summarizing the book’s contents,
sprinkling in a few compliments or criticisms. For example, the Literary World, a Boston
monthly founded as an aid to readers of all sorts, considered the book the most valuable
part of the Synthetic Philosophy yet published, but otherwise stuck to summary.258 Such
treatment was not out of the ordinary for some magazines and newspapers.259 The
newly popular North American Review, which once had room for fifty‐page critiques of
Spencer, now only allowed space enough for its critic to treat Spencer’s theories on
monogamy.260 There was also at least one case where the reviewers had clearly not
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read Spencer’s book. In the American Catholic Quarterly Review, a Philadelphia journal
edited by theologian James A. Corcoran, the critic described Spencer as a follower of
Comte (mistaking Social Statics for a book about Comte’s sociology) and focused on a
passage on the Real Presence that was insulting to Catholics rather than discussing
Spencer’s theories.261 The reviewer did at least know what the ghost‐theory was, though
he thought it depended in part on an assumption of man’s animal descent, making the
book “pernicious.”262
Some reviews were more detailed and conscientious. A writer for The
Universalist Quarterly read The Principles of Sociology thoroughly enough to notice that
despite having abundant data Spencer used certain sources repeatedly (the reviewer
pointed to a particular Sandwich Island tribe which was often referenced). The critic
thought Spencer’s speculations were ingenious, entertaining, and probably true, but
wrote that any philosophy that did not see a plan to the universe was shallow.263 Two
even more substantial reviews, one from the New York weekly of literary criticism The
Library Table and the other from the New York Times, hint at what readers of the book
might have found most interesting. In the former, T. B. Wakeman, who from his
comments on Christianity was obviously a skeptic, praised Spencer’s Synthetic
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Philosophy.264 The Times also paid its compliments, maintaining that familiarity with
Spencer’s thought was necessary for anyone who wanted to understand the “thought of
the age,” and must not be opposed on theological grounds.265 Both authors emphasized
Spencer’s intriguing ideas about primitive thought and the origin of religion in ancestor
worship, and both briefly discussed the family. The Times’ review went into great detail
about Spencer’s organic analogy; Wakeman stressed its importance but gave little
detail. Wakeman alone noticed Spencer’s invocation of Darwin and the survival of the
fittest (“or ‘fight‐i‐est,’” Wakeman wrote) in his account of family life. Neither review
commented on the struggle between societies, or on Spencer’s understanding of war as
a civilizing force.
Discussion of Spencer’s social Darwinism was limited in reviews, but this did not
mean that all writers were unaware of it. In the last years of the 1870s several articles
appeared critiquing Spencer’s draconian social ideals for sapping the moral will. D.
Appleton reprinted the American edition of Social Statics in 1877, which may partially
explain the sudden upsurge, though not many of the articles quoted it. George
Washington Julian, one‐time abolitionist and radical Republican Representative, wrote a
piece in the North American Review asking “Is the Reformer any Longer Needed?” He
acknowledged the truth of evolution in the physical world, but complained that some
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applied its teachings literally to politics and ethics.266 Julian criticized the idea that
society is an organism whose development could not be hurried, only hindered. He felt
this was not only a false doctrine, but demoralizing to those who might be tempted to
accept it “as a welcome scapegoat for their laziness or moral indifference,” trading “a
sickly moral fatalism for those deeds of heroism and self‐sacrifice which have glorified
human nature and lighted the world on its way to higher truth.”267 To Julian, social
evolution was the result of conscious individual effort; both individuals and
communities were “architects of their own fortunes.”268 A respondent in the Christian
Advocate agreed, adding that evolutionists of a certain class (of which Spencer was the
leader) were hostile to reforms because Christianity was responsible for most of them.
According to this writer, God worked in the world through the cooperation of social
reformers.269
Other writers were more equivocal. In 1879, F. D. Hoskins, professor and
Episcopalian minister, wrote in the American Church Review (which had dropped
“Quarterly” from its name) that “a certain school of philosophers” believed nature rid
itself of the worthless, and quoted Social Statics about the shouldering aside of the
weak. Hoskins observed that the poorest among the poor were multiplying rapidly: “we
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shall therefore not be rid of the pauper by any kindly interference of physical law.” But
he also pointed out that “the philosophers” were not quite ready to ignore the miseries
of the poor, since they acknowledged that the instinct to help was healthy. Hoskins
ended with an argument against indiscriminate charity.270 Similarly, a writer in Catholic
World that same year complained that the theory of competition pictured society as a
collection of sharks and tigers in which the stronger survived by preying on the weaker.
He argued that the fittest were not necessarily the best. He also put a Catholic slant on
the issue by arguing that Spencer put too much emphasis on rights and not enough on
duties, an error any Catholic child could correct by quoting his catechism. The writer
insisted that idleness, both voluntary and involuntary, was a “crime against society” and
any obstacles that kept men idle were flagrant evils. It was a man’s duty to earn his
bread by the sweat of his brow.271
Though it is difficult to draw solid conclusions from a few isolated articles, it
seems that Spencer’s Darwinian social thought was becoming more widely noticed.
These articles also show that the vocabulary of social Darwinism was becoming fixed,
involving “the survival of the fittest” and the perishing of the weak. More and more
Americans knew what social Darwinism was and what it argued, though as a set of ideas
it still did not have a name. However, these articles also suggest that the issue of racial
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improvement was scarcely addressed. Spencer’s doctrines were arraigned because they
were cruel and morally enervating, but his theories about what would improve the
human race were allowed to stand. In the future, it was this dichotomy that allowed the
eugenics movement to flourish. For eugenicists, race improvement could be effected by
sterilization, rendering the process less cruel.
Continuing the Sociology
During the winter of 1877‐78, while Spencer was working on the second volume
of his sociology, he experienced recurring bouts of illness. He suffered a series of colds
and fevers, one of which kept him indoors for eleven days.272 The ailments made him
seriously consider whether he would live to complete his Synthetic Philosophy. Spencer
felt the last two volumes, on morality, were the culmination of his work and its most
important part. He believed that in an age of receding faith, an ethics based on scientific
principles was greatly needed.273 So on January 9, 1878, he began working up ideas for
the Data of Ethics, the first part of The Principles of Ethics.274 However, he continued his
sociological work as well, since it was being serialized as the last volume had been, only
stopping when the first section of volume two was finished. This section was published
separately as Ceremonial Institutions in 1880.275
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Ceremonial Institutions was the slightest of the sections of Spencer’s sociology. It
took up only 250 pages of volume two, and was filled with countless examples of the
usages of aboriginal, historical, and modern peoples but comparatively little analysis.276
Spencer’s basic argument was that ceremony was the earliest form of government, in
the sense that it controlled conduct towards other people.277 More definite forms of
control—political, religious, and social—evolved from ceremonial restrictions,
specifically from behavior expressing subordination to a ruler.278 The remainder of the
section was filled with explanations of specific types of behavior. Some was self‐
aggrandizing, such as taking trophies, mutilating slaves, and displaying badges,
costumes, and fashionable dress. Spencer related this behavior to class distinctions. The
elite, which originally meant the strongest warriors, tried to demonstrate their power
over others and also to create visible distinctions between themselves and their
subordinates.279 Other types of ceremony expressed subservience to a better, such as
giving presents, paying visits, prostrating oneself, and using certain titles and forms of
address. All such ceremonious acts, in other words, were prompted by the exercise or
acknowledgement of power. As Spencer wrote, “From the beaten dog which, crawling
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on its belly licks its master’s hand, we trace up the general truth that ceremonial forms
are naturally initiated by the relation of conqueror and conquered, and the consequent
truth that they develop along with the militant type of society.”280 It was an idea
Spencer explored at greater length in the next section of his sociology.
Ceremonial Institutions was not discussed at any great length. Most of the
reviews that appeared were short summaries with little analysis. For example, the
review in Appleton’s Journal, after explaining the revised publication schedule of
Spencer’s books, gave a long account of Spencer’s main findings with extensive
quotations. The writer was generally positive in tone but had no specific assessments of
any of the arguments.281 The New York Times, too, gave an excellent and succinct
summary but offered no commentary.282 A few reviews were more critical, especially
about Spencer’s use of his material. A reviewer in the Chicago Tribune felt that
Spencer’s evolutionism made a difference in his selection and interpretation of facts.283
The reviewer for the Independent likewise thought that Spencer’s arrangement of facts
came from his view of progress as advance by differentiation and integration, and his
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inductions would stand or fall on the merits of his data and his skill at organizing it.284
Overall, response to the book was muted. The press was interested in other things.
As reviews of Ceremonial Institutions trickled out, another event focused
attention on Spencer’s sociological work. In January 1879 Yale Professor William
Graham Sumner, America’s first professor of sociology, began using The Study of
Sociology as a textbook in one of his classes. The book was popular with students, which
annoyed some of the faculty. In December 1879 President Noah Porter privately
objected in a letter to Sumner and in conferences with him.285 Citing academic freedom,
Sumner refused to drop the book in the spring, and was supported by a majority of the
faculty. The conflict became public when the New York papers caught wind of it. “Yale
as a Battle‐Ground,” read the New York Times’ headline. “Scientific Research Face to
Face with Dogmas of Faith.” The Times announced that the issue’s resolution would
decide the college’s attitude towards science, faith, and the modern search for truth.286
Youmans was delighted at the controversy, and sent Spencer two copies of the paper.287
However, the Times coverage of Spencer was cacophonous. One article did little
more than criticize his lack of religion, while another declared “the facts, so far as
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established, must be accepted . . . The philosophy that a master mind like that of
Spencer builds upon them is an obtrusive fact that cannot be overlooked or brushed
aside.”288 In a third article, the writer, believing that most educated Americans knew
Spencer only as the “White Czar of Agnosticism,” described the contents of The Study of
Sociology and gave a measured view of both sides of the debate.289 Ultimately the
whole affair was a tempest in a teapot. After proving his point Sumner quietly dropped
the book for the following academic year, and no more was heard about it in the
press.290
Not a few general discussions of Spencer’s sociological ideas appeared in the
years around 1880. One was from the pen of Noah Porter himself, and appeared in the
Princeton Review. Though not as meaty as it had been in the past, the review still had
the space for a 29‐page resume of Spencer’s work, especially if the author was the
president of the college. Porter made his distaste for The Study of Sociology clear from
the start, and at various points called it unorganized, rambling, sensational, indecent,
“positively flippant if not blasphemous,” and as offensive to Christians as the works of
Voltaire and Thomas Paine.291 He considered Spencer vague in his conceptions of
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organic structure, organization, and growth as applied to society, and in his very concept
of sociology itself.292 Porter believed Spencer’s main point to be that “everything we call
human nature in its holiest and most refined judgments is the product of
circumstance.”293 Moreover, Porter spent most of his article complaining about
Spencer’s attitude towards Christianity and little discussing the specifics of political
institutions, family dynamics, and social ritual.
Another significant discussion of Spencer’s sociology appeared in The Atlantic
Monthly—William James’ article “Great Men, Great Thoughts, and the Environment.” As
with Spencer’s psychology, James disliked the way evolutionary sociology reduced the
importance of individual will and action. As James wrote,
Social evolution is a resultant of the interaction of two wholly distinct factors:
the individual, deriving his peculiar gifts from the play of physiological and infra‐
social forces, but bearing all the power of initiative and origination in his hands;
and second, the social environment, with its power of adopting or rejecting both
him and his gifts. Both factors are essential to change.294
James used Shakespeare as an example: if he had died of cholera, would another like
him have been born?295 Ultimately, he decided that evolutionary philosophy was not a
scientific method but a metaphysical “mood”—that of “fatalistic pantheism.”296 John
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Fiske, feeling called upon to respond, made a number of points: first, that Spencer
acknowledged that social change was the result of many individual actions; second, that
even a genius could accomplish little in an unsupportive environment; and third, that
sociology had to do with large groups and general truths, not particular occurrences.297
As Spencer’s sociological volumes slowly emerged, Americans began to develop
a conception of what his science of society was all about. It was evolutionary, that was
certain. It discussed the development of society over time, from the dawn of man to the
present. It was deterministic, and thus excluded the effects of God’s will on history,
which to some made it profoundly anti‐Christian. So far, however, there was not much
comment on Spencer’s specific theories. What Americans would focus on, and what
they would ignore, remained to be seen.
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CHAPTER 6
A GIANT IN WINTER
In 1879, Spencer published the first and most important part of his work on
morality, The Data of Ethics.1 Like Social Statics, this was an attempt to deduce a
rational system of morals from scientific principles—or, to be more accurate, to find a
scientific way to defend “politico‐ethical conclusions” already held. Spencer had come
full circle, as he himself recognized.2 He was returning to the task of his youth, but this
time he had prepared himself by studying biology, psychology, and sociology. As for
publishing out of order, Spencer had this to say:
I am the more anxious to indicate in outline, if I cannot complete, this final work,
because the establishment of rules of right conduct on a scientific basis is a
pressing need. Now that moral injunctions are losing the authority given by their
supposed sacred origin, the secularization of morals is becoming imperative. Few
things can happen more disastrous than the decay and death of a regulative
system no longer fit, before another and fitter regulative system has grown up to
replace it.3
Spencer, a man of no small ego, meant to provide this replacement.
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The Science of Righteousness: A New Ethics
The first chapters of The Data of Ethics concerned conduct. Spencer defined this
variously as “acts adjusted to ends,” or “the aggregate of all external coordinations.”4
Good conduct was well adjusted to reach intended goals, bad the reverse, just as a good
knife was sharp and a bad knife dull.5 Spencer understood ethical conduct to involve
personal welfare, the welfare of offspring, and the welfare of other citizens. Good
ethical conduct thus meant actions conducive to these kinds of welfare, with the first
being the most important.6 Spencer considered good acts more evolved than bad ones
since they involved greater adjustment of organism to environment.7 Thus good ethical
conduct was the most highly evolved form; as Spencer put it, “ethics has for its subject‐
matter, that form which universal conduct assumes during the last stages of its
evolution. . . . those displayed by the highest type of being, when he is forced, by
increase of numbers, to live more and more in the presence of his fellows.”8 Only the
highest type of man in the highest type of society could practice purely ethical behavior,
a subject to which Spencer returned at the end of his book.
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Spencer next looked at ethics from the physical, biological, psychological, and
sociological points of view. He found that, just as the theory of evolution suggested, the
highest conduct (the ethically good) was the most definite, coherent, and
heterogeneous—focused, self‐restrained, and adjusted towards a variety of obligations
simultaneously.9 Biologically, Spencer harked back to Social Statics and the importance
of exercising the faculties. For him it was a moral obligation to exercise animal
functions, maintain health, and strive for “complete life.”10 “Sentient existence can
evolve only on condition that pleasure‐giving acts are life‐sustaining acts,” Spencer
wrote.11 To put it another way, evolution ensures that those actions necessary for life
are pleasant and those that are harmful are painful. Spencer contended that this was
not always true of man because he had not yet fully adapted to his social
environment.12
Evolutionary psychology was at the heart of Spencer’s ethical code. He argued
that as the mind evolved, complex adjustment of acts to ends became possible,
including the ability to focus on long term goals.13 This was the key to the moral
consciousness: the ability of some feelings to dominate others.14 Such self‐control
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became innate in the individual if it was exercised continually by a long series of
ancestors. Again, Spencer was trying to build a bridge between those who believed in an
intuitive moral sense and those who conceived of mind as something built up through
the association of experiences.15 Organisms’ reactions to occurrences could become
hard‐wired into the brains of their descendants, and because humans lived with their
fellows, much of this experience was of social interactions. “The life of the social
organism must, as an end, rank above the lives of its units,” Spencer wrote, though
adding that preservation of society was a “proximate aim taking precedence of the
ultimate aim, individual self‐preservation,” which was only necessary in the presence of
enemy societies.16 Thus higher ethical behavior, expressed in voluntary as opposed to
mandatory cooperation, was only possible when militant society gave way to the
industrial type.17
At the midpoint of The Data of Ethics Spencer switched course, developing a
critique of Utilitarianism. Like the Utilitarians, Spencer believed that “the good is
universally the pleasurable.”18 Though he agreed that the greatest happiness for all was
the universal aim of ethics, he did not agree that this should be the immediate aim of
ethics, for several reasons. Some of Spencer’s reasoning was similar to that found in
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Social Statics, though his arguments gained in sophistication over the years. First he
argued that ratios of pains and pleasures are hard to determine, especially since men
had different needs, different tolerations for pain, and different definitions of
pleasure.19 Second, he pointed out that what is good for the people of one society might
be bad for another, based on environmental conditions and level of social
advancement.20 The standard of justice, on the other hand, was essentially related to
equality and thus much easier to judge. It was also necessary for harmonious
cooperation, which all societies needed.21 To Spencer, the pursuit of justice was the best
way to secure the utilitarian goal, the greatest happiness for the greatest number.
However, the pursuit of justice did not necessarily mean individual self‐sacrifice.
Spencer argued that justice required each individual to reap the rewards (or penalties)
intendant upon their actions.22 The superior, with their greater abilities, would naturally
gain more happiness than the incapable. If higher types multiplied at the expense of
lower, this meant that future society would enjoy a greater aggregate of happiness,
especially since the ability to enjoy life to the fullest was also heritable.23 Besides,
egoism was necessary for altruism, which in the second edition of The Principles of
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Psychology Spencer attributed to the highest type of mind. Excessive self‐sacrifice was
damaging, eventually lessening an individual’s ability to care for others.24 Furthermore,
Spencer maintained that in a society, personal welfare depended on the welfare of all,
good treatment of peers was often reciprocated, and besides, the altruistic state of
mind was pleasurable in itself.25 Thus some sort of compromise between egoism and
altruism was necessary. Spencer concluded that the greatest happiness for all was
mostly achieved by individuals adequately seeking their own pleasure, but that
individuals gained happiness in part by promoting the general good.26
Whatever the ideal balance between egoism and altruism might be for present
society, Spencer believed that among ideal men in an ideal society self‐sacrifice would
be unnecessary. His utopian visions had not been dampened by the passing of years
since Social Statics. Though it is true that he was never more than vague about his
society of the future, he did make a few aspects of his utopia clear.27 First, Spencer
thought that the sense of duty originated with fears of legal, social, and supernatural
consequences, inherited from ancestors in an amorphous form.28 He believed this
feeling, whose origin was coercion, would dissolve as evolution gradually made moral
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actions pleasurable in themselves.29 In the future, men would be perfectly adjusted to
their social environment and would enjoy necessary activities, like work, while feeling
revulsion for what was harmful.30 Going even further, Spencer suggested that
opportunities for pure altruism would become scarce when most members of society
took pleasure in the things that made them self‐reliant.31 He even imagined a state
where individuals voluntarily limited their altruism so that everyone had a chance to do
good to others.32 Spencer wrote,
Far off as seems such a state, yet every one of the factors counted on to produce
it may already be traced in operation among those of the highest natures. What
now in them is occasional and feeble, may be expected with further evolution to
become habitual and strong; and what now characterizes the exceptionally high
may be expected eventually to characterize all. For that which the best human
nature is capable of, is within the reach of human nature at large.33
It was a stirring vision of what a society composed of only the best of us could be.
Spencer, however, was realistic about the present. In the current, imperfect
state of man, often there was no right action, only a least wrong one.34 For example,
Spencer noted that no society can be ideal if surrounded by aggressive neighbors,
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because the need for self‐defense entailed the need to inflict pain.35 As he put it, “the
limit of evolution can be reached by conduct only in permanently peaceful societies.”36
Even a perfect man would be unable to act completely ethically in an imperfect society
without bringing dire consequences on himself.37 Still, as he had in Social Statics,
Spencer argued that an understanding of the ethical ideal was necessary to the
determination of relative ethics, just as a physician needed to understand a healthy
body in order to treat disease.38 Ethical science could help determine which
compromises were least bad.39
The Data of Ethics, though intriguing and at times inspiring, has one serious
problem: it does not explain why the imperfect man should strive to follow the
Spencer’s ethical guidelines. Or to put it more simply, why do right when doing wrong
brings more personal pleasure? In answer to this question, Spencer argued that moral
action is necessary for “complete” or “highest” life. This contention can be broken down
into two parts: first, that moral individuals are more evolved and thus superior, and
second, that complete life implies maximum happiness. But, the imperfect individual
might ask, does either superiority or the attempt to approximate highest life bring
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happiness? If so, no ethical code is needed—men will naturally pursue these things
through egotism. If not, selfish men will not seek to be ethical without the legal, social,
and supernatural controls Spencer sought to supplant. Spencer considered an argument
against pure egotism unnecessary, because it would lead to “universal conflict and social
dissolution.”40 This is only true if everyone in a society is perfectly selfish, however. It is
no argument against one person being selfish in a society that is mostly moral.
Spencer never made it explicit, but part of what he argued in The Data of Ethics
was that complete egotism was impossible. Because of the experiences of ancestors,
feelings of duty were inescapable. Moral self‐restraint was heritable.41 Furthermore,
thanks to the continuing adjustment of man to society, humanity’s moral improvement
was inevitable. Thanks to evolution, human beings in the future would actually enjoy
acting ethically. On this view, The Data of Ethics was more of an overview of past and
future moral development than a guide to right living—in fact, it made ethical
handbooks seem rather pointless. Spencer reserved specific moral injunctions for later
parts of The Principles of Ethics, which tends to support such an interpretation. Whether
Spencer himself was aware of this potential reading of his book is another question.
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Evolutionary Ethics: The American Response
The Data of Ethics triggered a greater reaction than any of Spencer’s works since
First Principles. Biology, psychology, and even sociology might seem like esoteric topics
to many, but morality was everyone’s concern. Furthermore, the subject attracted the
interest of religious thinkers, for Spencer was propounding an ethical system founded
upon evolution and not Christianity. Since many of the conclusions of the new system
were the same as the old, the New York Times suggested that Christians should
welcome the book, which showed that Jesus’ teachings did not diverge from the
principles that regulated human life.42 But as Spencer predicted, religious reactions
were mostly negative.43 Any ethics that did not take God’s will into consideration could
not be accepted by most Christian, however similar its ultimate lessons might be.
Most of the reviewers appear to have read the book carefully. Summaries
tended to notice most of the salient points—that happiness was Spencer’s primary
desideratum, that he saw duty as descended from fear of legal, religious, and social
penalties, that egoism and altruism must be balanced, and that relative ethics were
different from but based on absolute ethics. Sometimes these points were
oversimplified, as when the New York Evangelist’s critic wrote “Mr. Spencer believes in
utilitarianism as the basis of morals.”44 The Christian Advocate was more accurate,
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highlighting the difference between empirical utilitarianism, which Spencer rejected,
and rational utilitarianism, though the latter was a somewhat curious name for what
Spencer actually argued.45
Unfortunately, there were a few critiques that showed basic ignorance of
Spencer’s positions. For example, S. L. Beiler, a Methodist minister, pictured Spencer as
a spider weaving a web to entrap the unwary, and claimed that his ethics understood
men as automata and defined right as what succeeded best.46 Some simply dismissed
Spencer, as when C. H. Payne, president of Ohio Wesleyan University, said in a
baccalaureate speech “there is no need of entering into a learned discussion with
Herbert Spencer, or any of [the] agnostic philosophers concerning the ‘data of ethics.’ It
is plain to [the] common sense of common men that there is no such thing as duty if
there is no such a being as God.”47 Most educated religious writers seemed to think it
was their duty to what was obvious to common men.
One basic criticism of Spencer was that he did not give scope for “free moral
agency in man.”48 This was Noah Porter’s main reproach. In a review in the Independent
Porter complained that Spencer relied on complex structure and function as an
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explanation for human behavior, and thus, failed to understand that morality was
primarily a matter of the intention behind voluntary action. Unfortunately, Porter’s
reading of Spencer was sometimes willfully obtuse; for example, he took Spencer’s
claim that conduct arose by insensible degrees from unconscious action to imply that
inanimate objects could also have conduct. Much of Porter’s critique hung on Spencer’s
denial of free will, something germane to his psychology but not discussed in the work
at hand.49 Lyman Atwater, writing in the Independent the following year, made a similar
point. He noted that an evolutionary system that accounted for man in terms of blind
material forces must explain his conscience. Atwater felt that Spencer failed to show
how the sense of right and wrong could be extrapolated from sensations of pleasure
and pain—the moral sense was something more than just a development of the instinct
to seek one and avoid the other.50
Many critics agreed with Atwater: there was something more to moral feelings
than evolution could explain. A critic in the Christian Union complained “to Mr. Spencer
there is no difference between what is natural and what is moral. They are both the
same, only the moral is the more evolved.”51 In a lengthy review in the Universalist
Quarterly, one writer argued that humanity’s ancestors were superstitious and inclined
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towards evil, thus mistaken in most of their ethical judgments. Any ethical system with
ancestral heritage as its centerpiece was suspect.52 This critic made a distinction
between intelligent action, based on reasoning about ends, and moral action, based on
knowledge of the intrinsic rightness or wrongness of behavior. Adultery, for example,
was wrong intrinsically, not just because it hurt wives and children.53 Similarly, William
Taylor Stott, President and Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy at Indiana’s
Franklin College, wrote in the Baptist Review (successor to the Baptist Quarterly) that
ethical conduct was not “earth‐born.” Stott contended that conscience was not a matter
of experience and observation, but of an intuitional moral sense, given by God, allowing
men to know what to do without making calculations about happiness.54
Stott rejected Spencer’s prophesies for the future, contending that moral
regeneration would come from above, not below.55 A few other critics were willing to
accept the improvement of ethics over long periods of time. The New York Evangelist,
usually hostile to Spencer, agreed that “civilization is the natural product of the
deposited virtues, the tastes, the refinements, the faith and devotion of all the ages,
funded in the human organism.” The writer put this in terms of the growth of
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conscience through Christianity, noting that Spencer could have put his system into
Christian terms if he had wished.56 James McCosh, writing in The Princeton Review
(which had dropped “Presbyterian Quarterly” from its name when it became bimonthly
in 1878), imagined the conscience as a “germ” planted by God. Its growth might depend
on its ancestry and environment but its origin was divine. McCosh agreed with Spencer
that development had led to increasing happiness as higher creatures evolved—and
pointed to this as evidence of a benevolent creator.57 Those who accepted evolution did
so marginally, and only with the proviso that God’s will was a factor.58
Another critique concerned Spencer’s ideas of happiness, justice, and “higher
life.” D. McGregor Means, a professor at Middlebury College in Vermont, wrote a long
essay in which he complained that Spencer could not measure any of these things with
any precision.59 This appeared in The Bibliotheca Sacra, a quarterly published at
Andover Theological Seminary that was aimed at clergymen and theology students.60
Means protested that he could not tell the difference between Spencer’s ethics and
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utilitarianism and thus that Spencer’s system was not new.61 He doubted, given the
complexity of the problem, that Spencer could know that happiness is increasing or that
conditions would become fixed in a certain way in the future.62 Likewise, he cast doubt
on the ability to rationally weigh means against ends, present unhappiness against
future happiness, and work against rewards.63 In The Unitarian Review, C. C. Everett
made a similar point, even going so far as to attempt to calculate the best life by
multiplying the length of the life by its complexity.64 In the same review a few months
later, Unitarian minister Minot J. Savage criticized Everett and other critics for
misunderstanding Spencer, and tried to demonstrate that the complexity of life could
indeed be objectively calculated.65
A few writers criticized Spencer’s system for not offering enough incentive for
good behavior. This was one of Everett’s main critiques. He argued that if Spencer’s
principles of morality were correct, they should increase virtue in a society. He
suggested a test for this: go through the thought processes of a young man subject to
temptation. Everett found that Spencer offered little incentive to do right; Christian
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teachings had improved society much more than Spencer’s ethics could.66 Means,
oversimplifying a bit, complained that the only punishment Spencer envisioned for
acting wrongly was being out of harmony with nature.67 Reviewers did not bring up the
subject of God’s commandments, Jesus’ teachings, or the afterlife, however. As usual,
they were eager to pick apart Spencer’s system with reason rather than resorting to the
odium theologicum.
Despite their criticisms, many of these religious writers demonstrated a sneaking
admiration for Spencer’s work. Even Noah Porter, a devout foe, praised Spencer’s style
and use of illustrations, called his system “stimulating and instructive,” and gave him
credit for keen analysis of utilitarianism.68 Another writer thought Spencer logical,
thorough, and knowledgeable; his mistake was attempting the impossible task of
bridging the chasm between man’s moral nature and animal’s lack thereof.69 James
McCosh began a long critique in the pages of The Princeton Review by admitting
“Herbert Spencer commands our respect by his terrible earnestness. He has an end to
live for and he lives for it. . . .He is to a large extent the author, and is certainly the
organizer, and the very embodiment, personification, and expression of
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development.”70 McCosh reaffirmed his praise from Intuitions of Mind; he seemed to
regret finding Spencer’s system a failure.71
McCosh’s review was probably the best that appeared: carefully written,
thorough, and almost always fair. However, he made his position clear at the outset:
Thinking men see that if development cannot meet the requirements of ethics,
which are quite as valid and certain as heredity or any other laws of physiology,
evolutionists will have to modify their theory, and allow that, while it can do
much, it cannot accomplish everything, and that it leaves many important facts
to be explained by other, and I may add higher, laws.
For McCosh, a committed evolutionist, ethics were a last refuge for God’s law acting in
the universe. There was little chance that he would accept Spencer’s system. Despite
the inevitability of a guilty verdict, however, McCosh gave Spencer a fine trial. He began
with Spencer’s psychology, which in a rare display of passion he called “about the
greatest philosophic abortion of our day.”72 McCosh agreed that the brain might be the
organ of the mind and constrain it in some ways, but he rejected the idea that
rationality was a direct result of the brain. Man’s primary intuitions, both mathematical
and ethical, could not be proved to exist even in the highest animals.73 Man was related
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to animals physically but not in mind, McCosh wrote; ethics were the province of the
human.74
McCosh agreed with Spencer that the ability to gain and feel happiness had
increased through the ages, like some others who reviewed The Data of Ethics. McCosh
felt that nature had a moral purpose, showing design, and that the process culminated
in the arrival of man, a moral creature who could appreciate that purpose.75 However,
he was not sure Spencer was correct in arguing that these processes eventually led to
the disappearance of evil.76 Furthermore, the development theory could not explain
why one person should promote happiness in others. Intuitive morality, on the other
hand, understood that promoting the greatest happiness was a duty given by a divine
lawgiver.77 “Love is the grand, the essential virtue,” an end in itself that promoted
happiness according to McCosh.78 Ultimately McCosh found that without God, the new
ethics removed one motive for virtue without providing others likely to influence most
people.79 But he held out hope that Spencer’s fuller treatment of ethics would address
some of his criticisms.
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Not all reviews of The Data of Ethics were negative; this was especially true of
the few that appeared in secular publications. For example, The Nation felt the book
exposed the muddled nature of current ethical thought and concluded it was Spencer’s
best book yet.80 The reviewer highlighted something that others ignored: that
evolutionary thinking had not made Spencer warlike, but brought an “almost Quakerish
humanitarianism and regard for peace.”81 The critic did have some complaints,
however. The most compelling was the notion that some might prefer struggles, joys,
sorrows, and life’s “delicious mess of fears and strivings” to Spencer’s “milk‐and‐water
paradise.”82 A similar criticism was leveled by a few other reviews. Everett, for example,
complained that Spencer had nothing worthwhile to say about suffering, which was a
necessary part of life in an imperfect world.83 As another critic put it, Spencer’s system
precluded heroism, courage, sacrifice, faith, and endurance as virtues.84
Most of those who wrote about The Data of Ethics had reservations. They
recognized the book’s ability and intriguing ideas, but few felt that it met the ambitious
goal of providing a replacement for Christian virtue. There were, of course, a few who
embraced Spencer’s book wholeheartedly. Minot Savage wrote “it is one of the few
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volumes of the world that will stand as a mile‐stone of human progress. It marks the
transition from theoretic, metaphysical, speculative ethics, to the scientific morality of
the future.” However, Savage included Christ and Christianity as part of the human
racial experience inherited by modern man, thus sneaking in religion through the back
door.85 For most, Spencer’s ethical system was thought‐provoking, but hardly provided a
firm basis for everyday decisions.
Systems of Legal Control: Political Institutions and its American Reception
Political Institutions first appeared in the United States in the pages of Popular
Science Monthly, starting in November of 1880.86 The book was not published until
1882; the following year the Appletons combined it with Ceremonial Institutions as the
second volume of The Principles of Sociology.87 In some ways Political Institutions was
like Spencer’s other political work. His basic ideas about government had not changed.
However, Spencer focused on description rather than prescription this time. He defined
various types of government, explained their advantages and disadvantages in different
environments and for different social types, and discussed their effects on the behavior
of citizens. Rather than extrapolating from rational laws of behavior, Spencer examined
actual institutions and attempted to classify them. The fact that his most important
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distinction, between the militant and industrial type of society, reinforced his views
about positive social development shows how deeply his beliefs affected his
categorization.
Spencer began with an argument for objectivity in social science. Thought and
feeling could not be disconnected completely, Spencer wrote, but we should try to
study men’s actions “as those of alien creatures, which it merely concerns us to
understand” rather than to judge.88 In this way Spencer prepared his readers for some
of his potentially controversial findings: that war played a significant role in the advance
of civilizations, and that it was sometimes necessary in the past for the strong to force
the weak into submission.89 The struggle for existence between societies had
encouraged their evolution, Spencer argued, but this would not necessarily be true in
the future.90 He did not provide any clear reasons why war should cease to operate
beneficially, however.91
For Spencer, the essence of society was cooperation towards a goal, usually food
production and warfare. Cooperation required organization, which usually meant
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political headship.92 Spencer understood social development in terms of his general
theory of evolution. As a homogenous social group grew, there must be political
integration (merging of tribes by conquest or in mutual self‐defense) and differentiation
(divisions between men and women, rulers and ruled, conqueror and slave).93 Political
leadership became more complex with growth, as greater organization was needed to
keep these various groups and classes of people organized. However, Spencer pointed
out that leaders essentially focused the will and feeling of the living community, and
even more so the will of the dead, since they mainly enforced inherited rules of
conduct.94
Spencer divided governing bodies into four classes. Rule could be individual, by
one leader, or compound, with multiple leaders of separate groups cooperating when
necessary. A combination of the two was also possible, which Spencer called a
consultative body, in which a chief ruler cooperated with a council of leading men.
Finally, representative bodies formed when popular power, which grew with trade and
with concentration in towns, became great enough to force concessions about self‐
rule.95 Spencer determined that governing institutions were more stable when positions
were hereditary, but more amenable to change when rank was based on personal
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ability, since office holders would be younger and less conservative.96 He went into
some depth about these various types of government, discussing government
functionaries, ministries, and local government. Throughout, Spencer painted a picture
of struggle, as various factions and groups sought to gain control or maintain their
power.97 He gave little space to the role of culture, tradition, and loyalty in maintaining a
government’s authority.
For Spencer, differentiation could be seen in the separation of the military and
judicial systems from the governing system. The military separated from the rest of
society for several reasons: disconnection of military obligations from citizenship,
political leaders who were not fit for military service, and the increasing civil duties of
leaders.98 Judicial systems grew when the king was not absolute and when secular,
military, and ecclesiastical justice became separate.99 Spencer cited four sources for
laws: quasi‐religious inherited customs, the commands of dead leaders, the will of the
current leader, and popular opinion.100 Depending on the source, ideas about crime
could differ—for example, murder could be seen as a sin, as a loss for the family of the
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victim, as a rejection of the will of the ruler, or as an injury the community.101 Spencer
also discussed the desire for property, which he saw as rooted in man’s animal ancestry,
and the collection of revenue which he associated with warfare.102
The last sections of Political Institutions were some of the most important. Here
Spencer explained his conception of the militant and industrial types of societies. This
distinction could be found as far back as the first edition of First Principles, where
Spencer described a change from “the military or predatory type of social structure, to
the industrial or mercantile type” which he saw ongoing in European societies.103
According to Spencer, almost all societies in history have been of the militant type,
including most of those still surviving. Spencer argued that among societies engaging in
military conflict those that were most efficient in fielding and supporting the maximum
number of fighters are bound to be victorious, and destroy or swallow up their
neighbors. Certain attributes are a necessary prerequisite for such dominance:
centralization of power, a status system with grades of authority based on military
ability, and regimentation for both military forces and the community at large.104 The
ultimate result is that the individual is owned by the state, shown in part by the
prevalence of “positively regulative” legislation: laws telling a person what they must
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do, rather than defining what they cannot do, leading to what Spencer termed
“compulsory cooperation.”105 The citizens of such societies might be strong,
courageous, and even virtuous, but they are also vengeful and destructive, with little
regard for the liberty or property of others.106 Patriotism, obedience, and loyalty are
lauded in such societies, while individual initiative and private enterprise are
smothered.107 Social norms and cultural values thus develop from environmental
conditions which include outside threats, a type of determinism that is typically
Spencerian.108
Spencer’s industrial type of society was almost a photographic negative of the
militant type. In the absence of serious external threats, self‐sustenance and
reproduction were the only remaining necessities. Individuality was the essential value
defended by the state, for where “life, liberty and property” are protected greater
prosperity follows, and prosperity is how industrial societies compete with each
other.109 Laws were only “negatively regulative,” meant to protect citizens from harm
rather than to control behavior, and to enforce contracts, which replace status as a
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means of formalizing social relations.110 Clearly, the industrial type of society is simply
another version of Spencer’s future utopia, where each is rewarded according to his
virtue and voluntary cooperation for a common good takes the place of state projects
and regulations. Spencer’s belief in government’s limitations, the efficiency of private
enterprise, and the importance of personal freedom, absorbed during his boyhood in a
Dissenting family in the English midlands, he simply blended with his concept of
progressive evolution.111 The citizen under such a regime would have a strong love of
personal freedom and of justice, both for self and others, and be humane where the
military type was vengeful and coercive.112
These types seem mutually exclusive, but Spencer argued that militant traits are
often found mixed with industrial, especially in Western societies that were making the
long, slow transition between the two.113 Furthermore, militant societies can also have
industry and commerce; their type is based on their organization, priorities, and ethos,
not their productive capacity.114 Still, Spencer clearly considered the industrial type
higher on the evolutionary scale than the militant type, and capable of out producing it.

110

PS, 2:611. For a discussion of Spencer’s beliefs about contracts see Tim Gray, The Political
Philosophy of Herbert Spencer: Individualism and Organicism (Aldershot: Avebury, 1996), 45‐48.
111

Many writers have discussed the context of Spencer’s political ideas; see for example John Offer,
Herbert Spencer and Social Theory (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 33‐
35. Alberto Mingardi discusses the congruence between Spencer’s evolutionary and social theories in
Herbert Spencer (New York: Continuum, 2011), 29.
112

PS, 2:628‐630.

113

PS, 2:632.

114

Offer, Herbert Spencer and Social Theory, 244‐245.

386
Since evolution was inevitable for Spencer, the transformation of societies from warlike
to peaceful and freedom loving must be inevitable too. In Spencer’s future, more and
more material and human resources will be committed to production and trade, making
the world more and more peaceful. At the time he wrote the second volume of The
Principles of Sociology, Spencer felt that Britain was moving in the right direction. Public
criticism of the nation’s actions towards the Afghans, Boers and Zulus was one sign of
this; the increasing honor paid to industrial and commercial over military careers was
another.115
The hubbub surrounding Spencer’s American visit overshadowed critical notice
of Political Institutions, but reviews did appear, though some of them were delayed until
after the visit. A few organs of the press even covered the articles as they appeared in
Popular Science Monthly. For example, The Salt Lake City Herald commended Spencer
for demonstrating the effects of militancy on liberty, national character, and the
progress of civilization.116 The Friend’s Intelligencer also showed itself eager to comment
where the virtues of peace were concerned, and summarized Spencer’s analysis of
personal character in the militant society.117 Most comments on Spencer’s typology
came after the publication of Political Institutions, however. These tended to focus on
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Spencer’s arguments for limited government, but his discussion of the role of war in
social evolution was also addressed. This was especially true in religious magazines,
which enjoyed great popularity in the nineteenth century. A reviewer in the Methodist
Christian Advocate wrote that Christians would find much to agree with in Spencer’s
latest book, including its tendency “to fortify the Christian position as to war and other
disasters of the militant type of society."118 The Christian Union argued that applying
evolution to society was not theologically objectionable, and considered the
military/industrial dichotomy to be the heart of Spencer’s book.119 Both reviewers were
careful to disassociate themselves from Spencer’s metaphysics.
Secular periodicals discussed Political Institutions as well, and as with Christian
periodicals they noted Spencer’s stance on war. W. W. Crane Jr.’s review in the
Californian and Overland Monthly was among the most insightful. The Overland Monthly
was the most famous Western periodical thanks to Bret Harte’s brief tenure as editor; it
had merged with the Californian earlier in 1882.120 In his article, also read before the
Berkeley club, Crane focused almost entirely on Spencer’s distinction between militant
and industrial types.121 He argued that Spencer paid too little attention to family
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relationships in his explanation of early human organization, and put too much stress on
war.122 Furthermore, he suggested that since political rights devolve on those willing to
fight for them, war can be a cause of development even in larger, modern nations.123
Finally, he disputed the idea that industrialism could lead to diminished laws and
regulations. While militarism does lead to government control of the individual, Crane
felt that growing industrialism does the same by fostering increasingly complicated
relationships between individuals and businesses, which necessitates more complex
legislation.124 Ultimately, Crane was ambivalent about this process, writing “the ulterior
effect is that the citizen really becomes more and more the slave of the State.
Apparently, we are free; actually, we are restrained of our liberties at every turn."125
Spencer would have agreed wholeheartedly with this sentiment, at least.
Other critics were more affirmative about Spencer’s message of peace. The Dial,
a modern and much changed incarnation of the mouthpiece for the Boston
transcendentalists, published a highly positive review by Walter R. Barnes. Barnes
accepted Spencer’s fundamental ideas about evolution and the regularity of law, even
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to the extent of invoking the homogeneous and the heterogeneous.126 As for militancy,
he wrote, "not he who fights the personal quarrels of a master, but he who causes two
blades of grass to grow where before there was but one, is the true patriot. These
lessons, and more, are the teachings of this philosophy."127 Another reviewer argued
that Spencer put too much emphasis on trade as a civilizing force. Moral forces,
especially Christianity, also played a large role in social improvement.128 These and other
reviews revealed that readers were quick to pick up on Spencer’s anti‐war sentiments;
not all agreed with his assessments, however.
The Philosopher Honored: Spencer Visits America
In August of 1882 Herbert Spencer paid a three month visit to America, in the
company of his longtime friend Edward Lott. Spencer was, by this time, a celebrity to
the American public, and great interest was aroused by his visit. As David Duncan
reported in Spencer’s Life and Letters, “the managers of great railways vied with one
another in offering him luxurious travelling facilities. Hotel proprietors showed in every
possible way their desire to welcome him as an honoured guest.”129 However, this was
not a publicity tour for Spencer, and certainly not a “victory lap” as Barry Werth styles it,
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but a vacation meant to improve his health, and he denied interviews to the press.130 As
he complained, some reporters filled the gap by simply making things up; this was more
common in newspapers, but some magazines were not above reporting that Spencer
carried a pillow full of hops for his insomnia, and ate almost nothing but dry toast and
sardines.131
It was common knowledge that Spencer was better known in America than in his
home country, and Americans were greatly interested to learn what Spencer thought of
them in return. As one writer put it in Century Illustrated Magazine (the newly
rechristened Scribner’s Monthly):
Few of his many admirers, indeed, are likely to see him; for he comes without
any intention of speaking in public, and expects generally to go about very
quietly. But, whether one actually sees him or not, there is a certain sort of
pleasure in feeling that one to whom we owe so much is at last in our country,
and is coming into daily contact with our ways of living and thinking.132
Unfortunately for Americans, Spencer’s insomnia was worsened by shipboard noise on
the trip across the Atlantic. An interview with “an old friend of Herbert Spencer” by a
New York Post reporter revealed that Spencer was “broken‐down” from the voyage
over, could not sleep or calm down, and would not accept visitors or even read their
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letters.133 Spencer’s ill‐health was confirmed by other papers as well.134 Spencer had
little to say to the American people for quite a while.
Spencer spent most of his time in America relaxing and sightseeing. As usual, his
solution for his health problems was vigorous physical activity, so he left New York via
the Hudson for five days of walking in the Catskills. His travels eventually took him to
Montreal, Niagara Falls, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and
Boston, among other places. Along the way he visited Johns Hopkins and Yale, met with
such people as O. C. Marsh, Asa Gray, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and John Fiske, and spent
much time with E. L. Youmans, his wife, and his sister.135 His visit to Pittsburgh was at
the behest of Andrew Carnegie, a disciple of Spencer’s who dined with him on the
voyage from Europe. Spencer found polluted Pittsburgh repulsive, confiding to Carnegie
“six month’s residence here would justify suicide.”136 It should be noted that although
Carnegie claimed Spencer as his “master teacher” he did not refer to him about public
issues before his article on “Wealth,” where he criticized another follower of Spencer
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for giving money to a panhandler.137 The extent to which Carnegie understood Spencer
is subject to debate.138
Spencer did eventually make a statement to the American press, in the form of
an interview conducted by Youmans in which Spencer answered the questions he
himself preferred. As usual, Spencer thought he knew how to arrange things better than
the experts. Youmans sent the interview to several New York and Chicago newspapers,
and also printed it in in Popular Science Monthly.139 In the interview, Spencer made a
number of comments on the American character: he noticed the “do or die attitude,”
the determination, and the capacity for work.140 He criticized the infringements on
freedom that were the inevitable result of machine politics, and suggested that
Americans “tolerate various small interferences and dictations” because it would be too
troublesome to oppose them, a habit which might ultimately endanger their free
institutions.141 Finally, he denied that he promoted laissez‐faire approaches to
government. As he put it, “I have contended that in its special sphere, the maintenance
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of equitable relations among citizens, governmental action should be extended and
elaborated.”142 Spencer was consistent in his belief that government should provide
equal protection to all, but aid to none.
The press treated Spencer’s judgments on America as those of a moral reformer.
The New York Times felt that the profound sociologist was so on‐target that “his words
leave in us a vague sense of awe, as if we had listened to the voice of a prophet.” The
Times agreed with Spencer that America’s paper‐constitution was weak because it had
been made and not grown, but took comfort in the fact that The Data of Ethics showed
moral sentiments to be based on humanity’s experiences of utility. Momentary failures
simply indicated periods of adjustment; problems would correct themselves as moral
feelings rose once more.143 The Chicago Tribune on the other hand was disappointed
that Spencer only repeated what was common knowledge, without shedding new light
on the problems or showing how to solve them. The Tribune writer too had faith in
Americans’ eventual ability to deal with railroad corruption and rigged political
primaries.144 The Christian Index was pleased that Spencer stressed moral strength over
education as the primary need for citizens of a republic.145 Others noted Spencer’s
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Figure 1. “Our distinguished guest—Herbert Spencer holds the mirror up to our political system.” J.
Kepler, Puck 12, no. 295 (Nov. 1, 1882), 136.

comments about political bosses with approval (see figure 1).146 Henry Cabot Lodge was
certainly not alone in recalling with pleasure the final words of Spencer’s interview: “I
think that whatever difficulties they may have to surmount, and whatever tribulations
they may have to pass through, the Americans may reasonably look forward to a time
when they will have produced a civilization grander than any the world has known.”147
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The culmination of Spencer’s American visit was a banquet given in his honor at
Delmonico’s in New York. Attending were influential men from all walks of life:
businessmen, academics, scientists, and even ministers. Andrew Carnegie was there, as
well as Spencer’s strongest supporters: Youmans, Fiske, and several members of the
Appleton family. New York mayor Abraham Hewitt attended, as did statesmen like
Congressman Perry Belmont, future congressman Chauncey Depew, Carl Schurz, future
Secretary of State Elihu Root, and former treasury secretary Benjamin Bristow. Writers
and editors included E. L. Godkin, Parke Godwin, and Charles A. Dana. Besides Carnegie
and the Appletons, businessmen included Henry Holt, Samuel J. Colgate, and Cyrus
Field, prime mover behind the transatlantic cable. Even some clergymen attended,
including Henry Ward Beecher, his successor at Plymouth Church Lyman Abbott, and
Minot J. Savage. And of course there were scores of prestigious attendees whose names
are less well known today. Altogether nearly 200 people attended, filling Delmonico’s
banquet hall to capacity.
Youmans published the guest list, along with Spencer’s “interview” and the text
of the speeches made at the banquet, in a short book entitled Herbert Spencer on the
Americans, and the Americans on Herbert Spencer.148 In 1973, the book was reissued by
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Arno Press as part of a series called “Big Business: Economic Power in a Free Society.”149
The inside cover had this description of the banquet:
…a gathering of eminent scientists, industrialists, educators and political
economists assembled at Delmonico's to hail the thinker who had synthesized
from Darwinian biology and Comtean sociology a cosmic vindication of the
industrial tycoon as the fittest to survive in nature's competitive struggles.
In fact, the speech Spencer gave did not praise relentless competition. Instead, Spencer
argued that Americans worked too hard, risking the dangers of nervous collapse. This
was completely in character for Spencer; overwork had long been an obsession with
him, and he blamed it for the early deaths of both his father and his uncle.150
Demonstrating the strength of his Lamarckian beliefs, he warned his audience,
“damaged constitutions reappear in children, and entail on them far more of ill than
great fortunes yield them good.” In short, he said, there has been altogether too much
of the “gospel of work,” “It is time to preach the gospel of relaxation.”151
According to historian Richard Hofstadter, this speech was “somewhat
disappointing.”152 Historian Stephen Shapin referred to it as a “disaster” and “a slap to
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Figure 2. “A Disciple of the Great Philosopher.” Frederick Burr Opper, Puck 12, no. 298 (Nov.
22, 1882), 182.

the face of national virtue.”153 But as Robert Bannister points out, the speech would
only have disappointed those who assumed that Spencer, and the evolutionary doctrine
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in general, defended modern competitive society. Instead, the public reaction both at
the time and years later was quite favorable.154 Magazines reacted to “the gospel of
relaxation” in a variety of ways. Some thought Spencer’s words should be taken to
heart.155 For others, the concept was ripe for good‐natured fun (see figure 2). One
writer, while accepting that the comments were made in a friendly fashion, wondered
whether they were appropriate for Americans as a whole, or just those of the upper
classes.156 While the toasts in Spencer’s honor were complimentary to the highest
degree, the subject of the speeches was revealing. Evolution was toasted repeatedly;
again and again, Spencer was lionized as the originator of evolution as a universal
doctrine. Spencer was introduced with the comment that his system “aims at the
highest results in virtue; that it treats evil not as eternal, but as evanescent.”157 William
Graham Sumner likewise saw in the philosophy of evolution a way to find sweeping
solutions to all social problems.158 Spencer earned high praise as a champion of science
against tradition, and as an original thinker who proposed evolution as the law of all
progress long before Darwin explored it in the biological realm.159 The speakers scarcely
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mentioned Spencer’s social and political views, the phrase “survival of the fittest” was
never used, and where there was any hint of social Darwinism, it was in the context of a
joke.160
Spencer later admitted he should never have made the trip. He had hoped the
change of scenery would improve his health, but that did not happen. Sleepless nights
aboard ship and the stresses and strains of American travel left him “in a worse state
than I went: having made another step downwards towards invalid life.”161 His health
deteriorated thereafter. Spencer described his condition as a series of relapses and
recoveries, each cycle leaving him less sound than the last.162 His work suffered. He
produced some important articles over the rest of the decade, and managed to get
through another section of the sociology, Ecclesiastical Institutions, but the remaining
volumes of the Synthetic Philosophy were not published until the 1890s.
The Prophet versus the State
In 1884, Spencer published a series of four political essays in the British monthly
The Contemporary Review. These were reprinted in Popular Science Monthly, and
republished as The Man Versus the State in Britain in 1884 and in America in 1885.163 In
some ways these essays reiterated political positions Spencer had held since he was a
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young man. However, his perspective on these views had changed. Thanks to his
sociological work, what he had once seen as immediately desirable he now saw as ill‐
suited to the present nature of civilized man. Institutions which he disliked he now saw
as necessary evils preventing even worse conditions from developing. Secondly, Spencer
had grown more pessimistic about the inevitability of evolution. He had become
concerned that retrogression against the flow of evolution was possible, at least in the
short term. As David Weinstein puts it, these fears remained as an “undercurrent of
anxiety” which were not integrated into his system of evolution as described in the
Synthetic Philosophy.164 In The Man Versus the State Spencer explored these issues at
length.
In the first of his essays, “The New Toryism,” Spencer contributed to an ongoing
discussion about the meaning of liberalism.165 Spencer complained that liberals had
once struggled against Torys to reduce compulsory cooperation and restrictions on
action. This increased happiness in society, so Liberalism became identified with
promoting the general welfare.166 In pursuit of this aim, Liberals became coercive in
turn. As Spencer noted, neither altruistic motives nor popular support make regulations
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less restrictive.167 Spencer put the issue in stark terms: “If men use their liberty in such a
way as to surrender their liberty, are they thereafter any the less slaves?”168 In “The
Coming Slavery” Spencer explored this subject. He argued that the lower classes had
come to expect government to provide them with things they should be earning for
themselves, while politicians pandered to them with promises.169 Each law passed led to
further expectations, adding momentum to the governmental machine.170 The
inevitable result would be state socialism.171 To Spencer, socialism implied slavery; just
as a slave was forced to work for a master, the socialist citizen was forced to work for a
state which owned all land, transportation systems, and industries.172 Obviously,
Spencer was greatly exaggerating for the sake of effect. As the Chautauquan (journal of
the eponymous movement) suggested, Spencer should try being a slave long enough to
correct his error.173 However, The Man Versus the State was a polemical book, and
Spencer was delivering a jeremiad, not a careful discourse.
The final two essays discussed the actions of lawmakers. In “The Sins of
Legislators” Spencer wandered familiar paths. He accused politicians of making laws
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without an understanding of social science and complained that reformers did not
understand that people’s limited capacity for change made it impossible to remake the
world through legislation.174 “The Great Political Superstition” argued that elected
governments are no more entitled to absolute obedience than kings.175 The majority’s
rule over the minority must be limited by individual rights.176 Spencer ended where he
began, with liberalism. He wrote, “the function of Liberalism in the past was that of
putting a limit to the powers of kings. The function of true Liberalism in the future will
be that of putting a limit to the powers of Parliaments.”177
In a postscript, Spencer explained that he did not expect to convince many
people of his views, in part because the dramatic restriction of government he proposed
was only possible for a purely industrial type of society, a type nowhere yet existing.178
In other words, he did not believe society was yet ready to accept his ideas. Nor would it
be for quite a while, because the military social type was necessary to train citizens to
work steadily, follow instructions, and organize for large works—training that was still
needed.179 Furthermore, imperialism blocked transition to the higher social type: “it is
impossible to unite the blessings of equity at home with the commission of inequities
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abroad,” Spencer wrote. He confided to Youmans, “we are on the highway to
communism, and I see no likelihood that the movement in that direction will be
arrested.”180
Running through several of these essays was a pervasive thread of social
Darwinism. Much of the legislation Spencer complained of was that designed to help the
poor. Of the unemployed, Spencer wrote: “’They have no work,’ you say. Say rather that
they either refuse work or quickly turn themselves out of it. They are simply good‐for‐
nothings, who in one way or other live on the good‐for‐somethings.”181 Spencer blamed
the poor for their misfortunes, writing “is it not manifest that there must exist in our
midst an immense amount of misery which is a normal result of misconduct, and ought
not to be dissociated from it?”182 He reprinted a section from Social Statics which
discussed the shouldering aside of the weak by the strong, and commented that he still
believed in “the beneficial results of the survival of the fittest.”183 Spencer made his
usual concessions about the benefits of private charity, but briefly and in much less
striking fashion.184 A reader might easily miss such passages, while Spencer’s
disallowance of public aid was unmistakable.
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There was little immediate reaction to The Man Versus the State in the American
press. Americans did discuss Darwinistic social ideas at times, and Spencer’s name was
sometimes raised on these occasions. In March of 1883 William Graham Sumner gave a
talk before New York’s famous Nineteenth Century Club in which he declared that the
struggle for existence affected all animals. Sentimentalists and reformers simply did not
understand sociology, Sumner opined. “If we do not like the survival of the fittest,” he
said, “we have but one alternative—the survival of the unfittest, and this would be
working backward, not forward.” However, Sumner did not cite Spencer. Despite the
fact that he used Spencerian terminology, had used The Study of Sociology in his classes,
and gave a speech at the banquet at Delmonico’s, Sumner was not a devout disciple.185
He did not mention Spencer once in his book What Social Classes Owe to Each Other, for
example.186
Responding to Sumner’s speech, Isaac L. Rice, a recent graduate of Columbia
College, criticized Spencer’s sociology and argued that society must take care that only
the most worthy survive.187 The true purpose of sociology, Rice said, was to promote
brotherhood.188 Two days later, an anonymous article in the Times poked fun at Rice for
thinking sociology any more moral than gravity or the multiplication table. For Rice, the
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article said, it was not good enough for men like Spencer to learn facts and discern laws;
“they should make the facts and laws preach as well as teach.”189 Rice took a further
opportunity to criticize Spencer’s sociological work in an article in the June issue of The
North American Review. Rice argued that evolution was a half‐truth that must be
combined with its opposite. Sometimes social phenomena went from coherence to
incoherence, as when a nation develops at the expense of family bonds.190 In addition,
Rice criticized Spencer’s conception of the state. Spencer did not give the state the right
to prevent the strong from exploiting the weak; “on the basis of false inductions and
self‐contradictory dogmas, he exalts private interests above public needs, and
subordinates the most sacred rights of all to the supposed advantages of a few.”191 It
was typical of those who criticized Spencer’s social ideals to ignore the fact that he
expected the state to prevent violence, trespass, and the breaking of contracts; hardly a
recipe for unlimited exploitation. As was often the case, Youmans rode to the rescue,
but he concerned himself more with Rice’s disparagement of Spencer’s understanding
of Plato than with Rice’s attack on individualism.192
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Reviews of The Man Versus the State were confined mostly to the secular press.
One exception was a survey of the book appearing in the Congregationalist
Independent. The Independent had grown more religious under editor Henry Chandler
Bowen. Still, it continued to feature a variety of secular content, and was one of the few
religious periodicals that appealed to an audience outside the denomination.193 Its
discussion of the book was mostly summarization, by the writer did argue that “The
Great Political Superstition” was the most important chapter, though the least
popular.194 A review in The Critic took more time to discuss the issues Spencer raised.
The Critic was a newer magazine, founded in 1881, which printed literature along with
its criticism—including works from Walt Whitman, Joel Chandler Harris, Emma Lazarus,
and Julia Ward Howe. Its critic felt that by criticizing state regulation Spencer was
opposing the spirit of the time, making him a voice “crying in the wilderness.”195 The
reviewer acknowledged that real problems with government existed, but noted that
popular government’s advantage is that it can correct its mistakes. A reaction the other
way was bound to occur.196
Neither of these reviews discussed Spencer’s attitude towards the poor.
However, it did not go completely unnoticed. The Dial’s critic, J. A. Jameson, considered
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Spencer’s social and political writings the most worthy of attention since those of
Aristotle, but he felt that some of Spencer’s theories must be rejected or at least not
acted upon until conditions changed.197 Jameson wrote that no Christian people could
accept Spencer’s belief that the suffering of criminals and the impoverished was
deserved and necessary. Jameson noticed that Spencer allowed private charity, but
concluded that this conflicted with a desire to be rid of the unfit.198 Otherwise he
recommended the book highly. Jameson clearly recognized Spencer’s social Darwinism
and understood how incompatible it was with Christian teachings. He was not alone in
doing so, but he was in the minority.
Some discussions of The Man Vesus the State revolved around his attacks on
socialism. In the anarchist magazine Liberty a commentator pointed out that it was
incorrect to tie socialism to state power. Voluntary socialism was also possible. Liberty
had previously claimed Spencer as an anarchist (“if only he knew it”) but now, the writer
said, “I begin to be a little suspicious of him. It seems as if he had forgotten the
teachings of his earlier writings, and had become a champion of the capitalistic class.”199
Liberty felt Spencer was right to attack government attempts at reform, but wrong to
ignore laws protecting wealth and monopoly: “He is greatly shocked that the rich should
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be directly taxed to support the poor, but that the poor should be indirectly taxed and
bled to make the rich richer does not outrage his delicate sensibilities in the least.”200 In
1886, several more discussions of socialism appeared that revolved around Spencer.
Nicholas Gilman, writing in The Unitarian Review, understood it as putting group welfare
first, as opposed to individualism, which put individual welfare first.201 Spencer was
mistaken about liberalism, Gilman thought; just because liberals traditionally focused on
freeing the lower classes does not mean they should not help them once they are
freed.202 Gilman did not support state ownership, but he did not think government a
wasteful, oppressive monster, either. Economist Edward W. Bemis understood the
growing popularity of socialism as a reaction against laissez‐faire doctrines.203 Though
he thought socialism a fallacy for its labor theory of value, he believed its ideals were
good, and moderate state action advisable.204
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“A Battle of the Skeptics”: Spencer Returns to Religious Controversy
If few were discussing Spencer’s social Darwinism, what did they discuss? The
doctrine of evolution was an important subject, as was Spencer’s attitude towards
religion and morality. On the subject of religion, while discussion of the Unknowable
continued, Spencer’s next book, Ecclesiastical Institutions, gave plenty of new fodder for
conversation. This was the next section of The Principles of Sociology, published
separately just as the last two had been. While Ecclesiastical Institutions did not come
out in the United States until 1886, Spencer released sections of it in magazines just as
he had been doing with all his sociological work. In January 1884 he published the last
section of the book, “Religious Retrospect and Prospect,” in the British review The
Nineteenth Century and in Popular Science Monthly.205 A response came from British
positivist Frederick Harrison, and a “controversy” between the two men began,
stretching over several articles from each, and only ceasing when Spencer allowed
Harrison to have the last word. Sensing Americans’ interest, and fearing some other
company would publish first, Youmans had the entire series of articles issued in a book,
The Nature and Reality of Religion, with his own partisan introduction attached. It
outraged Harrison, for it was done without his consent. Eventually Spencer felt obliged
to telegraph the Appletons and request that they stop selling the book and destroy the
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plates, charging him with any expense.206 The series of events was reported in the New
York Times among other papers.207 Of course, the coverage excited American interest,
and a pirated reprint of the series of articles appeared soon after.208
The debate started with Spencer’s essay “Religion: A Retrospect and Prospect.”
In this essay, Spencer traced religion forward from primitive ghost‐worship through
more and more complex systems of gods, to the unification of all godlike attributes in
one God. It is absurd, Spencer wrote, to think that development will simply stop at this
point.209 He felt that in advanced societies the concept of God was undergoing “de‐
anthropomorphisation” (a term of Fiske’s) was would continue to do so.210 This meant
doctrinal changes, like jettisoning hell and original sin, but it also meant widening of the
conception of the first cause until it was without limits like personality and intelligence,
inspiring (with the help of science) a sense of wonder in man.211 Spencer argued that
such a conception could develop from the ghost theory because the germ of it was
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there, in the understanding that “the power which manifests itself in consciousness is
but a differently‐conditioned form of the power which manifests itself beyond
consciousness.”212 He ended his essay by calling this force “an Infinite and Eternal
Energy, from which all things proceed.”213 It was a very religious turn of phrase, which
stood out for many writers.
Frederic Harrison disliked the theological phrasing of Spencer’s last words, but
this was hardly his main objection in his rejoinder, “The Ghost of Religion.”214 It was
Spencer’s conception of religion that was the most problematical for Harrison. He
believed that religion had three elements: belief, worship, and influence on conduct.
One could not believe or worship something that could not be known, not could it
inspire changes in behavior.215 As a positivist, Harrison thought a creed focused on
humanity as a whole could provide these things. In “Retrogressive Religion,” Spencer
replied that the Unknowable was hardly nothing, as Harrison implied, and that he had
hinted that it possessed something higher than consciousness.216 Spencer trod on
dangerous ground in this essay, edging the Absolute closer than he ever had towards
the domain of God. As Sydney Eisen puts it, “Spencer, wounded by ridicule for raising
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aloft as an object of reverence a mere emptiness, puffed up the Unknowable with
attributes which brought it dangerously close to the anthropomorphic Deity he had
rejected.”217 As for the religion of humanity, Spencer considered this a transformation of
the ancient worship of the dead, and thus a regression.218 Spencer was harshly critical of
man, both ancient and modern, and in addition found Comte’s instructions on how to
worship humanity the product of an imbalanced mind.219
In “Agnostic Metaphysics” Harrison astutely pointed out that the difference
between the two men was in their concept of religion: for Spencer, it was philosophical,
for Harrison, it was practical.220 Nevertheless, Harrison made some effort to meet
Spencer on his own ground, and explored Spencer’s vagueness about whether the
Absolute created the material world, manifested the material world, or was the material
world.221 Harrison also objected strongly to Spencer’s ghost‐theory of religion, calling
the Descriptive Sociology “a pile of clippings made to order,” and to Spencer’s portrayal
of Comte’s religion of humanity, claiming Spencer had not read Comte.222 These
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accusations upset Spencer, especially the aspersions against the Descriptive Sociology,
on which he had spent so much toil and treasure.223 Spencer’s “Last Words about
Agnosticism and the Religion of Humanity” defended his work and used it to quantify
the prevalence of ghost‐worship.224 He also argued that that he had never said the
Unknowable should be worshipped.225 Spencer seemed to recognize the point Harrison
had made: that a religion is more than just a metaphysical belief system, but must have
applications in real life. Spencer hardly wanted to found a new religion around the
Unknowable, which to him must stir a feeling of awe, not of worshipfulness.
Despite Spencer’s later protestations, religious writers in America took his initial
admissions as a positive sign. The Independent, always interested in Spencer’s religious
ideas, approved of his stress on the failures of humanity, his use of the idea of a
“Creative Power,” and his admission of the limitations of science.226 Another critic felt
the argument showed the emptiness of both positions compared to the gospel, but was
pleased that Spencer continued to recognize the necessity of self‐existent being.227 Even
among religious writers that did not refer to the Spencer‐Harrison debate directly, there
seemed to be a thawing of attitudes towards Spencer. Few were as positive as Henry
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Ward Beecher, who wrote in his book Evolution and Religion that in the future “Herbert
Spencer will be found to have given the world more truth in one lifetime than any other
man that has lived in the schools of philosophy in this world.”228 However, Beecher’s
admiration had its limits; he scarcely referred to Spencer at all in the rest of his book.
Another clerical supporter, Minot Judson Savage, believed Spencer had used science to
do what religion could not: disprove materialism.229
Even Catholics, who in the past had sometimes dismissed Spencer as a problem
for Protestants, had some positive things to say.230 Jesuit Father John J. Ming, in an
impressively clear review of Spencer’s religious ideas, found that Spencer went beyond
agnosticism in framing his own view of religion which assigned a number of positive
properties to the Unknowable, such as existence and an intrinsic relation to the material
world.231 However, Ming concluded that Spencer’s Unknowable was merely indefinite,
not infinite, and had no identity with the Christian God.232 F. S. Chitard was more
enthusiastic. Chitard praised Spencer for his service to religion, and discussed some
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ways in which Spencer’s attacks on Christian dogma—for example, his disdain for
portrayals of God as having emotions and desiring worship—were similar to the ideas of
some Catholic theologians.233 Chitard ended on an optimistic note, writing of Spencer
“we hope and pray that his earnest and manly truthfulness will be rewarded by a still
greater knowledge—the knowledge which surpasses all earthly knowledge and which so
satisfies man's yearnings.”234 Ultimately, Christian writers could not accept an
unknowable God; nevertheless, some felt Spencer journeyed in the direction, but simply
stopped too soon.
Secular newspapers and magazines had a few things to say about the debate as
well. The New York Times considered it strange that though both Spencer and Harrison
had given up what most people considered religion, they were still fighting over the use
of the word. The Times’s critic thought that Spencer’s position suggested a possible
compromise with Christianity, which explained Harrison’s reaction.235 A writer in
Overland Monthly declared the book to be an important work that would be referred to
for years to come. Ultimately this reviewer believed that the religious value of the
Unknowable was a personal issue, but felt that the trend in religion was away from
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intense personal ideas of God and towards Spencer’s position.236 Reviews in secular
sources were generally positive. Those who were less theologically hidebound—or,
some might say, scarcely Christian—found promise in Spencer’s attempts to shake
hands across the aisle. The Open Court (whose subtitle proclaimed it “Devoted to the
Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and the Extension of the Religious
Parliament Idea”) had this to say: “In Herbert Spencer's Retrospect and Prospect are
indices of better times ahead when the evolved social organism and its individual
components will have loftier aims, ideas, and methods.”237
Ecclesiastical Institutions appeared in its entirety in America in 1886. It was a
short book, less than 200 pages.238 A meager work considering it had been three years
since Political Institutions was published, The Chicago Tribune said, but not in the sense
of argument, where Spencer was just as “keen” and “crushing” as ever.239 Spencer
began with a clear statement about institutions: “There can be no true conception of a
structure without a true conception of its function.”240 Spencer’s sociology was above all
practical. To him social arrangements existed because they served the interests of the
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group and/or the individuals participating in them. Religious organizations were no
different; thus, Spencer had to determine what needs they served before he could
explain them. Beginning at the beginning was standard operating procedure with
Spencer, so he started his explanation with a further exploration of his ghost theory of
religion. First, Spencer used anthropological evidence and a few modern accounts of the
deaf to show that untutored man had no innate predisposition to develop religious
ideas.241 As before, Spencer explained their origin by the ghost‐theory. Much of this
explanation was not new; however, Spencer did significantly expand his argument that
the Hebrews’ worship of “Jahveh” was no exception to the rule.242 Christianity, then,
Spencer treated as one religion among many, declaring that he must “part company”
with those who believed otherwise.243
The remainder of the book dealt with specific aspects of religion, from
practitioners such as medicine‐men and priests, to religious organizations and their
hierarchies, to the relation of the church and the state. The most interesting sections
were Spencer’s conception of the ecclesiastical system as a strengthener of social ties
and his discussion of nonconformity. Spencer argued that the community ties based on
sacred rites and places were just the social arrangements typical of funerals writ large.
At a funeral, family gathered, old squabbles were repressed, and wishes of the deceased
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were respected.244 Similarly, communities could form from repeated gathering around
particular sacred locations, such as the burial place of a chief or holy man, where
fighting was prohibited and the injunctions of the ghost or god were reinforced in
rites.245 Spencer felt that this made religion essentially conservative:
…we may say that ecclesiasticism, embodying in its primitive form the rule of the
dead over the living, and sanctifying in its more advanced forms the authority of
the past over the present, has for its function to preserve in force the organized
product of earlier experiences versus the modifying effects of more recent
experiences.246
Far from denying the value of this role, Spencer claimed it was essential, for what
worked in the past was likely to work in the present, barring drastic changes in
conditions.247 Nevertheless, he saw Nonconformity as superior, in the sense that it was
possible only in high states of civilization featuring monotheistic religions, or in isolated
cases like that of Socrates.248 Spencer thought that forms that simply exchanged one
structure of ecclesiastical authority for another were low. The highest type of
nonconformity involved individual judgment on religious questions, which meant
denying religious authority altogether—a type Spencer connected with industrial
societies.249 It is no surprise that Spencer would put free religious judgment at the
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pinnacle of his religious system, given his own religious background, his individualism,
and his dislike for authority.
Ecclesiastical Institutions was another of Spencer’s books that, for various
reasons, did not attract much critical attention. What reviews appeared were generally
short. Partly this was because many of its most important theories were not new, but
elaborations on previous ideas explored in other works. As a reviewer for the Overland
Monthly observed, the book was based on a theory already explained in the first part of
The Principles of Sociology and in “Religious Retrospect and Prospect,” pushed only a
little farther in the present volume.250 Another reason was certainly that one of the
most interesting sections of the book had already been published and discussed. In
addition, some writers were tired of Spencer’s interventions into religious thought, a
task for which many thought him ill‐prepared. In the Dial, John Bascom complained,
The mind of Mr. Spencer, as far as any spiritual insight or sympathy is concerned,
belongs to the most irresponsive and tuneless order. He interprets, not knowing
what he interprets; and destroys, in ignorance of the living things
destroyed....few men by constitution are less fitted to fathom these questions of
faith.251
Likewise, an otherwise poor review in the Universalist Quarterly contained one good
line: “Mr. Spencer's agnosticism is necessitated by his rejection of revelation, and his
assigned reasons therefor are so puerile that if his great name had not been attached to
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this book its contents would receive general condemnation.”252 Neither of these
reviewers felt the need to take Spencer’s ideas seriously.
Not all discussions were short, however. James T. Bixby devoted almost ten
pages to the book in an article in the New Englander (which added the suffix “and Yale
Review” in 1885.)253 To Bixby, Spencer’s great abilities and erudition were for naught in
the realm of religion, because he did not acknowledge the spiritual reality of the power
whose actions he was tracing.254 Nevertheless, he engaged Spencer on his own ground.
He attacked Spencer on the facts, questioning his knowledge of the philological origins
of words and the facts of Egyptian, Chinese, and Indian religion. He also complained that
Spencer took myths and customs from many different places and times and piled them
up in support of his pet theory.255 However, it turned out that Bixby’s own theories
about the origin of religion were not so different from Spencer’s. Bixby contended that
primitive man was aware of his inward self and felt its unity with “the life that circles
within all the forms and masses around us,” just as Spencer suggested a similarity
between inner and outer manifestations of the Unknowable was at the root of religious
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belief.256 Bixby also believed that religion must need some real human need or else it
would lose in the struggle for existence between human institutions, a concept that
echoed Spencer’s ideas about the function of structures.257
An Aging Titan: Spencer’s Late Work
In 1886, Spencer suffered another collapse. This one brought with it a severe
bout of depression. He stopped all writing, even putting a halt to his work on An
Autobiography, which effectively ended with his American visit in 1882. His gloom was
heightened by the death of his longtime champion, Edward Livingston Youmans, in
1887. Spencer had begged Youmans to stop overworking himself for years. Now he was
vindicated, in the worst possible way. His last letter to Youmans, dated on the first of
the year, was filled with melancholy: “Though the day suggests it, it is absurd for me to
wish you, or for you to wish me, a happy New Year. There is not much happiness
remaining in store for either of us.”258 The situation was dire. Yet Spencer recovered
enough life and health to begin work again. Both physical and mental health improved;
at the beginning of 1888 Huxley reported in a letter to Hooker, “Spencer was here an
hour ago as lively as a cricket.”259 Slowly, Spencer began to work on the Synthetic
Philosophy once more.
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Progress was slow, but in 1891 part IV of the ethics, Justice, was published, and
in 1892 and 1893 the two volumes of The Principles of Ethics appeared in America. In
the introduction to the first volume, Spencer reported that he was anxious to complete
the next, which would have sections on negative and positive beneficence. “In its full
scope, the moral system to be set forth unites sternness with kindness; but thus far
attention has been drawn almost wholly to the sternness. Extreme misapprehensions
and gross mis‐statements have hence resulted,” Spencer wrote. However, these
sections, dealing with self‐restraint and positive action for the benefit of others,
comprised less than 100 pages each, while the section on justice itself was over 250
pages long.
The first volume began with “The Data of Ethics,” which had already been
published more than ten years previously. In the next section, “The Inductions of
Ethics,” Spencer wrote that the confusion of thought on morality was part of its
evolution from the incoherent and chaotic to the comprehensive and comprehensible.
Specifically, he noted a conflict between the “ethics of enmity” necessary for dealing
with enemy societies and the “ethics of amity” which fostered cooperation within the
social group.260 After this introduction Spencer dived into a series of chapters dealing
with individual moral issues such as aggression, industry, and obedience. As with much
of Spencer’s sociological writings, these were festooned with evidence from a variety of
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societies, ancient and modern, primitive and advanced. Spencer generally connected
higher moral standards with industrial development. Not only was aggression in forms
like revenge, treachery, and robbery an accompaniment of the militant type;
peacefulness encouraged justice, generosity, and humanity. For Spencer, ideas about
rights could only grow as warfare decreased.261 Spencer thus tied his ideas about ethics
into his political and social ideals. More advanced societies fostered moral values in
individuals that in turn made further social progress possible.
At the end of “The Data of Ethics” Spencer split ethics into categories. The first
division was between behavior towards the self and that towards others; the latter was
further separated into justice, which concerned whether a person reaped the rewards
or consequences of his conduct, and beneficence, which concerned altruistic behavior.
Beneficence was further divided into the negative and positive categories, the first
having to do with refraining from harm, the second with actively helping others.262 For
the remainder of the work Spencer followed these guidelines, starting with a section on
“The Ethics of Individual Life.” Here, as he had often before in both public and private,
he stressed the duty of self‐care, including periods of rest. Life is either a good thing or it
is not, Spencer wrote, and if it is good then those activities which preserve and heighten
life must also be morally approved.263 This is especially true since personal health and
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welfare are foundational to the performance of other moral actions like care of
dependents and positive contribution to society.264 Self‐care, for Spencer, involved a
balance between activity, recreation, and relaxation. Spencer found that the positive
value of “race‐maintenance” through marriage had to be balanced with the loss of
bodily resources that an individual used for reproduction.265 Spencer was indirect in the
best Victorian manner, but what he was really talking about was limiting sex within
marriage (he believed that chastity was essential outside of marriage). In his chapter on
parenthood Spencer discussed population control as another reason to limit the number
of children, noting that even the bloodthirsty tribes of New Guinea “show us a deep
consciousness of the truth that too frequent child‐bearing is injurious to the race.”266
However, Spencer urged his reader not too be too self‐critical about self‐restraint, since
given the current advancement of humanity there was only so much one could do.267
Spencer considered his section on “Justice” of high importance, which was why
he executed and published it first, in case his health did not allow him to finish the
rest.268 He began with “animal‐ethics,” since, if ethics is about conduct and its helpful or
detrimental effect on self or others, ethics must apply to animals as well as people.269

264

PE, 1:481‐483.

265

PE, 1:542‐543.

266

PE, 1:553.

267

PE, 1:561.

268

PE, 2:ix.

269

PE, 2:3‐4.

425
Again, Spencer judged conduct based on its results, and not based on the intention
behind it. For animals he determined that survival of a species required that each gained
or suffered according to conduct, which included conduct towards others in gregarious
animals.270 Thus he found a biological source for this familiar rule, which he applied
equally to human beings. Among men, Spencer found that justice could be attained in
two ways: by the artificial distribution of rewards to the meritorious, typical of military
societies, and by the natural distribution characteristic of the industrial type.271 Natural
distribution implied the law of equal freedom, unchanged since Social Statics, which
enjoined all from interfering with another’s right to do as he pleased and face the
consequences, good or bad.272 Most of the section on justice concerned itself with
deductions from these principles. Spencer candidly noted in his preface that the
evolutionary view had not led him to differ markedly with common sense principles, and
it showed here.273 The rights Spencer enumerated are familiar ones: freedom of
movement, exchange, belief, speech, and the right to possess property. Much of this
was familiar from Social Statics. Spencer’s conclusions about the rights of women had
changed, however. He continued to defend certain rights for women, such as choice of
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profession, but he now linked political rights with capability for military service, arguing
that basic fairness required men to be rewarded for the risk of bodily harm they ran.274
The final sections of ethics dealt with positive and negative beneficence. No
drastic changes to Spencer’s opinions had occurred, though further space allowed him
to develop his ideas in more detail. Under the heading of negative beneficence, Spencer
called for self‐restraint when it came to things like competition, displays of ability,
praise, and blame. The result was that sometimes people should refrain from exercising
their rights to the fullest extent allowed.275 The purpose of negative beneficence was to
avoid hurting others when possible, in order to promote the health of society and the
species.276 Spencer looked for positive beneficence in individual acts towards family, the
sick, and those in danger, as well as general acts that benefited society. As for aid to the
loafer and the weakling, Spencer felt private charity was beneficial to the giver as well as
the received, but counseled restraint here too. He wrote,
If left to operate in all its sternest, the principle of the survival of the fittest,
which, as ethically considered, we have seen to imply that each individual shall
be left to experience the effects of his own nature and consequent conduct,
would quickly clear away the degraded. But it is impracticable with our present
sentiments to let it operate in all its sternest. No serious evil would result from
relaxing its operation, if the degraded were to leave no progeny. A shortsighted
beneficence might be allowed to save them from suffering, were a longsighted
beneficence assured that there would be born no more such. But how can it be
thus assured? If, either by public action or by private action, aid were given to
the feeble, the unhealthy, the deformed, the stupid, on condition that they did
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not marry, the result would manifestly be a great increase of illegitimacy; which,
implying a still more unfavorable nurture of children, would result in still worse
men and women. If instead of a “submerged tenth” there existed only a
submerged fiftieth, it might be possible to deal with it effectually by private
industrial institutions, or some kindred appliances. But the mass of effete
humanity to be dealt with is so large as to make one despair: the problem seems
insoluble.277
Perhaps Spencer would have agreed with the eugenicists, that sterilization was a
solution to the problem he pondered. Then again, the idea of state‐supported, forced
interference with the reproductive capacities would probably have horrified him.
Many of the reactions to Spencer’s statement on ethics came early, after the
publication of Justice as a stand‐alone volume. Most reviewers were complimentary of
Spencer’s abilities and of the book as a whole, but found fault with the details. An
anonymous reviewer in the Social Economist, a new magazine founded by politico‐
economic theorist George Gunton, wrote
Any work by Mr. Spencer is sure of wide and laudatory notice, and "Justice," his
latest work, has been received with a chorus of plaudits calculated to make any
author proud. The praise has been rather indiscriminate, as indeed it usually is
when a man writes on a subject relating to morals and finds that morality is a
good thing . . .278
Critics noticed that many of Spencer’s findings were quite similar to those in Social
Statics. For example, the reviewer in the Critic observed that Spencer’s views on
government were well known and his latest volume did not add anything to them.279
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Lewis G. Janes, who wrote several articles on Spencer’s ethics and sociology in the early
1890s, suggested that Justice was supposed to replace Social Statics.280 Spencer clearly
did not think so, as he developed a revised and abridged version of the latter which the
Appletons combined with The Man Versus the State and published in 1892. A number of
critics, including Janes, felt that Spencer was becoming more conservative and more
aware of the limitations of man’s ability to develop ideal social institutions.281
Some of the criticisms of The Data of Ethics were repeated in reviews of Justice
as well. One major sticking point with many writers was Spencer’s derivation of moral
feelings from the experiences of ancestors, including animals and primitive man. A
reviewer in the Literary World complained that Spencer viewed animal behavior through
his knowledge of man, thus imagining humanlike motivations where none existed.282
Similarly, J. H. Hyslop, a Colombia College professor who wrote several reviews of
Spencer’s ethical system for The Andover Review, thought that it was the distinctions
between human justice and animal justice that needed an explanation, not the
elements that were similar. Hyslop admitted that Spencer was probably right about the
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development of justice, but noted that Spencer also tried to deduce morals from
general principles, which two enterprises did not necessarily align.283
Some critics tried to interject their own systems into the discussion. In the Dial,
John Bascom argued that Spencer’s system was too narrow. He used the metaphor of a
honeycomb: each individual in Spencer’s system is in a cell, bounded by cells of equal
size that represent the equal freedoms of others. This view was too narrow to
encompass cooperation, Bascom thought, and likened society to a body, as St. John
described it.284 This was ironic given the organic analogy Spencer used elsewhere. An
even more elaborate theory was developed by the anonymous critic in the Social
Economist. He argued that justice was a social matter, “rooted in the exchange of
economic equivalents,” but, somewhat inconsistently, that a “great race” would make
sure that each gets whatever additional benefits others can provide, and that each
suffers to a minimum degree from his limitations.285
The complete volumes of The Principles of Ethics, published in 1892 and 1893,
roused less interest. Critics felt that the truly interesting parts of Spencer’s ethics had
already been published.286 Most of the remainder was made up of concrete moral
guidelines about things like temperance and flattery. The Chicago Tribune found
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Spencer’s ethics similar to the “Golden Rule of Christ,” while others simply talked of
“platitudes.”287 Several critics worried that Spencer’s volumes on ethics would mislead
those who failed to read him closely. In the Dial, a reviewer worried that the advantages
of Spencer’s scientific truths did not outweigh “the distinctly anti‐ethical associations
that they necessarily convey to the majority of readers.”288 J. H. Hyslop felt most readers
would interpret Spencer’s books as advocating the relativity of morality; they would not
realize that Spencer corrected this by referring to man’s inner feelings as a guide.289
Such reviews were not negative, per se, just concerned about the book’s effect on the
average reader.
Those who wrote on Spencer in the 1890s increasingly felt that, now that his
system was nearly complete, final judgment must await the passage of time. As one
critic put it,
The Synthetic Philosophy is undeniably the popular philosophy of the day, but
more than one day before this has had its philosophy fully as popular. The
gradual subsidence of the Synthetic Philosophy into its proper place in the
history of philosophy is now going on, and it is highly desirable that neither
eulogy nor detraction of Mr. Spencer himself should interfere with a just
settlement.290
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However, Spencer did not put the last stone in place until 1896, when he finished
volume three of The Principles of Sociology. This contained Ecclesiastical Institutions and
two new sections, one on the professions and one on industrial institutions. In the
former, Spencer discussed occupations as varied as medicine, music, acting, history, law,
and teaching. He found that professions generally had roots in the political and
ecclesiastical system, especially the latter, since priests were a leisure class supplied by
society at large, and thus with time and energy to devote to intellectual work and art.291
As for industry, Spencer found that advances were accelerating while environmental
obstacles fell away at a similar rate.292 However, Spencer spent little time discussing
technology, and much discussing the various ways labor has been organized, by systems
of production, regulation by authority figures, and ultimately, by free contract.
Spencer felt that the age of freedom, at its high point at the middle of the
century, was ebbing away in the West before a rising tide of state interference which
was leading inevitably to regimented socialism.293 Nevertheless, he still held out hope
for a more distant future. Spencer believed that regression would end either in revolt or
in conquest by superior people “who have not been emasculated by fostering their
feebles.”294 He imagined a future federation of the most civilized nations could put an
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end to wars, leading to greater social advance and the ultimate appearance of men of
the highest type.295 Despite his pessimism and his frustration with his countrymen,
Spencer did not give up his utopian dreams altogether.
Spencer’s secretary Walter Troughton described the scene as the seventy‐six
year old Spencer dictated the last word of the Synthetic Philosophy:
Rising slowly from his seat in the study at 64, Avenue Road, his face beaming
with joy, he extended his hand across the table, and we shook hands on the
auspicious event. “I have finished the task I have lived for” was all he said, and
then resumed his seat. The elation was only momentary and his features quickly
resumed their customary composure.296
Congratulations came from all over the world. Notices appeared in the papers, though it
was generally not front page news. Compliments were duly paid. “It is an achievement
probably without a parallel in English philosophical writing,” the Chicago Tribune
observed.297 A few Christian periodicals, reporting the news, made one last effort to
bring Spencer into the fold. This usually took the form of musing on the development of
Spencer’s religious beliefs, with quotations from “Religion: Retrospect and Prospect”
and other sources.298 Spencer remained a puzzle for religious thinkers. His work
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contained hints of religious feeling yet his sentiments about Christianity were no less
clear in the last volume of the Synthetic Philosophy than in the first.
Herbert Spencer lived for another seven years after completing his life’s work.
He continued to write, but mostly this meant making final revisions and penning
responses to criticisms, letters to the editor, and other short pieces of miscellaneous
material. He remained physically healthy until his last year, when several serious
episodes kept him in bed for long stretches of time. Spencer died in his bed early in the
morning of December 8, 1903. Condolence letters and telegrams poured in from all
corners of the globe.299 An Indian admirer, Shyamaji Krishnavarma, donated a thousand
pounds to Oxford to found a lectureship in his honor. The first lecture was given in 1905
by Frederic Harrison, Spencer’s old sparring partner of twenty years before.300 There
was an unsuccessful campaign to inter Spencer in Westminster Abbey, something he
would have abhorred.301 Spencer’s cremated remains were deposited in a sarcophagus
in Highgate Cemetery. As per his instructions, the stone bears only his name, his birth
date and the date of his death, and his age.302
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CONCLUSION
A MAN FOR HIS TIME
He is not dead; his mighty thought still lives,
And shall live through the ages yet to come,
Our tongues most eloquent seem strangely dumb
To tell what he to human knowledge gives.
‐‐from “Herbert Spencer,” by Howell S. England.1

News of Herbert Spencer’s death prompted an outpouring of reminiscences and
comments. Newspapers published long articles in tribute to a man many called the “last
of the great thinkers of the Victorian age.”2 The New York Times, which followed
Spencer’s illness, reported on the funeral arrangements, cremation, and internment.3
Obituary articles in the press typically contained a short biography, a description of
Spencer’s work, and a judgment, usually positive yet vague. The Chicago Tribune, for
example, judged the Synthetic Philosophy “one of the mightiest monuments that ever
pure intellect has raised.”4 Scientific American declared that the world was indebted to
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Spencer for overturning old traditions and prejudices.5 As for reminiscences, one of the
most important came from Spencer’s onetime assistant William Henry Hudson. Hudson
judged the Synthetic Philosophy unmatched in its display of sustained intellectual force,
and believed its influence deep and far‐reaching. His portrayal of Spencer touched on
both the negative and positive sides of his personality: his warmth towards friends, his
coolness towards strangers, his punctilious sense of justice, his nervous irritability, and
above all his courage in pushing his great work forward in the face of all obstacles.6
Religious papers, many of which had been among Spencer’s greatest foes,
expressed mixed feelings. Often enough, there was some regret that Spencer had never
manifested deep religious sentiments or given credence to the Christian faith. “That
Herbert Spencer knew so much and yet remained so ignorant of many necessary facts,
will always remain a matter for profound regret on the part of his discriminating
admirers,” one writer reflected.7 Many religious writers felt that Spencer simply did not
look in the right places for answers. If he had he would have come to a different
conclusion about God and immortality.8 On the other hand, some pointed out that
Spencer was a religious‐minded man in his own way, though the faith that satisfied him
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was not enough for most.9 One critic wrote that Spencer’s influence had harmed
religion for the most part, but the religious elements in his thought had led other men,
such as John Fiske, to go even farther towards deism.10 For the most part, religious
writers balanced appreciation for what Spencer had accomplished in the scientific realm
with dissatisfaction about his metaphysics.
As the release of the last volume of The Synthetic Philosophy had been,
Spencer’s death was the occasion for some general summing up of his career and
legacy. Modern writers on Spencer, who have the benefit of hindsight, often argue that
Spencer’s reputation was already fading by the time of his death. As J. D. Y. Peel puts it,
Posterity is cruelest to those who sum up for their contemporaries in an all‐
embracing synthesis the accumulated knowledge of their age. This was what
Spencer did for the Victorians. So of all the great Victorian sages, Spencer lost his
repute soonest . . . . When he died in 1903 he was already a figure of the past
whose synthesis of knowledge was not so much disproved as needed no
longer.11
However, it was not true, as Michael Taylor suggests, that Spencer’s reputation followed
him to the grave.12 In America, his books continued to be widely read. Evidence comes
from the public library of Muncie, Indiana, the subject of Robert and Helen Lynd’s classic
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study Middletown.13 During the period from 1891 to 1902 Spencer’s books were
checked out 97 times by 74 different patrons. For comparison, readers borrowed works
by Darwin 64 times in the same period. The book of Spencer’s that was taken out the
most, interestingly, was The Principles of Psychology. Unfortunately, records after 1902
are not available, but it is doubtful that readership in Muncie plummeted abruptly after
his death.14
Debating Spencer’s Legacy
Comments at the time of his death show that the longevity of Spencer’s
reputation was still an open question to his contemporaries. Some suggested that more
time was needed to assess the impact of Spencer’s work—as a writer in Zion’s Herald
said, Spencer’s admirers should postpone wholesale adoption of his philosophy until
both science and metaphysics were more “ripe” for the kind of blending he
attempted.15 Others suggested one or another aspect of Spencer’s system would remain
influential, if not the whole. In the same magazine, the Rev. Charles Dwight judged that
Spencer never advanced much beyond a civil engineer’s idea of the universe. A weak
metaphysical foundation caused Spencer’s system to lose influence, Dwight thought,
but added that he succeeded in coordinating thought and systematizing previously
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inchoate areas of knowledge.16 Mary Whiton Calkins, a philosophy and psychology
professor as Wellesley College, found Spencer’s ethics and sociology of lasting value.
She found Spencer’s strength was that he traced the growth of moral ideas and then
applied his findings rigorously to society.17 These and other writers accepted certain
aspect of Spencer’s system without feeling the necessity to embrace the whole.
Some writers felt otherwise, and were ready to make a judgment on Spencer’s
thought as a whole. “Herbert Spencer had outlived both his fame and his influence,”
wrote one, then immediately contradicted himself by noting the large changes in
religious conceptions due to Spencer.18 The Rev. James J. Fox, writing in The Catholic
World, argued that the many praises of Spencer’s work that appeared after his death
recognized Spencer’s broad influence but either explicitly or implicitly accepted that his
philosophical system was losing its relevance.19 Such judgments usually came from
religious men, while Spencer’s adherents typically thought of themselves as men of
science. Some put the distinction in sharp terms. A writer in the Medical News thought a
reaction against Spencer was rising, and declared “the fate of science, and with it
possibly the fate of modern civilization, may depend more than we perceive on the
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courage with which scientific men adhere to the principles of Spencer.”20 For some,
Spencer’s system was still a worthy defense of scientific truth against dogma.
At the time of Spencer’s death, no consensus existed about the direction in
which Spencer’s legacy might lie, or whether it would exist at all. Two practitioners of
the human sciences in which Spencer took such a large hand in organizing and
systematizing can be allowed to have the last word here. Professor of psychology
William James, often a critic, suggested that Spencer’s influence was wide and
immediate rather than deep and distant. “Thousands of readers who are not technical
students know him in the original; and to such readers he has given . . . a simple,
sublime, and novel system of the world,” James wrote.21 But James found Spencer’s
lasting contributions harder to pin down. His scientific work was already becoming
obsolete, but James predicted that The Data of Ethics would continue to be read, along
with the political writings, which appealed to an “antique spirit of English individualism”
that would continue as a factor in human thought whatever developments in the
sciences might occur.22
Franklin H. Giddings, professor of sociology at Columbia University, was more
impressed by Spencer than James. “There is no surer mark of human greatness than the
inability of a great man’s contemporaries to define his genius and to say wherein his
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supremacy consists,” Giddings wrote.23 Giddings believed that the doctrine of evolution
had become so widely believed and internalized that even specialists used it in their
work without realizing its origin in Spencer.24 He felt that Spencer’s sociological work,
seen through the lens of First Principles and The Principles of Psychology, was the
highest of Spencer’s productions, demonstrating as it did that an ideal type of liberalism
must win out over authoritarian centralization if the highest peaks of the evolutionary
process were to be reached.25 Though James and Giddings differed somewhat in their
assessment of what in Spencer’s system would last, they agreed about the breadth of
his impact. Spencer’s name might not be uttered so much in the future, but the
intellectual and theological world would never be the same thanks to his works.
Ironically, Spencer’s name continued to be uttered after the body of work was
forgotten, because many American parents named their children after the great
philosopher. These men bore Spencer’s name into the twentieth century. Some were
well known in the field of science, such as Herbert Spencer Jennings, a zoologist,
geneticist, and eugenicist; Herbert Spencer Jennings, creator of the “Golden Guide”
series of nature books; and Herbert Spencer Gasser, who won the Nobel Prize in 1944
for his work on the nervous system. Others were more obscure: Herbert Spencer

23

Franklin H. Giddings, “The Greatness of Herbert Spencer,” Independent 55, no. 2872 (Dec. 17, 1903),

2959.
24

Ibid., 2960.

25

Ibid., 2962.

441
Hadley, who prosecuted Standard Oil in Missouri; Herbert Spencer Simpson, author of
Thoughts Along the Way (1955), Herbert Spencer Davis, who studied diseases in fish,
and myriad unheralded men like H. S. Barber, Preston, Ratner, Salsibury, and on and on.
It is a tribute to the profound impact Spencer had on many of his readers that some
chose to name their children after him. The philosopher was honored in America like no
place else in the world.
Spencer’s Star Falls
Late in 1915, as the nations of Europe strained their industrial muscles to
support warfare on an unprecedented scale, a series of articles on Spencer’s collection
of essays The Man versus the State began appearing in Forum magazine. Obviously,
some felt that Spencer’s political ideas were still relevant—and this included important
Americans like Elihu Root, Henry Cabot Lodge, Charles Eliot, and William Howard Taft.
While the ostensible subject was Spencer’s views on government, several of the authors
veered from the path to discuss his views on war. Many of the writers approved of
Spencer’s stance on military aggression, including Taft.26 Lodge among others identified
modern Germany with Spencer’s description of the militant type of society.27 David
Jayne Hill argued that the militant and industrial types could not be clearly
distinguished—while the militant governments abroad had the greatest control of their
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industries, America and other industrial states were dealing with the militant labor
forces within.28 Perhaps the most prophetic comment came from Eliot. He saw the war
as a test of whether spontaneous cooperation or centralized control was the more
efficient social system. Eliot himself chose the “side of freedom.”29
Yet by 1933 it was possible for historian Crane Brinton to ask “who now reads
Spencer?”30 Sociologist Talcott Parsons quoted Brinton in his 1937 book The Structure of
Social Action, and continued “we must agree with the verdict. Spencer is dead.”31 In
1950 historian Edward S. Corwin wrote “Spencer’s influence is today extinct. No
intellectually respectable person would wish to be caught in the company of the
‘synthetic philosophy.’”32 While these writers were clearly exaggerating for dramatic
effect, it remains true that Spencer was read by a smaller and smaller group of people
each year. J. D. Y. Peel has found, based on Robert Perrin’s bibliography, that a quarter
of all posthumous references to Spencer come from 1903‐1912; thereafter, sharp
decline leads to a nadir in the 1940s.33 What was the reason for this? Brinton believed
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that thought had simply evolved beyond Spencer. Parsons blamed suspicion of
Spencer’s ideas about progress, the industrial future of society, and the origins of
science and religion in primitive man.34 Corwin felt that the quasi‐religious aspect of
Spencer’s system made Darwinism palatable; ultimately, Darwin got the credit, not
Spencer.35
In fact, a number of factors combined to encourage Spencer’s decline. One
obvious point is that, because of his lack of academic position and his increasing
reclusiveness, Spencer had no students. Most of his disciples were his own age or close
to it; he outlived both Youmans and Fiske, for example. This is not to say that he did not
influence men who were important in their fields. In psychiatry, for example,
neurologist John Hughlings‐Jackson was open about his debts to Spencer; other possible
connections include Ivan Pavlov and B. F. Skinner.36 William James, too, was
influenced—mostly through opposition, though his idea of the “stream of
consciousness” may have descended from a similar metaphor in First Principles.37 In
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biology, Spencer influenced contemporaries like Edward Drinker Cope and E. G. Conklin,
and later figures like geneticist Sewell Wright and sociobiologist E. O. Wilson.38 In
sociology Spencer has been linked to Émile Durkheim, and Americans William Graham
Sumner and Lester Frank Ward developed their sociological ideas in response to
Spencer’s.39 Progressivism in American education has been attributed to Spencer’s
influence by one writer.40 Lawrence Cremin’s suggestion is more reasonable: that
Spencer’s Education acted as an accelerant on tendencies already developing in
American educational thought.41 However, Spencer’s impact on these thinkers and
movements was not great enough to maintain his own reputation. In great measure this
was because his influence was wide, but diffuse. In no one particular field was he
acknowledged as a pathbreaker.
As one writer put it shortly after Spencer’s death, “the present always looks
forward to the future with confidence, but it is to be doubted if it will give birth to minds
that will take all knowledge for their province. That was the heritage of the past . . . .
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This is the day of specialization.”42 During Spencer’s lifetime, science changed from an
avocation to a profession. The shift is perhaps best seen by comparing Charles Darwin
(1809‐1882) and Thomas Henry Huxley (1825‐1895). Darwin, the scion of a wealthy
family, received a classical education. An important part of his biological training took
place while he was the gentleman companion to the captain of the HMS Beagle. Huxley,
like Spencer, was the son of a school‐teacher and largely self‐taught. He worked as the
assistant surgeon during his training voyage on the HMS Rattlesnake. Thanks to his
position, Darwin was able to practice science at his leisure, while Huxley struggled to
make science his profession, teaching university classes and occupying various positions
in Britain’s scientific societies. Needless to say, the path of science was in a direction
away from Darwin and towards Huxley, and part of the change was the growth of
greater and greater specialization among professional scientists, whose employment
depended on small and specific contributions to the edifice of human knowledge.
Spencer, with his grand generalizations and audacious theories, was out of place even
during his lifetime.
Another factor in the demise of Spencer’s reputation was the rejection of some
of his key theories by the scientific community. The most serious case was the
successful case against Lamarckism made by August Weisman and others, confirmed by
the rediscovery of the work of Gregor Mendel. Much of Spencer’s system depended on
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the inheritance of acquired characteristics.43 It went beyond his biology; in his
psychology he put great stress on the extent to which the experiences of forebears
contributed to modern human thought patterns. This then affected his sociology,
because it suggested that human beings readily became adapted to their particular
social conditions over time. Strict Darwinism on the other hand, denied that learned
behavior could be passed on to children as instinct. This meant that mental evolution
must be much slower than Spencer anticipated. Paradoxically, it also undermined
Spencer’s reservations about rapid social change. If mental evolution was so slow, then
it could no longer account for most of the adaptation to changing social conditions that
was constantly going on. A great deal of social conduct that Spencer considered “hard
wired” into the brain was obviously learned behavior, which could be unlearned, or
learned differently. However, it is possible to overestimate such difficulties to Spencer’s
system. His contemporaries generally did not recognize the centrality of his Lamarckian
beliefs. Furthermore, Spencer himself was not consistent on the matter. Much of his
social Darwinism was presaged purely on natural selection; there was little sense that
children of bad parents could be anything but bad.
Thus, Spencer’s science was unlikely to stand the test of time. What of his
politics and ethics? Here the largest barrier lay not with Spencer’s ideas, but with their
applicability to changing American conditions. Even if the effect was more spiritual than
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real, the closing of the American frontier meant less scope for rugged individualism and
personal enterprise.44 The new environment to which Americans had to adjust was
increasingly urban, and the “American race” was becoming more polyglot.
Corporatization, too, reduced the attractiveness of a doctrine of individualism. As
companies began to oversee marketing and distribution of their products as well as
production, more and more Americans who were once independent businessmen
became managers at large companies. The growth of corporate bureaucracy made
individual communities less autonomous and the social order more homogenous.45
Widespread loss of faith in the powers of individual communities to solve the large
social problems led to large, national reform movements. Populism, despite its calls for
nationalization of railroads, telegraphs and telephones maintained some individualist
elements, such as the call for the resolution of problems through voluntary cooperation
among producers. Progressivism, with its “search for order” through centralized,
government reform, was something different.46 For the Progressives, human
improvement came through regulation and management, not competition and struggle.
For those who concerned themselves with the biological improvement of the human
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race, concern about the heritability of poverty and inferiority was expressed in eugenic
rather than Darwinistic terms. To eugenicists, letting nature run its course was not
effective; the state must interfere to control the breeding of undesirables.
Hofstadter’s portrayal of Spencer as an arch‐conservative social Darwinist
resurrected him. Social Darwinism in American Thought ensured Spencer’s place in the
history books, but only as a reactionary ghoul haunting a Gilded Age now seen as an era
of unrestricted laissez‐faire capitalism. This has made it difficult for scholars to take him
seriously as an intellectual. Historians tempted to examine Spencer’s work directly are
likely to balk at the length and density of his books. Furthermore, no single volume of
Spencer’s encapsulates all of his thought or even provides a good starting place. First
Principles comes closest to performing this function, but also happens to be the book of
Spencer’s that has aged the least well. The theological issues it raised are no longer
pertinent, and its version of science is too a priori and dogmatic to interest the modern
reader. Spencer’s sociology that has attracted the most modern commentary, and this is
spread out over three volumes of the Synthetic Philosophy and The Study of Sociology. It
is no wonder that so few historians have any knowledge of Spencer beyond “the survival
of the fittest.”
The winds may be shifting, however. A growing number of books on Spencer
have appeared since the turn of the twenty‐first century. Major studies by Mark Francis,
Alberto Mingardi, John Offer, and Michael Taylor offer new insights into Spencer’s life
and thought, while a recent collection of essays discusses Spencer’s legacy in a number
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of academic fields. I hope to add a new, American perspective to this body of work.
Though I do not argue Spencer’s relevance to the thought of today, unlike some of the
sociologists who have studied him, I believe he had a great historical impact, especially
in America.47 As I have argued, this significance had little to do with any appeal his
Darwinistic social views might have had to strivers in an individualistic, competitive
social environment. His influence was, instead, theological, evolutionary, and
inspirational.
Spencer’s impact on theology is ironic because it was, at least initially,
unintentional. His section on the Unknowable was supposed to save him from charges
of materialism. Spencer conceived it as a mere prologue to the rest of the Synthetic
Philosophy whose purpose was to delimit the field of investigation. However, the fact
that Spencer responded to accusations of materialism, sometimes vociferously, shows
that he cared about religious issues. His essay “Religion: Retrospect and Prospect” and
the debate it ignited returned Spencer to the center of theological controversy, to the
extent he had ever left in the first place. A large portion of the ink that was spilled over
Spencer’s ideas fueled the pens of churchmen. While a few tried to find accommodate
with Spencer’s doctrines, most took an opposing position, resulting in a long series of
rejoinders, none of which quite seemed enough to slay the Spencerian beast. Religious
writers did not so much defeat Spencer as gradually lose interest in the type of abstract,
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scholastic theology that made unconditioned, absolute infinity God’s most important
attribute. The rise of fundamentalism, with its emphasis on the concrete lessons of the
Bible, had a large hand in this change.
Spencer’s effect on the evolutionary debate is hard to understate. Biologists
might focus primarily on Darwin, but to the public at large “evolution” was often
understood in its Spencerian sense as a universal process, whose consequences were
not just confined to the origin of life, but included ideas about the mind, society, and
morality. This expansion of the evolutionary theory had a paradoxical effect. On the one
hand, it raised the stakes, for the truth of evolution now impacted ideas about human
volition and purpose. On the other hand, because Spencer left some room for theism,
his theories sometimes seemed less dangerous than Darwin’s. Natural selection was, at
heart, a theory that random chance governed the universe. Spencer’s universe, on the
other hand, moved in a positive direction, as animals, including man, continually
adjusted to more perfectly fit their environments, in the process gradually eliminating
pain, disease, and death.
It was this inspirational side of Spencer’s work, more than any other, which
attracted Americans to his system. They were more interested in the optimistic,
progressive, ethically oriented aspects of social evolution than in the pessimism of
laissez‐faire and the survival of the fittest. Spencer was popular with Americans because
he proposed a new basis for social and ethical development that rested on the
rationality of scientific knowledge and promised a grand and glorious future. For those
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who had lost faith in traditional Christian religion, Spencer offered a new belief system
that stressed both personal freedom and personal responsibility, and that offered ideals
of conduct based on natural law. His modern ideas about education, his willingness to
allot a bailiwick to the spiritual realm, and his belief in ultimate progress gained him
more followers than a dour and heartless view of life as a struggle for existence ever
could have.
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